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Abstract
This thesis contains three chapters discussing different aspects of financial markets.
The first chapter studies the impact of learning information about future non-fundamental
shocks on stock price dynamics and provides a new insight into how rational speculators can
cause inefficiency and volatility to stock markets during periods of information technology
advancement. I construct an infinite-period competitive market model and analyze how an
increase in non-fundamental signal precision affects trading strategy of rational investors, price
formation, and efficiency. Contradicting to traditional rational speculative theory, I found that
higher non-fundamental signal precision can increase stock return volatility, increase price
sensitivity to both current and future non-fundamental shocks, and decrease price informa-
tiveness. Moreover, even though investors have better information about future stock prices,
they can predict stock returns less accurately. This is because the investors expect that their
future counterparts will also trade more aggressively on new non-fundamental information
that arrives in the future, causing future stock prices to be endogenously more volatile to new
non-fundamental shocks which are unpredictable to the investors at the present.
The second chapter develops a game-theoretic dynamic model to study strategic dealer
choice of buy-side investors in over-the-counter (OTC) secondary asset markets and provides
a new theory of why periphery dealers, despite locating at inferior positions in OTC dealer
network, can survive and co-exist with core dealers. My theory is based on a premise that
buy-side investors form a non-binding long-term relationship with core dealers to obtain costly
liquidity in bad periods. The main finding is that periphery dealers can help investors with
infrequent liquidity needs, those who cannot form the relationship with core dealers directly due
to commitment problem, successfully obtain costly liquidity in bad periods. By connecting with
several investors and forming relationship with a core dealer on their behalf, periphery dealer
will have enough power to pressure the core dealer to commit to the relationship. Therefore,
investors with infrequent liquidity needs will trade with periphery dealers to obtain the benefit of
long-term relationship, granting market power to periphery dealers to co-exist with core dealers.
The third chapter develops a game-theoretic model to study strategic formation of financial
network. In the model, a finite number of risk-averse agents who invest in risky projects can issue
and trade forward contracts (i.e. assets) to obtain fractions of investment return of other agents.
All trades are bilateral, each involving two parties with trading relationship privately bargaining
8
on asset price and quantity. The main objective is to examine how structural properties of trading
network determine trading decision of the agents and equilibrium asset allocation. To this
end, I use the concept of line graph transformation to identify network of asset flows and map
positions of trading links onto the equilibrium outcome. The main insight is that equilibrium
asset allocation corresponds to a generalized Bonacich centrality of the network of asset flows.
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Chapter 1
A Hidden Curse of Non-fundamental
Information in Stock Markets
1.1 Introduction
In the past years, rapid rise of information technology has shifted competition and profitability
nature of financial markets towards information processing capability. Nowadays, all market
participants can store and analyze financial data more efficiently than ever before. However,
there is widespread debate on how this may cause inefficiency due to shifting nature of informa-
tion processing towards non-fundamental information, the information about temporary price
movement unrelated to the fundamentals. A recent empirical literature has found that stock
price informativeness has been declining over time (Farboodi et al (2017)).1 We aim to shed
light on this issue by studying the impact of learning non-fundamental information toward price
efficiency and implications of information technology growth in stock markets.
This paper focuses on future noise information – the information about temporary future
price deviation from the fundamentals. Based on traditional rational speculative theory (Fried-
man (1953)), learning more information about future non-fundamental shocks reduces asset
volatility while having ambiguous effect on price informativeness. Intuitively, when speculators
are more informed about future prices, they will buy more assets when asset price is low (and
vice versa). Therefore, asset price becomes less sensitive to current non-fundamental shock,
resulting in lower asset volatility and possible improvement on price efficiency. However, this
argument assumes that speculative return is exogenous which might be misleading for stock
markets, because future stock price dynamics depend on trading decision of future investors who
can also learn more non-fundamental information. We contribute to the literature by revisiting
1Farboodi et al (2017) found that price informativeness of all publicly traded firms in the US has declined. When
considering subsamples of S&P500 firms VS other public firms, price informativeness of S&P500 firms has been
increasing while that of other listed firms has been decreasing. The analysis suggested that the increase in price
informativeness of S&P500 firms can be explained by a change in size composition of S&P500 firms.
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this issue in an infinite-period dynamic setting, in which asset return depends on trading strate-
gies of future investors, and examine the impact of a permanent increase in non-fundamental
signal precision on price formation, volatility, and efficiency.
We develop an infinite-period competitive market model based on Farboodi and Veldkamp
(2018). There is a long-lived divisible risky asset (i.e. stock) which is a lifetime claim of
stochastic dividends that follow AR(1) process. In every period, a new generation of short-lived
investors is born and enters the market. Each cohort contains a unit continuum of rational
risk-averse investors who face an idiosyncratic non-tradable endowment shock and live for one
period. Prior to trading, they receive noisy private signals about dividend shock (i.e fundamental
shock) and next-period aggregate endowment shock (i.e future non-fundamental shock). At the
end of each period, the dividend is publicly observable and paid out to all investors. We follow
the notion of competitive rational expectation equilibrium and characterize the most informative
stationary equilibrium.
Our main finding is that, contradicting to classical rational speculative theory, an increase
in non-fundamental signal precision can increase asset return volatility and reduce price in-
formativeness. Also, asset price becomes more responsive to both current and future non-
fundamental shocks. The intuition is as follows. Consistent with the rational speculative theory,
better non-fundamental information partly reduces investment risk which stimulates trade and
moves the price to the right direction. However, there is a hidden adverse dynamic effect
from an endogenous change in trading strategies of future investors. When the quality of
non-fundamental information improves, future investors will also trade more assets based on
future non-fundamental information, causing future prices to be endogenously more volatile to
non-fundamental shock of further periods. Unfortunately, the investors cannot learn the future
non-fundamental information that their future counterparts can learn. As a result, future asset
price becomes endogenously harder to predict for the investors even though they have more
financial information. This higher future non-fundamental information risk feeds back into
trading decision of the investors, resulting in higher asset volatility, higher price sensitivity to
non-fundamental shocks, and lower price informativeness.
In addition, we found that price efficiency when investors do not have non-fundamental
information can be optimal (i.e. maximum price informativeness with minimum price sensitivity
to both non-fundamental shocks) if two conditions are met: 1) the investors have accurate private
fundamental signals and 2) discount factor approaches one. From the model, price efficiency
can increase when non-fundamental information quality improves due to two reasons. First, the
benefit of more financial information starts dominating the adverse dynamic feedback effect.
Second, when the investors trade more stocks based on non-fundamental information, past
stock prices are more informative about current non-fundamental shock, helping the investors
extract fundamental information from current stock price more accurately. Consequently, price
efficiency when the investors have good non-fundamental signals can improve from the level
which the investors have no non-fundamental signals. However, if the investors already have
perfect fundamental signal, they will use the information from past prices to extract only non-
fundamental information from the current price. Also, when discount factor is high, the future
noise information risk will cause large adverse impact toward the investors, resulting in no
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efficiency improvement from learning non-fundamental information.
To study the implications of non-fundamental information production on information tech-
nology growth, we introduce endogenous information acquisition to the model. Prior to trading,
investors strategically choose precisions of their fundamental and non-fundamental private
signals subject to an information technology constraint, a constraint which requires the sum
of acquired signal precisions to not exceed a value which we called information-processing
capacity. We examine how an increase in the processing capacity which permits the investors to
obtain higher quality of financial information will affect equilibrium information choice of the
investors and stock price informativeness.
Provided that 1) non-fundamental information is relatively hard to process and that 2)
discount factor is sufficiently high, we found that advancement in the information-processing
capacity can deteriorate price informativeness when the processing capacity is high. When
the processing capacity is low, financial information is scarce and stock price is uninformative.
Thus, the investors will acquire only fundamental information. However, once the processing
capacity is high, the fundamental information, both from stock price and from private signals
of the investors, is abundant. To outperform the market, the investors will start processing the
more costly non-fundamental information and free-riding the fundamental information from
stock prices. They may also process more fundamental information at this stage. However,
it will reduce their investment risks marginally, as they already have good quality of the
fundamental information. During this stage, an increase in the processing capacity causes price
informativeness to (non-monotonically) decrease and converge to a lower level.
At first sight, one may expect that there should be no non-fundamental information produc-
tion when the fundamental information is abundant since stock prices will be fully revealing.
Interestingly, the model predicts that price inefficiency from the non-fundamental information
production is bound to happen, because stock prices are never fully revealing. Due to the infinite-
period payoff structure of stocks, stock investors cannot learn perfectly future information, both
fundamental and non-fundamental information, that their future counterparts can learn. Thus,
regardless of how developed the information technology is, the stock price will not be fully
revealing, driving the investors to start processing the costly non-fundamental information to
make more speculative profits in due course.
Related literature
Our paper belongs to the early literatures that study how rational speculators can destabilize
asset prices. Hart and Kreps (1986) constructed a model consisting of rational speculators who
can store commodity across periods. They established that the speculators, who intend to buy
and store the commodity to resell at a higher price in the future, can cause price destabilization
from their de-storage strategies. Stein (1987) pointed out that an entry of rational speculators
who have noisy private fundamental information can bring noise to the market price, causing
negative informational externality to those who are already in the market. De Long et al (1989)
constructed a model which contains speculators and positive feedback traders – those who buy
securities when the asset price increases and sell securities when the asset price declines. They
established that rational speculators can destroy price informativeness, because their speculative
12
trades can trigger positive feedback traders to react to the price move and destabilize the price
further away from the fundamentals. A more recent theoretical study by Madrigal (1996) proved
that an entry of non-fundamental speculators – those who have superior information about past
non-fundamental shocks which allows them to infer fundamental information from the market
price – can cause price destabilization. This is because their information free-riding behaviour
reduces trading profits of informed investors who will in turn respond by modifying their trading
strategies to convey less information. This paper contributes to the literature by showing that
future speculative investors can deteriorate price efficiency by creating future non-fundamental
information risk toward present speculative investors when the signal quality of future noise
shocks increases.
This paper also belongs to a growing literature which studies the impact of learning non-
fundamental information. Several literatures focus on information about short-term deviation of
past or current asset prices from the fundamentals (e.g. Ganguli and Yang (2009), Manzano
and Vives (2010), Guo and Yang (2014), Marmora and Rytchkov (2015), and Yang and Zhu
(2016), Farboodi and Veldkamp (2018)). Such noise information can improve price efficiency as
it helps risk-averse investors extract fundamental information from asset prices more accurately.
A main drawback which can cause inefficiency is that investors may excessively free-ride
information from asset prices rather than using their own private information. Another line of
literature focused on other types of information unrelated to the fundamentals such as beliefs of
other traders (Banerjee et al (2018)), trading motives of other investors (Banerjee and Green
(2015)), variance of non-fundamental factor (Hong and Rady (2002)), or the number of informed
traders (Gao et al (2013)). We contribute to this literature by studying a different type of non-
fundamental information – the information about future non-fundamental shock – and shedding
light on how the dynamic feedback effect from learning non-fundamental information can cause
price inefficiency.
The most closely related literature to this paper is Farboodi and Veldkamp (2018) which
studied evolution of information choice between fundamental and non-fundamental information
(about current noise) when there is long-run information-processing technology growth. In their
model, there is future fundamental information risk which prevents asset prices from being
fully informative. This is similar to the future non-fundamental information risk which causes
inefficiency in our paper. Farboodi and Veldkamp (2018) also established that investors will
initially acquire fundamental information when the technology is poor and will start acquiring
non-fundamental information to extract fundamental information from asset price later on.
However, price efficiency improves because the information about current noise helps the
investors extract fundamental information more accurately from the asset price. This is different
from our finding, particularly on implications towards price efficiency, which states that the
investors start processing costly non-fundamental information (about future noise) to beat the
market when trading on fundamental information is no longer profitable.
Structure of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model setting. Section
3 analyses the model without non-fundamental information production. Section 4 examines
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the impact of learning information about future non-fundamental shock. Section 5 analyzes
how learning information about current noise shock can deteriorate price informativeness in
our framework. Section 6 extends the model to include endogenous information acquisition
and analyzes the impact of information technology growth. Section 7 concludes. Throughout
the paper, NF information refers to information about future non-fundamental shock while
F information refers to information about fundamental shock unless stated otherwise. The
equilibrium characterization and all omitted proofs are in appendix.
1.2 The model
Consider a discrete-time infinite-period model based on Farboodi and Veldkamp (2018) consist-
ing of a risky asset (i.e stock) which is a claim on lifetime stochastic dividend payments {dt}∀t
and unlimited cash. The dividend payment follows AR(1) process of dt = αdt−1 + θt + θ¯
in which θt ∼ N(0, σ2θ) is an i.i.d. random dividend shock and θ¯ ∈ R+ is the mean. Denote
τθ =
1
σ2θ
. At the end of period t, dividend dt is publicly observable and paid out to all investors.
In every period, a new generation of risk-averse investors is born and enters the market.
Each cohort contains a unit continuum of investors who live for one period. Each investor i has
the following mean-variance utility function:
Ui(piit|I) = E(piit|I)− ρ
2
V ar(piit|I)
where ρ is the degree of risk aversion and piit = (δpt+1 + dt − pt)(xit − uit) is the return
from buying xit units of the risky asset at price pt and selling them in the next period at
pt+1. The non-tradable endowment shock uit = ut + σuiµuit consists of i.i.d. market-wide
shock ut ∼ N(0, σ2u) and i.i.d. white noise idiosyncratic shock µuit. Denote τu = 1σ2u . This
endowment shock is privately observable and represents investor sentiments or unexpected
idiosyncratic liquidity needs.2 We refer to dividend shock θt as the fundamental shock and
aggregate endowment shock ut as the non-fundamental shock. Note that an idiosyncratic
endowment shock uit which each investor i can observe is also informative about the non-
fundamental shock ut with precision of τui = 1σ2ui
. For simplicity, we assume that τui = 0,
implying that the investors cannot learn about non-fundamental factor ut from observing their
own endowment shocks.3
The trading timeline is as follows. At the beginning of period t, a cohort of investors enters
the market and observes public information dt−1, their private signals sit, and their endowment
shocks uit.4 Afterwards, all investors submit their demand schedules xit(pt, sit, uit, dt−1)
contingent on market price pt to an auctioneer who will set a price to clear the market. Then, all
2Note that this non-tradable endowment shock creates stochastic intercept in the demand function which serves
as a non-fundamental shock that prevents the stock price from being fully revealing. In fact, the stochastic aggregate
endowment shock in market price (ut) is identical to aggregate random demand of noise traders in the standard
competitive noise-trading model. See Manzano and Vives (2010) and Farboodi and Veldkamp (2018) for more
details.
3This assumption will not affect our main findings. We will discuss the role of information about current noise
factor ut in Section 1.5.
4For tractability purpose, we assume that the investors cannot observe past prices. This allows us to focus on the
main role of NF information in the model while avoiding complicated posterior updating about ut from past prices.
We discuss how relaxing this assumption would affect our results in Section 1.4.3.
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trades take place and the market continues to the next period in which 1) all investors close their
positions and realize their investment returns and 2) a new generation of investors enters the
market.
The equilibrium
Let Iit = {sit, uit, dt−1} be the information set of investor i at the time of submitting demand
schedule to the auctioneer. The equilibrium definition is as follows.
Definition 1.1 (Competitive rational expectation equilibrium) An equilibrium consists of a
sequence of market price function {pt(·)}∀t and demand function of all investors X(p) such
that
1. each investor chooses demand schedule optimally.
xit(pt) ∈ arg max
x
Ui(piit(x)|Iit)
2. market-clearing condition of the asset market is satisfied.∫
i
xitdi = 0
This is the standard competitive rational expectation equilibrium which imposes optimality
conditions in a competitive market framework. We also restrict our focus to the stationary
most-informative linear equilibrium as described below.
Definition 1.2 (Equilibrium selection) The equilibrium is such that
1. market price function is linear and stationary.
pt =
1
k4
(k1dt−1 + k2θt + k3ut+1 + ut + k5θ¯)
2. provided that multiple linear equilibria exist, choose the most informative linear equilib-
rium.
Measures of volatility and efficiency
First, our measure of stock volatility is unconditional asset return volatility as defined below.
Intuitively, this volatility metric evaluates the asset riskiness from a viewpoint of uninformed
investors.
Definition 1.3 (Volatility) Asset volatility in period t is var(δpt+1 + dt − pt).
It is worth noting that, even though this metric provides a good estimation of asset riskiness
in general, it might not reflect an actual risk of stock returns faced by individual investors. When
the investors have more financial information, they actually face lower return risk provided that
the stock volatility does not change. Therefore, we will also consider the variance of stock
return conditional on all information available to investors as defined below.
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Definition 1.4 (Perceived asset risk) Perceived asset risk of investor i in period t is var(δpt+1+
dt − pt|Iit, pt).
To measure price informativeness, we follow the notion of revelatory price efficiency (Bond
et al. (2012), Bai et al. (2016)) which estimates how much stock prices reveal the information
about fundamental components that have impact to real economic activity. In our model, the
assumption of exogenous random process of dividend shocks (i.e. no feedback channel between
stock price dynamics and firm’s decision making) does not allow us to clearly identify the key
factor that has real economic impact. To proceed, we will assume that the information about
dividend shocks which should convey new information about the firm’s fundamental in practice
can have real economic impact. This is intuitive, as real decision makers (e.g firm managers,
business partners of the firms, policymakers) depend on secondary market prices to learn new
information about the firm fundamentals to take appropriate actions (Bond et al. (2012)). We
define the level of price informativeness as follows.
Definition 1.5 (Informativeness) Price informativeness at period t is var(θt)− var(θt|pt)
From the definition, price informativeness estimates how much fundamental shock volatility
from an outsider viewpoint is reduced if the outsider observes the market price. An alternative
measure of price informativeness is price impact of fundamental shock (∂pt∂θt ). However, this
measure does not capture possible changes of non-fundamental components in stock prices. As
such, it may not be suitable in our study.
To measure market liquidity, the standard metric is price impact of non-fundamental shock
( ∂pt∂ut ). In the standard noise-trader model, this is the price impact of a trade from noise traders.
Intuitively, lower price impact of non-fundamental shock implies that market price can absorb
trade orders from noise traders well, reflecting a liquid (deep) market. In our model, price
impact of non-fundamental shock will indirectly measure how well an asset price can absorb non-
fundamental-driven portion of asset trading of investors. However, the price impact ∂pt∂ut might
not contain enough information for measuring market liquidity in our context, as stock prices,
say in period t, might depend on both current fundamental shock ut and future non-fundamental
shock ut+1. Therefore, we measure market liquidity based on the following condition.
Definition 1.6 (Liquidity comparison) Market liquidity is lower(higher) if both ∂pt∂ut and
∂pt
∂ut+1
are higher(lower).
1.3 Baseline equilibrium without NF information.
In this section, we will analyze the model without non-fundamental (NF) information production
to understand fundamental properties of stock prices in our dynamic setting. We assume that the
investors obtain a noisy private signal about fundamental factor θt. Define sθ,it = θt +
√
1
τˆθ
θ,it
in which θ,it is an i.i.d. random variable drawn from a normal distribution N(0, 1) with signal
precision τˆθ. We obtain the following remark.
Remark 1.1 If private signal profile is sit = {sθ,it}, then
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1. an equilibrium in which the investors trade the asset exists if and only if the degree of risk
aversion is sufficiently low,
2. price informativeness increases if one of the following is true:
a) the degree of risk aversion decreases
b) τˆθ increases if the degree of risk aversion is sufficiently low.
3. market price is never fully revealing for any positive value of risk-aversion degree.
Firstly, we found that the existence condition of equilibrium with trade depends on the
degree of risk aversion. When the investors are more risk-averse, they trade the asset less
aggressively, causing the asset prices to be more sensitive to non-fundamental shock and harder
to predict. This high volatility feeds back into trading decision of investors in previous periods,
causing asset price volatility to amplify further. Thus, if the investors are highly risk-averse,
asset return volatility can be indefinite which causes the market to shut down.5
Interpretation of the second remark is straightforward. Price informativeness is higher
if the investors are more risk-tolerant or if the investors are more informed about the asset
fundamental, because they are willing to buy more assets to speculate against price deviation
from the fundamentals. What is more interesting is the last remark which states that the asset
price will never be fully revealing even when the investors are perfectly informed about the
fundamental shock, consistent with the finding in Farboodi and Veldkamp (2018).
Why is the price not fully revealing when the investors have perfect information about
dividend shock θt? This seems counterintuitive as the investors with perfect fundamental signal
should continue trading until the asset price returns to its fundamental value, the expected
discounted sum of all future dividends E(
∑∞
i=t δ
i−tdi|dt−1, θt). However, this is not true
because the investors still face positive investment risk. Indeed, when trading assets, they do not
know the information about future dividend shock θt+1 which will arrive in the future. To see
this, consider the mathematical expression of the asset prices below. In period t, the investors
cannot perfectly forecast pt+1, because they are uninformed about θt+1. As such, they will be
reluctant to trade more assets and move the price towards the fundamental value, even though
there is profitable opportunity to do so.
pt = f(dt−1, θt, . . . )
pt+1 = f(dt, θt+1︸︷︷︸
unknown
, . . . )
At this point, one may claim that, if the investors in every period can also learn about
one-period ahead dividend shock (i.e. sit = {θt, θt+1}), then market price can be fully revealing.
Unfortunately, this is invalid because, from the viewpoint of investors, their future counterparts
will also learn information about fundamental shocks of further periods that they cannot learn
5Note also that non-stationary equilibrium with trade cannot exist too since there is no finite real-valued
coefficients in asset price function that are consistent with expected future price.
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today. This is illustrated mathematically below. In this situation, the investors in period t now
face future price risk from being uninformed about two-period ahead dividend shock θt+2.
pt = f(dt−1, θt, θt+1, . . . )
pt+1 = f(dt, θt+1, θt+2︸︷︷︸
unknown
, . . . )
Let us look into this issue by considering the case when the investors have more signals
about future dividend shocks. We obtain the following remark.
Remark 1.2 If private signal is sit = {θk}t+nk=t , then
1. asset price is not fully revealing for any finite value of n,
2. if discount factor is strictly less than one, price sensitivity to noise factor strictly decreases
when n increases,
3. if discount factor is one, price sensitivity to noise factor does not change when n increases.
This remark highlights an important distinction between stocks and other asset classes
with fixed maturity date. For the latter, asset prices may be fully informative if the investors
have perfect information about all fundamental shocks of the whole remaining asset lifetime.
However, because common stocks are expected to pay dividend perpetually, future price risk
will persist. Unless the investors have perfect information about all future dividends; that is,
when the investors in every period t have perfect information about all future dividend shocks
{θi}∞i=t or when there are no dividend shocks (i.e σ2θ = 0), the asset price will not be fully
informative. Moreover, when the discount factor is high, a reduction in price sensitivity to noise
factor can be minimal.
One important implication from this finding is that any inefficiency from learning non-
fundamental information can be long-lasting, because the investors will always have incentive
to learn non-fundamental information. This is particularly true when the investors have good
fundamental information, because non-fundamental-information-based trading can be more
profitable to the investors who always look for new information that other investors do not have.
We will shed more light on this issue in the next two sections.
1.4 Analysis of learning NF information.
In this section, we will study how learning NF information, the information about next-period
aggregate endowment shock ut+1, can cause inefficiency to asset prices. We will first consider
the impact of learning NF information using a standard two-period model. Then, we analyze the
impact of an increase in NF information quality in our infinite-period model.
1.4.1 Static effect of learning NF information
Consider a classical two-period trading model with similar setting to our infinite-period dynamic
model. There is a risky divisible asset which pays a stochastic return θ + u2 in the second
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period where θ ∼ N(0, σ2θ) is an i.i.d. stochastic fundamental factor and u2 ∼ N(0, σ2u) is an
i.i.d. random non-fundamental factor. There is a unit continuum of investors with the following
mean-variance utility function:
Ui(pii|I) = E(pii|I)− ρ
2
V ar(pii|I)
where ρ is the degree of risk aversion and pii = (θ + u2 − p1)(xi − ui) is the return from
buying xi units of risky assets at price p1 in period 1. As noted before, the investors also face
non-tradable endowment shock ui = u1 +
√
1
τui
µui with market-wide shock u1 ∼ N(0, σ2u)
and i.i.d white noise idiosyncratic shock µui1 in period 1. Assume that τui = 0. Let private
signal profile of investor i be si = {sθi, sui} in which
sθi = θ +
√
1
τˆθ
θi and sui = u2 +
√
1
τˆu
ui
This setup allows the investors to observe both private fundamental signal sθi and non-fundamental
signal sui. The trading protocol and equilibrium solution concept are identical to our main
infinite-period model. Note that this static setting is a one-period snapshot of our infinite-period
model with an additional assumption that future asset prices remain unchanged regardless. We
obtain the following remark.
Remark 1.3 (Static effect of learning NF information) In the static setting, if τˆθ is sufficiently
high, then an increase in τˆu causes
1. perceived asset risk var(θ + u2|Ii, p1) to decrease
2. price impact of future noise factor ( ∂p1∂u2 ) to increase
3. price impact of current noise factor ( ∂p1∂u1 ) to decrease if and only if τˆu >
ρ(τu−ρ)
τu
.
4. stock volatility to decrease if τˆu >
ρ(τu−ρ)
τu
5. price informativeness to decrease if τu − ρ is positive and sufficiently high
6. price informativeness to increase if τu < ρ and τˆu is small.
Moreover,
1. limτˆu→∞
∂p1
∂u1
= 0,
2. limτˆu→∞ var(θ|p) < limτˆu→0 var(θ|p) if and only if ρ > τu, and
3. limτˆu→∞ var(θ + u2 − p1) = 0.
Interpretation of this result is straightforward. When the investors have more financial
information to estimate their investment returns, their investment risks are lower, increasing
their willingness to trade more assets. Due to more aggressive trade, price sensitivity to current
noise factor ( ∂p1∂u1 ) decreases while price sensitivity to future noise factor (
∂p1
∂u2
) increases. An
exception is when the noise factor volatility is relatively low, because the investors will free-ride
the non-fundamental information from asset price excessively when their own private signals are
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relatively low (i.e. when τˆu <
ρ(τu−ρ)
τu
). This free-riding behavior decelerates aggregation speed
of non-fundamental information in the price and causes the price to be more sensitive to current
non-fundamental shock temporarily. As shown in Figure 1.1, price impact of non-fundamental
shock u1 increases temporarily before declining towards zero when non-fundamental signal
precision increases. Stock volatility declines, but price informativeness deteriorates. Eventually,
when the investors have perfect non-fundamental signal, asset price in period 1 will no longer
fluctuate with current non-fundamental shock u1 and stock volatility converges to zero. That is,
the asset price becomes fully informative about asset return θ + u2.
Figure 1.1: Simulation results of an increase in non-fundamental signal precision τˆu with τu = 3,
ρ = 0.8, and τθ = 1.
Interestingly, price informativeness could improve when non-fundamental signal precision
increases, because asset price is less volatile to current non-fundamental shock. From the remark,
this scenario is possible when degree of risk aversion is so large that the asset price when there
is no non-fundamental information would be relatively volatile to current non-fundamental
shock u1. As shown in Figure 1.2, an increase in non-fundamental signal precision causes price
informativeness to increase and converge to a higher level.
In a nutshell, from efficiency point of view, learning NF information can improve price
efficiency and reduce asset volatility. However, this conclusion might be misleading for stock
markets since we have not yet considered dynamics effect from endogenous change of future
price dynamics.
1.4.2 Dynamic feedback effect and price inefficiency.
Our next step is to analyze the impact of learning NF information on price formation in
our dynamic setting. Let sθ,it = θt +
√
1
τˆθ
θ,it in which θ,it is an i.i.d. random variable
drawn from a normal distribution N(0, 1) and τˆθ is precision of the fundamental signal. Let
su,it = ut+1 +
√
1
τˆu
u,it in which u,it is an i.i.d. random variable drawn from a normal
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Figure 1.2: Simulation results of an increase in non-fundamental signal precision τˆu with τu = 1, ρ = 2,
and τθ = 1.
distribution N(0, 1) and τˆu is precision of the non-fundamental signal. Throughout Subsection
1.4.2, we make the following assumption unless stated otherwise.
Assumption 1.1 Private signal profile is sit = {sθ,it, su,it}
Now, consider an exogenous increase in non-fundamental signal precision τˆu. Undeniably,
better NF information must partly improve price efficiency based on our static analysis. In the
static model, risk-averse investors who learn more NF information will trade more aggressively
which will reduce price sensitivity to current non-fundamental shock. Additionally, since
the investors trade more assets on their NF information, current asset price becomes more
informative about future non-fundamental shock ut+1, providing more information about future
price to all investors. This in turn should reduce the price impact of noise factor ut even more.
Surprisingly, we found that this conjecture is invalid as established in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.1 (Inefficiency from learning NF information I) If 1) fundamental signal pre-
cision and discount factor are sufficiently high and 2) non-fundamental signal precision is
sufficiently low, an increase in non-fundamental signal precision leads to
1. lower market liquidity,
2. higher stock volatility,
3. lower price informativeness, and
4. higher perceived asset risk as measured by var(δpt+1 + dt|Iit, pt).
This proposition establishes contradicting predictions from classical rational speculative
theory. From the proposition, when the investors have better quality of NF information, the stock
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volatility increases, price informativeness declines, and price sensitivity to non-fundamental
factors increases (i.e. lower market liquidity). More surprisingly, the investors view that the
asset is riskier (i.e. higher var(δpt+1 +dt|Iit, pt)) despite having more information about future
price. This is because of higher future price risk endogenously created by future investors.
When receiving better NF information, the future investors will also trade more assets on their
NF information, causing the future prices to be more volatile to non-fundamental shocks of
further periods. However, the investors cannot learn the NF information that the future investors
can learn. This is illustrated mathematically below.
pt = f(dt−1, θt, ut+1, ut)
pt+1 = f(dt, θt+1, ut+2︸ ︷︷ ︸
unknown
, ut+1)
When the investors learn NF information, asset price in period t + 1 now depends on both
fundamental factor θt+1 and two-period ahead non-fundamental factor ut+2, both of which are
unknown to investors in period t. When the non-fundamental signal precision increases, asset
price pt+1 becomes more sensitive to noise factor ut+2 which adversely affects the investors
in period t. This higher stock return volatility feeds back into trading decision of investors,
resulting in lower price efficiency.
The next question is whether learning NF information can improve price efficiency at some
point; that is, whether the negative dynamic feedback effect will always dominate the positive
effect of learning more information. Indeed, we found that when the noise signal precision is
high, price efficiency might improve when the noise signal precision increases as implied in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1.2 (Inefficiency from learning NF information II) Provided that fundamental
signal precision and discount factor are sufficiently high,
1. limτˆu→∞
∂pt
∂ut
< ∂pt∂ut for any τˆu > 0,
2. limτˆu→∞
∂pt
∂ut
≤ ∂pt∂ut at τˆu = 0.
From the proposition, the price will be least sensitive to the current noise shock when
the investors have perfect non-fundamental signals. Interestingly, the sensitivity can even go
below the value which the investors do not have non-fundamental information. The is because
the marginal benefit of learning more information exceeds the negative dynamic feedback
effect. This finding suggests that it might be socially desirable if the investors have good
non-fundamental signals. However, our next proposition established that this is not the case
when discount factor is high.
Proposition 1.3 (Inefficiency from learning NF information III) If the fundamental signal
precision is sufficiently high and the discount factor is strictly less than one, then
1. limτˆu→0 var(δpt+1 + dt − pt) > limτˆu→∞ var(δpt+1 + dt − pt),
2. limτˆu→0 var(δpt+1 + dt|Iit, pt) > limτˆu→∞ var(δpt+1 + dt|Iit, pt),
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3. limτˆu→0
∂pt
∂ut
> limτˆu→∞
∂pt
∂ut
,
4. limτˆu→0 var(θt|pt) < var(θt|pt) for any τˆu ∈ R+ if the discount factor is sufficiently
high.
From the proposition, if the investors obtain good non-fundamental signals, then stock
volatility, perceived asset risk, and price sensitivity to noise factor ∂pt∂ut are lower than the level
which the investors have no NF information. However, price informativeness will always
be lower than the level which the investors do not have NF information if discount factor is
sufficiently high. This is because the price is more sensitive to future non-fundamental shock, but
the price sensitivity to current non-fundamental shock marginally declines due to the dynamic
feedback effect. Figure 1.3 displays simulation results of an increase in non-fundamental
Figure 1.3: Simulation results of an increase in non-fundamental signal precision τˆu ∈ [0, 85] with
τu = 3, ρ = 0.085, τˆθ = 100, α = 0.94, δ = 0.97, τθ = 3.
signal precision when the discount factor is 0.97. From the figure, price sensitivity to current
non-fundamental shock, asset volatility, and perceived investment risk increase initially before
declining to a new lower level. Price informativeness sharply declines and converges to a lower
value than the level which the investors do not have NF information.
Indeed, the discount factor partly determines magnitude of the adverse dynamic feedback
effect. As shown in the next proposition, we found that asset volatility, perceived investment
risk, and price sensitivity to current non-fundamental shock converge to the same level which
the investors do not have NF information when the discount factor is one. Intuitively, when
the investors care about future price immensely, they will be heavily affected by the adverse
dynamic feedback effect from higher future NF information risk which can offset the benefit
from learning more NF information completely.
Proposition 1.4 (Inefficiency from learning NF information IV) If τˆθ is sufficiently high and
discount factor is one, then
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1. limτˆu→0 var(δpt+1 + dt − pt) = limτˆu→∞ var(δpt+1 + dt − pt),
2. limτˆu→0 var(δpt+1 + dt|Iit, pt) = limτˆu→∞ var(δpt+1 + dt|Iit, pt),
3. limτˆu→0
∂pt
∂ut
= limτˆu→∞
∂pt
∂ut
As shown in Figure 1.4, price sensitivity to current non-fundamental shock, asset volatility,
and perceived investment risk are always higher than the level which the investors do not have
NF information. Price informativeness will always be suboptimal when the investors learn NF
information. Indeed, we also found that price efficiency will be optimal when the investors
do not learn NF information if the discount factor approaches one, as stated in the following
remark.
Figure 1.4: Simulation results of an increase in non-fundamental signal precision τˆu ∈ [0, 100] with
τu = 3, ρ = 0.085, τˆθ = 100, α = 0.94, δ = 1, τθ = 3.
Remark 1.4 If discount factor is one and fundamental signal precision is sufficiently high,
then price informativeness and market liquidity are maximized if τˆu = 0. Specifically, for any
τˆu ∈ R+,
1. var(θt|pt) > limτˆu→0 var(θt|pt),
2. ∂pt∂ut+1 > limτˆu→0
∂pt
∂ut+1
,
3. ∂pt∂ut ≥ limτˆu→0
∂pt
∂ut
.
So far, the main inefficiency from NF information production comes from the negative
dynamic feedback effect of future NF information risk. One might wonder whether allowing
the investors to learn future NF information that their future counterparts learn would solve this
problem. That is, what if the investors in period t can acquire information about ut+2? We found
that the inefficiency problem still remains. In fact, price informativeness can deteriorate even
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more. To see this, we now assume that the investors have perfect signals about non-fundamental
factors of several periods ahead as follows.
Assumption 1.2 Private signal profile is sit = {θt} ∪
⋃n
k=1{ut+k}
Consider the following proposition.
Proposition 1.5 (Learning far-future NF information) Provided that Assumption 1.2 is true,
price impact of current noise factor ( ∂pt∂ut ) is non-zero for any finite n ≥ 1. Also, if n increases,
then
1. asset volatility, perceived asset risk, and price impact of current noise factor ( ∂pt∂ut )
decrease if discount factor is lower than one.
2. asset volatility, perceived asset risk, and price impact of current noise factor ( ∂pt∂ut ) do not
change if discount factor is one.
3. price informativeness is strictly lower if discount factor is sufficiently high.
This proposition confirms that learning information about non-fundamental shocks of several
periods ahead can deteriorate price efficiency, especially if the investors care a lot about the
future (i.e. high discount factor). The reason is that 1) future information uncertainty still
remains in the stock prices and 2) the negative feedback dynamic effect from NF information
uncertainty has significant impact on the investors. As a result, the price sensitivity to current
non-fundamental shock will decline marginally when the investors obtain more non-fundamental
signals. To illustrate, suppose that the investors in every period t obtain perfect noise signals
about {ut+1, ut+2}. As written mathematically below, asset price in period t+ 1 now contains
ut+3 which is unknown to investors in period t.
pt = f(dt−1, θt, ut+1, ut+2, ut)
pt+1 = f(dt, θt+1, ut+3︸ ︷︷ ︸
unknown
, ut+2, ut+1)
Thus, even though the investors obtain more future non-fundamental information, the asset
price will always be volatile to non-fundamental shock ut. In addition, the asset price is now
sensitive to new future non-fundamental shock ut+2, causing price informativeness to decline
further. Overall, an attempt to learn new NF information of future periods, instead of improving
efficiency, can turn out to harm market liquidity and price informativeness tremendously.
This finding provides an important insight for market regulators into how the benefits of
learning NF information can be overrated. Typically, we believe that the investors can reduce
their investment risks by learning more NF information which could improve price efficiency.
However, our model suggests that stock prices could become more volatile, less informative,
less liquid, and harder to estimate for all the investors. To promote price efficiency, perhaps a
better way is to promote fundamental information disclosure to allow the investors to properly
assess the firm prospects, both for the short term and the long-term. This can reduce the future
fundamental information risk and improve the quality of stock prices.
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1.4.3 What if the investors can observe historical prices?
So far, we have assumed that investors cannot observe past prices when updating their posteriors.
This assumption, while giving us a tractable model, might raise concerns on the result robustness.
In this section, we will discuss how relaxing this assumption may affect our findings.
Why do investors value historical prices? Recall that when investors learn NF information,
asset prices will be informative about future noise factors. Therefore, the historical prices will
be another valuable source of learning information about current noise factor ut, helping the
investors in period t extract relevant information from current asset price more efficiently. To
clarify, below is the mathematical expression of asset price in period t and t− 1.
pt = f(dt−1, θt, ut+1, ut)
pt−1 = f(dt−2, θt−1, ut, ut−1).
The investors in period t would optimally use pt to learn about θt and ut+1 to forecast their
expected returns δpt+1 + dt. Therefore, learning ut from price pt−1 would increase their
information quality obtained from price pt even further. How much information about ut that
the investors can extract from pt−1 depends on the investor’s information about past dividend
shocks, past non-fundamental shocks, and the length of observable past price sequence. Note
that observing longer periods of past prices should increase the information quality about ut. To
illustrate, consider pt−2 = f(dt−3, θt−2, ut−1, ut−2) which is informative about ut−1. Indeed,
pt−2 reveals information about ut−1, helping the investors infer the information about ut from
pt−1 more accurately.
To conclude, the impact of NF information production missing from our previous analysis
is the impact from more information about current noise factor from past prices. In other
words, there is endogenous increase in public information about current noise factor when
the non-fundamental signal precision increases. This implies that most of our analysis should
remain true, particularly the findings based on the investors who obtain perfect signals about
θt and ut+1. This is because the investors already have perfect private information, and thus
additional information from past prices will be irrelevant.
However, one may wonder whether this assumption will significantly affect our analysis
when the investors have imperfect signals. With imperfect signals, the investors still depend on
the information they could learn from asset prices. Therefore, observing historical prices would
improve their information quality. This positive effect might dominate the negative dynamic
feedback effect which might compromise some of our findings.
To have a preliminary investigation on this conjecture while maintaining tractability of our
model, we now assume that the investors also obtain a private signal about current noise factor
ut with identical signal precision as if they can observe n periods of past prices. From the
equilibrium price function, we know that 1k3 (k4pt−1 − k1dt−2 − k2θt−1 − k5θ¯) = ut + 1k3ut−1.
Provided that the investors know all past dividend shocks, this implies that the investors who
observe {pt−1, pt−2, . . . , pt−n} will obtain the information equivalent to observing a signal
about ut with signal precision k23τu
(
1−k2n3
1−k23
)
. Let sup,it = ut +
√
1
τˆup
up,it in which up,it is an
i.i.d. white noise normally-distributed random variable and τˆup = k23τu
(
1−k2n3
1−k23
)
. We make the
following assumption.
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Assumption 1.3 Private signal profile is sit = {sθ,it, su,it, sup,it}
This assumption states that in addition to the fundamental and non-fundamental information,
the investors also receive a private signal about current non-fundamental shock ut which is
informationally equivalent to observing n periods of past prices. Figure 1.5 compares two
simulation results when the investors cannot observe private signal sup,it and when n = 4
(equivalent to observing {pt−1, pt−2, pt−3, pt−4}). From the figure, allowing the investors who
have imperfect fundamental signals to observe past prices improves price efficiency compared
to the case of no past price observation. Since the precision of current non-fundamental signal
is endogenously increasing, the effect from observing past prices will start taking place when
the investors have sufficiently good non-fundamental signals. Indeed, the investors also obtain
better NF information from the asset price, but this might contribute positively to price efficiency.
From our previous analysis, when the investors have good non-fundamental signals, the positive
effect of learning more NF information will start dominating the negative dynamic feedback
effect. Therefore, having better quality of NF information from the market price can positively
affect price efficiency at this stage. However, note that the negative dynamic feedback effect
which causes price inefficiency still exists.
Figure 1.5: Simulation results of an increase in non-fundamental signal precision τˆu ∈ [0, 100] when the
investors cannot observe sup,it (i.e unobservable past prices) and when they can observe sup,it for n = 4
with parameter value of τu = 4, ρ = 0.085, τˆθ = 100, α = 0.94, δ = 0.97, τθ = 4.
In contrast, if the investors already have perfect fundamental signals, the type of information
the investors would learn from the price would be only the NF information. Thus, the assumption
on past price observations should affect only the speed of convergence of price efficiency when
there is an increase in non-fundamental signal precision. This is confirmed in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1.6 (Inefficiency from learning NF information V) If private signal profile sat-
isfies Assumption 1.3 and the discount factor is sufficiently high, then for any τˆu > 0,
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1. limτˆθ→∞ var(θt|pt) > limτˆθ→∞,τˆu→0 var(θt|pt),
2. limτˆθ→∞
∂pt
∂ut+1
> limτˆθ→∞,τˆu→0
∂pt
∂ut+1
, and
3. limτˆθ→∞
∂pt
∂ut
≥ limτˆθ→∞,τˆu→0 ∂pt∂ut if the discount factor is one.
From the proposition, our findings on price efficiency from the previous section remain
true. When the investors have perfect fundamental signals and high discount factor, the price
informativeness will always be suboptimal. Also, when the discount factor is one, both price
informativeness and market liquidity are maximized when the investors do not have NF infor-
mation, because the investors do not need the informational benefit from past prices to learn the
fundamental information.
1.5 Impact of learning information about current
non-fundamental shock
In reality, apart from learning information about future noise shocks, the investors also process
order-flow data to estimate past or current non-fundamental shocks. This section will look
into the impact of learning information about current non-fundamental shock ut on price
informativeness and examine whether the interacting effects of learning information about both
current-period and future-period noise shocks can deteriorate price efficiency.
How would acquisition of the current-noise information affect price formation? In general,
there are two sources of financial information that investors in any period t can learn from:
private signal sit and public signal pt. Since better information about noise factor ut helps the
investors extract relevant information from asset price pt more accurately, price informativeness
can improve. However, as documented in standard literature, price informativeness deterioration
might come from herd behavior of the investors; they depend too much on information from
the price and too little on their private information, resulting in less degree of information
aggregation in asset prices.
In this section, we will show that price informativeness can decrease when the investors
obtain better current-noise information from a different angle. That is, the investors might extract
more NF information from asset price when they have better current-noise information which
can destroy price informativeness. Formally, we assume that investors in period t can observe
a private signal about noise factor ut in addition to their private signals about fundamental
factor θt and future non-fundamental shock ut+1. Define suc,it = ut +
√
1
τˆuc
uc,it in which
uc,it ∼ N(0, 1) is an i.i.d. idiosyncratic disturbance. We make the following assumption.
Assumption 1.4 Private signal profile is sit = {sθ,it, su,it, suc,it}
Applying this assumption to our model, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1.7 (Current-period noise information) Provided that Assumption 1.4 is satis-
fied, asset price dynamics when the investors have perfect signal about θt and ut+1 does not
depend on τˆuc. Also, for X = {dt−1, θt, ut, ut+1},
lim
τˆθ→∞,τˆuc→∞
pt(X) = lim
τˆu→∞,τˆuc→∞
pt(X) = lim
τˆθ→∞,τˆu→∞
pt(X).
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This proposition emphasizes the role of current-noise information. First, the current-noise
information is redundant when investors already have perfect private signals. Second, when
the investors have perfect information about ut, the asset price function will be equivalent to
when the investors have perfect private signals. This is because the investors with imperfect
private signals, either fundamental or non-fundamental signals, now have a perfect public signal
– the asset price – to learn from. Note that this intuition works only if the investors already have
perfect signal of one information type so that the investors can infer the other information type
from the asset price perfectly.
There are two implications on price informativeness from this proposition. First, when the
investors already have good information about future noise factor ut+1, more information about
current noise factor ut will allow the investors to obtain more fundamental information from
the asset price which can improve price informativeness. This is shown in Figure 1.6 which
illustrates how an exogenous increase in signal precision of suc, the signal about ut, can improve
price efficiency.
Figure 1.6: Simulation results of an increase in signal precision τˆuc ∈ [0, 100] with parameter value of
τu = 4, ρ = 0.085, τˆθ = 3, τˆu = 2000, α = 0.94, δ = 0.97, τθ = 4.
However, when the investors already have good private signal about fundamental factor, the
investors will instead use the asset price to obtain more NF information, resulting in possible
deterioration of price informativeness as stated in the following remark.
Remark 1.5 If 1) τˆθ and discount factor are sufficiently high and 2) τˆu is sufficiently low, then
lim
τˆuc→0
var(θt|pt) < lim
τˆuc→∞
var(θt|pt).
Figure 1.7 illustrates the impact of an increase in precision of current-noise signal when the
investors have good fundamental signals. Indeed, the evolution of price efficiency is similar to
the case of an increase in non-fundamental signal precision. From the figure, stock volatility
and price sensitivity to noise factor ut increases initially before gradually decreasing. Price
informativeness non-monotonically decreases to a lower level.
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Figure 1.7: Simulation results of an increase in signal precision τˆuc ∈ [0, 100] with parameter value of
τu = 4, ρ = 0.085, τˆθ = 5000, τˆu = 0.5, α = 0.94, δ = 0.97, τθ = 4.
This finding provides one important insight into how post-trade market transparency (i.e.
public disclosure of past order flows) can adversely affect stock prices. Depending on what
information is in high demand from the investors, price informativeness which regulators would
like to promote can instead decrease in response to higher degree of post-trade transparency.
1.6 Endogenous information choice and information
technology growth.
So far, we have seen how learning information about future non-fundamental shock can cause
inefficiency to stock prices. However, given the assumption on exogenous non-fundamental
signal precision, we cannot see clearly whether the investors will indeed acquire more NF
information. Our next task is to study whether the investors will actually acquire NF information.
If so, under what conditions such NF information acquisition can deteriorate price inefficiency.
To this end, this section extends the model to incorporate endogenous information acquisition.
1.6.1 Model setting: information acquisition stage
We will now incorporate endogenous information acquisition stage to the model, allowing the
investors to strategically choose their private signal precisions. Denote sθ,it = θt +
√
1
τˆθ,it
θ,it
in which θ,it is an i.i.d. random variable from normal distribution N(0, 1) with signal precision
τˆθ,it, and su,it = ut+1 +
√
1
τˆu,it
u,it in which u,it is an i.i.d. random variable from normal
distribution N(0, 1) with signal precision τˆu,it. Define τˆit = {τˆθ,it, τˆu,it}. Prior to trading in
period t, all investors who are born in period t can choose their private signal precisions τˆit
subject to the following information technology constraint:
τˆθ,it + γτˆu,it ≤ Γ
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where γ ∈ R+ is a relative cost of processing NF information and Γ ∈ R+ is the information-
processing capacity. Assume that private signal profile is sit = {sθ,it, su,it} in which signal
precision τˆit is now endogenously determined. The equilibrium definition which now includes
optimality condition for the information acquisition decision is as follows.
Definition 1.7 (Competitive rational expectation equilibrium) An equilibrium consists of in-
formation acquisition choices {τˆit}∀i,t, market price functions {pt(·)}∀t, and demand functions
of all investors X(p) such that
1. each investor chooses signal precisions optimally
τˆit ∈ arg max
τˆit
Ui(piit) s.t. τˆθ,it + γτˆu,it ≤ Γ
2. each investor chooses demand schedule optimally.
xit(pt) ∈ arg max
x
Ui(piit(x)|Iit)
3. market-clearing condition of the asset market is satisfied.∫
i
xitdi = 0
Also, the equilibrium selection criteria now includes symmetric and stationary information
choice of the investors as below.
Definition 1.8 (Equilibrium selection) The equilibrium is such that
1. equilibrium signal precision is symmetric and stationary.
τˆit = τˆ = {τˆθ, τˆu}
2. market price function is linear and stationary.
pt =
1
k4
(k1dt−1 + k2θt + k3ut+1 + ut + k5θ¯)
3. provided that multiple linear equilibria exist, choose the most informative linear equilib-
rium.
1.6.2 Optimal information choice
First, let us examine how investors decide between processing fundamental and non-fundamental
information. Obviously, both types of information reduce forecasting error of different stochastic
components in future asset prices. Comparing to standard goods-consumption model, both
information types are comparable to differentiated goods which increase expected utility of the
investors. However, the investors have limited resources (i.e limited information-processing
capacity to process financial data) and must choose signal precision of each information type in
an optimal way. The following lemma describes optimal information choice of investors in the
equilibrium.
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Lemma 1.1 (Optimal information choice) An equilibrium information choice (τˆθ, τˆu) of all
interior solutions must satisfy
1
γ
=
(
a1(τu + τˆu) + τuk3(k3a1 − k2a2)
a2(τθ + τˆθ)− τuk2(k3a1 − k2a2)
)2
in which a1 = δ k1k4 + 1 and a2 =
δ
k4
.
This is a standard optimality condition in which relative marginal cost of processing more
fundamental information (left side) equals to its relative marginal benefit (right side). Both a1
and a2 are the coefficients of θt and ut+1 in expected return term E(δpt+1 + dt), respectively.6
The marginal cost term is directly derived from information technology constraint. The marginal
benefit term depends on 1) what information type the investors consider more significant for
their future price forecasts reflected by a1 and a2, 2) which factors are more volatile and thus
more valuable to learn as measured by τu and τθ, and 3) which information type the investors
can free-ride from the asset price as captured by |k3a1 − k2a2| weighted by information quality
of the asset price τu, the inverse volatility of current-noise factor ut. For instance, when k3k2 <
a2
a1
,
a case of NF information shortage in the asset price, the investors are more likely to process
more NF information on their own.
1.6.3 Information-processing capacity advancement
Now, let us analyze the impact of information-processing capacity development on equilibrium
information choice and price informativeness. Generally, better information-processing capacity
shall improve price informativeness. However, this depends on the type of financial information
that investors choose to process. If the investors process non-fundamental information heavily
when the information technology improves, price informativeness might in fact decrease. The
following proposition establishes that, if the NF information is costly to process, a permanent
decline in price informativeness is possible when the capacity is sufficiently good.
Proposition 1.8 (NF information acquisition) If γ and δ are sufficiently high, then there exists
Γ∗ ∈ R+ such that
1. τˆu > 0 if Γ > Γ∗ and τˆu = 0 otherwise,
2. there exists Γ¯ > Γ∗ such that for any Γ ≥ Γ¯,
var(θt|pt) > lim
Γ→Γ∗
var(θt|pt)
From the proposition, when the investors care a lot about the future and when NF information
is relatively hard to process, they will process cheaper fundamental information when the
processing capacity is low. This is because financial information is scarce, and market price
which is the public source of financial information is still uninformative.
However, once the processing capacity is high, there is abundance of fundamental infor-
mation both from private signals and asset price. Therefore, at some point all investors will
6Note that E(δpt+1 + dt) = (δ k1k4 + 1)θt +
δ
k4
ut+1 + · · · = a1θt + a2ut+1 + . . . .
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start processing more NF information to beat the market. This is shown in Figure 1.8 which
plots simulation results of an increase in information-processing capacity when the cost of pro-
cessing NF information is high. Even though the investors may also process more fundamental
Figure 1.8: Simulation results of an increase in information processing capacity Γ with parameter value
of τu = 4, ρ = 0.085, γ = 200, α = 0.94, δ = 0.97, τθ = 4.
information at this stage, it will marginally improve their fundamental information quality as
they already have good fundamental information. From the proposition, the efficiency effect of
the capacity increase is ambiguous in the neighborhood of Γ∗, the capacity threshold that the
investors start processing NF information. This is because the NF information is highly costly,
and thus the negative impact of NF information acquisition might not dominate the positive
impact of fundamental information acquisition at this point. However, once the market price
aggregates more NF information when the capacity is higher, the investors can now learn NF
information from the price, resulting in the deterioration of price informativeness.
Another important implication from the proposition is that the deterioration in price informa-
tiveness from NF information production is bound to happen. This finding is counterintuitive at
first glance. Intuitively, if the relative cost of NF information is sufficiently high and the capacity
is good, the investors will not process NF information as the asset price should be (almost)
fully revealing. However, recall from our previous section that stock prices will never be fully
revealing because of future fundamental information risk. Intuitively, investment risks of the
investors are not fully eliminated as they cannot learn perfectly the fundamental information
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that their future counterparts learn. As a consequence, the growing processing capacity will
eventually drive the investors to process the costly non-fundamental information once trading
on fundamental information no longer beats the market in due course.
Figure 1.9: Simulation results of an increase in information processing capacity Γ with parameter value
of τu = 4, ρ = 0.085, γ = 1, α = 0.94, δ = 0.97, τθ = 4.
It is worth noting that more NF information production does not imply that price informa-
tiveness must decline. Remember that the processing capacity advancement is essential for
investors to process more fundamental information. Therefore, if the investors are in shortage of
the fundamental information, price informativeness can increase even though the investors also
process more NF information. An example is when the cost of processing NF information is
relatively low as shown in Figure 1.9. In this scenario, the investors will process more of both
information types, and the negative effect of the NF information acquisition is dominated by the
positive effect of the fundamental information production.
Another note is that, if the cost of processing NF information is moderate, the deterioration of
price informativeness can be temporary. In this scenario, the investors might start processing the
NF information when the quality of their fundamental information is still imperfect. Therefore,
improvement in information processing capacity is still necessary for the investors to process
fundamental information later on. As such, price informativeness can bounce up to a higher
level when the processing capacity is more developed as shown in Figure 1.10.
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Figure 1.10: Simulation results of an increase in information processing capacity Γ with parameter value
of τu = 4, ρ = 0.085, γ = 40, α = 0.94, δ = 0.97, τθ = 4.
1.7 Concluding remark
This paper studies the impact of learning information about future non-fundamental shocks on
stock price formation and efficiency and provides an insight into how information technology
growth can be detrimental to stock markets. Our main finding is that, contradicting to con-
ventional wisdom on rational speculative trade, an increase in non-fundamental information
quality can increase stock volatility, decrease market liquidity, and reduce price informativeness.
Moreover, advancement in information-processing capacity can harm price informativeness
if the investors exploit its benefit toward processing more NF information. Our results point
out an important challenge faced by regulators on how to regulate stock markets and promote
efficiency in the current era of fast-paced information technology advancement.
Our paper can be extended to study a few related issues in stock markets. First, one can
relax the assumption about exogenous dividend payments and incorporate decision making of
firms to the model. This will allow us to see how a change in stock price dynamics from learning
NF information affects the firm’s decision making and its feedback effect toward the stock
traders. Second, one can consider endogenous acquisition of NF information from a different
perspective. That is, instead of imposing the information technology constraint, one can consider
costly information acquisition in which the investors face an increasing cost of acquiring NF
information. In this way, we can analyze whether NF information acquisition in the presence of
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dynamic feedback effect will exhibit strategic complementarity or substitutability among the
investors. Because of the dynamic feedback effect which endogenously increases stock return
volatility, it is possible to obtain strategic complementarity result along with its consequence of
over-acquisition of NF information.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Equilibrium characterization
In this section, we will solve for equilibrium price function assuming that the investors obtain
private signal of sit = {sθ,it, su,it, suc,it}. Recall that sθ,it = θt +
√
1
τˆθ
θ,it in which θ,it is an
i.i.d. random variable drawn from normal distributionN(0, 1) and τˆθ is precision of fundamental
signal, su,it = ut+1 +
√
1
τˆu
u,it in which u,it is an i.i.d. random variable drawn from normal
distribution N(0, 1) and τˆu is precision of non-fundamental signal, and suc,it = ut+
√
1
τˆuc
uc,it
in which uc,it ∼ N(0, 1) is an i.i.d. idiosyncratic disturbance. Suppose that equilibrium price
function at period t is
pt =
1
k4
(k1dt−1 + k2θt + k3ut+1 + ut + k5θ¯)
in which the set of coefficients {k1, k2, k3, k4, k5} will be determined using market-clearing
condition. The standard utility-maximizing trading strategy of each investor from optimization
problem is
xit − uit = E(δpt+1 + dt|Iit)− pt
V ar(δpt+1 + dt|Iit) .
The next step is to find the posterior belief δpt+1 + dt|Iit of investor i given signal precision
{τˆu, τˆθ}. Denote a random variable zt = a1θt + a2ut+1. Our objective is to find the posterior
zt|pt, sit, uit. We first update stochastic components in zt using private signal sit which yields
θt|sθ,it = N
(
τˆθ,itsθ,it
τθ + τˆθ
, (τθ + τˆθ)
−1
)
ut+1|su,it = N
(
τˆu,itsu,it
τu + τˆu
, (τu + τˆu)
−1
)
which , by independence, implies that
zt|sθ,it, su,it = N
(
a1
τˆθ,itsθ,it
τθ + τˆθ
+ a2
τˆu,itsu,it
τu + τˆu
, a21(τθ + τˆθ)
−1 + a22(τu + τˆu)
−1
)
Also, the posterior belief about noise factor ut assuming that τui = 0 is
ut|suc,it, uit = N
(
τˆuc
τu + τˆuc
suc,it, (τu + τˆuc)
−1
)
The last step is to update the posterior belief using pt. Denote pˆt ≡ k4pt − k1dt−1 − k5θ¯ =
k2θt + k3ut+1 +ut which is informationally equivalent to pt about zt. That is, zt|pt = zt|pˆt. To
find zt|pˆt, we find conditional probability distribution of pˆt|zt and apply Bayes’ rule to obtain
zt|pˆt. Rewrite pˆt as pˆt = βzt + rt which contains relevant information zt and a stochastic
residual term rt. A natural solution is to find optimal β which minimizes var(rt), find pˆt|zt,
and apply Bayes’ rule. However, zt and rt might be dependent since both factors can share
the same random variables θt and ut+1. To proceed, we assume that the investors ignore the
correlation between zt and rt. To find the optimal β ∈ arg minβ E(pˆt − βzt|sit, uit)2, we first
substitute pˆt and zt in the objective function which gives
β ∈ arg min
β
(k2 − βa1)2(τθ + τˆθ)−1 + (k3 − βa2)2(τu + τˆu)−1 + (τu + τˆuc)−1.
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Taking first-order condition yields
−(k2 − βa1)a1(τθ + τˆθ)−1 +−(k3 − βa2)a2(τu + τˆu)−1 = 0,
which can be easily proved that second-order derivative is always positive and thus second-order
condition is satisfied. Rearranging the condition gives
β =
k2a1(τu + τˆu) + k3a2(τθ + τˆθ)
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
which implies that
E(rt|sit, uit, zt) = (k2 − βa1) τˆθsθ
τˆθ + τθ
+ (k3 − βa2) τˆusu
τˆu + τu
+
τˆucsuc
τˆuc + τu
var(rt|sit, uit, zt) = (k2a2 − k3a1)
2
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
+ (τu + τˆuc)
−1
where the first term noise comes from the mismatch in the composition of θt and ut+1 and the
second term is the noise from ut in pˆt. Define ˆˆpt = 1β (pˆt − E(rt|sit, uit, zt)). Substituting
E(rt|sit, uit, zt) yields
ˆˆpt =
pˆt −
(
(k2 − βa1) τˆθsθτˆθ+τθ + (k3 − βa2)
τˆusu
τˆu+τu
+ τˆucsucτˆuc+τu
)
β
which, given that 1β pˆt = zt +
1
β rt, implies that
ˆˆpt|zt = N
(
zt,
var(rt|sit, uit, zt)
β2
)
Denote τP = β2var(rt|sit, uit, zt)−1 which is the signal precision of ˆˆpt. By standard Bayes
rule, we obtain
zt|sit, uit, pt = N
τZ
(
a1
τˆθsθ
τˆθ+τθ
+ a2
τˆusu
τˆu+τu
)
+ τP ˆˆpt
τZ + τP
, (τZ + τP )
−1

where τZ = (a21(τθ + τˆθ)
−1 + a22(τu + τˆu)−1)−1 which gives the following lemma.
Lemma 1.2 (Posterior updating) Let zt = a1θt + a2ut+1, then
zt|sit, uit, pt = N
τZ
(
a1
τˆθsθ,it
τˆθ+τθ
+ a2
τˆusu,it
τˆu+τu
)
+ τP ˆˆpt
τZ + τP
, (τZ + τP )
−1

where
β =
k2a1(τu + τˆu) + k3a2(τθ + τˆθ)
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
ˆˆpt =
1
β
(
k4pt − k1dt−1 − k5θ¯ − (k2 − βa1) τˆθsθ
τˆθ + τθ
− (k3 − βa2) τˆusu
τˆu + τu
− τˆucsuc,it
τˆuc + τu
)
τZ = a
2
1(τθ + τˆθ)
−1 + a22(τu + τˆu)
−1
τP = β
2
(
(k2a2 − k3a1)2
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
+ (τu + τˆuc)
−1
)−1
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Next, we use the lemma to characterize equilibrium price using market-clearing condition.
We first characterize general form which dictates both stationary and non-stationary equilibrium.
Then, we impose stationary condition to obtain our stationary equilibrium. From market-clearing
condition
∫
i xitdi = 0, we obtain∫
i
E(δpt+1 + dt|It)− pt
ρV ar(δpt+1 + dt|It) di+ ut = 0
because
∫
uitdi = ut. Rearranging the condition gives∫
i
E(δpt+1 + dt|It)di+ ρV ar(δpt+1 + dt|It)ut = pt.
Recall that
pt =
1
k4t
(k1tdt−1 + k2tθt + k3tut+1 + ut + k5tθ¯).
Notice the time subscript in all coefficients in the price equation. However, to have clear
distinction between coefficients and random variables, we will drop subscript t and use ′ to
indicate coefficients in period t+ 1 instead as shown below.
pt =
1
k4
(k1dt−1 + k2θt + k3ut+1 + ut + k5θ¯)
and
pt+1 =
1
k′4
(k′1dt + k
′
2θt+1 + k
′
3ut+2 + ut+1 + k
′
5θ¯)
First, we know that
δpt+1 + dt = (δ
k′1
k′4
+ 1)dt + δ
k′2
k′4
θt+1 + δ
k′3
k′4
ut+2 +
δ
k′4
ut+1 + δ
k′5
k′4
θ¯
= (δ
k′1
k′4
+ 1)(αdt−1 + θt) + δ
k′2
k′4
θt+1 + δ
k′3
k′4
ut+2 +
δ
k′4
ut+1 + (δ
k′5
k′4
+ δ
k′1
k′4
+ 1)θ¯.
Notice that
E(δpt+1 + dt|It) = α(δ k
′
1
k′4
+ 1)dt−1 + (δ
k′5
k′4
+ δ
k′1
k′4
+ 1)θ¯ + E((δ
k′1
k′4
+ 1)θt +
δ
k′4
ut+1|It)
V ar(δpt+1 + dt|It) = V ar(δ k
′
2
k′4
θt+1 + δ
k′3
k′4
ut+2) + V ar((δ
k′1
k′4
+ 1)θt +
δ
k′4
ut+1|It).
Let a1 = δ
k′1
k′4
+ 1, a2 = δk′4 and zt = a1θt + a2ut+1 . Then, we have
E(δpt+1 + dt|It) = α(δ k
′
1
k′4
+ 1)dt−1 + (δ
k′5
k′4
+ δ
k′1
k′4
+ 1)θ¯ + E(zt|It)
V ar(δpt+1 + dt|It) = V ar(δ k
′
2
k′4
θt+1 + δ
k′3
k′4
ut+2) + V ar(zt|It).
Using the market-clearing condition, we obtain
pt = α(δ
k′1
k′4
+ 1)dt−1 + (δ
k′5
k′4
+ δ
k′1
k′4
+ 1)θ¯ +
∫
i
E(zt|Iit)di
+
(
V ar(δ
k′2
k′4
θt+1 + δ
k′3
k′4
ut+2) + V ar(zt|Iit)
)
ut (∗)
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Based on Lemma 1.2, we know that∫
i
E(zt|Iit)di =
∫
i
τZ
τZ + τP
(
a1
τˆθsθ
τˆθ + τθ
+ a2
τˆusu
τˆu + τu
)
+
τP
τZ + τP
ˆˆpt di
=
τZ
τZ + τP
(
a1
τˆθθt
τˆθ + τθ
+ a2
τˆuut+1
τˆu + τu
)
+
τP
τZ + τP
∫
i
ˆˆpit di (∗∗)
and that∫
i
ˆˆpitdi =
1
β
(
k4pt − k1dt−1 − k5θ¯ − (k2 − βa1) τˆθθt
τˆθ + τθ
− (k3 − βa2) τˆuut+1
τˆu + τu
− τˆucut
τˆuc + τu
)
Substituting
∫
i
ˆˆpitdi into (**) and simplifying the expression yields∫
i
E(zt|Iit)di = θt
(
a1 − τP
τZ + τP
(
k2
β
)
)(
τˆθ
τˆθ + τθ
)
+
ut+1
(
a2 − τP
τZ + τP
(
k3
β
)
)(
τˆu
τˆu + τu
)
− ut
(
τP
τZ + τP
)(
τˆuc
τˆuc + τu
)(
1
β
)
+(
τP
τZ + τP
)
(
k4pt − k1dt−1 − k5θ¯
β
).
Last step is to plug in
∫
iE(zt|Iit)di and var(zt|Iit) into the market-clearing condition (*)
and compare the coefficients with the price equation we conjectured from the beginning. Let
var(δ
k′2
k′4
θt+1 + δ
k′3
k′4
ut+2) = Vt and note that var(zt|Iit) = (τZ + τP )−1. Once comparing the
coefficients, we obtain that equilibrium price function in any linear and symmetric equilibrium
given signal precision (τˆu, τˆθ.τˆuc) must be such that
pt =
1
k4
(k1dt−1 + k2θt + k3ut+1 + ut + k5θ¯)
in which the set of coefficients must satisfy the following system of equations.
k1
k4
= αa1
k2 =
a1
(
τˆθ
τˆθ+τθ
)
ρ ((τZ + τP )−1 + Vt) +
(
τP
τZ+τP
)(
τˆθ
τˆθ+τθ
− τuiτui+τu
)
1
β
k3 =
a2
(
τˆu
τˆu+τu
)
ρ ((τZ + τP )−1 + Vt) +
(
τP
τZ+τP
)(
τˆu
τˆu+τu
− τuiτui+τu
)
1
β
k4 =
1
ρ ((τZ + τP )−1 + Vt) +
(
τP
τZ+τP
)(
1− τuiτui+τu
)
1
β
k5
k4
= δ
k′5
k′4
+ a1
where
a1 = δ
k′1
k′4
+ 1, a2 =
δ
k′4
, Vt = δ
2
((
k′2
k′4
)2
σ2θ +
(
k′3
k′4
)2
σ2u
)
β =
k2a1(τu + τˆu) + k3a2(τθ + τˆθ)
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
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τZ = (a
2
1(τθ + τˆθ)
−1 + a22(τu + τˆu)
−1)−1
τP = β
2
(
(k2a2 − k3a1)2
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
+ (τu + τˆuc)
−1
)−1
Lastly, we impose stationarity condition and finalize our equilibrium characterization.
Consider k1k4 = αa1,
k5
k4
= δ
k′5
k′4
+ a1 and, a1 = δ
k′1
k′4
+ 1. Imposing stationary condition
{k1 = k′1, k4 = k′4, k5 = k′5}, we obtain that.
k1
k4
=
α
1− αδ and
k5
k4
=
1
(1− δ)(1− αδ)
Combining all the results proves the following proposition.
Proposition 1.9 (Equilibrium characterization) Any stationary equilibrium price given sig-
nal precision {τˆθ, τˆu, τˆuc} is such that
pt =
1
k4
(k1dt−1 + k2θt + k3ut+1 + ut + k5θ¯)
in which
k1
k4
=
α
1− αδ
k2 =
a1
(
τˆθ
τˆθ+τθ
)
ρ ((τZ + τP )−1 + Vt) +
(
τP
τZ+τP
)(
τˆθ
τˆθ+τθ
− τˆucτˆuc+τu
)
1
β
k3 =
a2
(
τˆu
τˆu+τu
)
ρ ((τZ + τP )−1 + Vt) +
(
τP
τZ+τP
)(
τˆu
τˆu+τu
− τˆucτˆuc+τu
)
1
β
k4 =
1
ρ ((τZ + τP )−1 + Vt) +
(
τP
τZ+τP
)(
1− τˆucτˆuc+τu
)
1
β
k5
k4
=
1
(1− δ)(1− αδ)
where
a1 =
1
1− αδ , a2 =
δ
k4
, Vt = δ
2
((
k2
k4
)2
σ2θ +
(
k3
k4
)2
σ2u
)
β =
k2a1(τu + τˆu) + k3a2(τθ + τˆθ)
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
τZ = (a
2
1(τθ + τˆθ)
−1 + a22(τu + τˆu)
−1)−1
τP = β
2
(
(k2a2 − k3a1)2
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
+ (τu + τˆuc)
−1
)−1
Denote kˆ4 = 1k4 . From the proposition, we can easily substitute (τˆθ, τˆu, τˆuc) further and
obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1.1 Provided that τˆuc = 0 and τˆθ →∞, then
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1. if τˆu = 0, then
k1
k4
=
α
1− αδ ,
k2
k4
=
1
1− αδ , k3 = 0, kˆ4 = ρδ
2
((
1
1− αδ
)2
σ2θ + kˆ
2
4σ
2
u
)
2. if τˆu →∞, then
k1
k4
=
α
1− αδ ,
k2
k4
=
1
1− αδ , k3 = δ, kˆ4 = ρδ
2
((
1
1− αδ
)2
σ2θ + δ
2kˆ24σ
2
u
)
.
1.8.2 Omitted proofs
Proof of Remark 1.1: To prove this remark, we first obtain equilibrium characterization of the
baseline model by substituting τˆu = 0 and τˆuc = 0 into Proposition 1.9, which yields
pt =
1
k4
(k1dt−1 + k2θt + ut + k5θ¯)
where
k1
k4
=
α
1− αδ ,
k2
k4
=
(
τˆθ + k
2
2τu
τθ + τˆθ + k
2
2τu
)(
1
1− αδ
)
k5
k4
=
1
(1− δ)(1− αδ) , k4 =
(
τˆθ
τˆθ + k
2
2τu
)
1
K
K = ρ
[
1
(1− δα)2(k22τu + τˆθ + τθ)
+ δ2
((
k2
k4
)2 1
τθ
+
(
1
k4
)2 1
τu
)]
.
Next, we simplify the system of equations by substituting k2k4 and K into the equation
k4 =
(
τˆθ
τˆθ+k
2
2τu
)
1
K which yields
k2
τˆθ
(
1 +
δ2(τˆθ + k
2
2τu)
2
τθ + k
2
2τu + τˆθ
[
1
k22τu
+
1
τθ
])
︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS
=
1
ρ
(
1
1− αδ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
(1.8.2.1)
which is now a function of only k2. Note that
k4 = (1− αδ)
(
τθ + τˆθ + k
2
2τu
τˆθ + k
2
2τu
)
k2
is a function of k2 which will always exist if k2 exists. Thus, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1.3 A baseline equilibrium exists iff there exists k2 ∈ R+ such that
k2
τˆθ
(
1 +
δ2(τˆθ + k
2
2τu)
2
τθ + k
2
2τu + τˆθ
[
1
k22τu
+
1
τθ
])
=
1
ρ
(
1
1− αδ
)
.
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Next, we prove existence condition by finding a condition when k2 exists. Considering the
left term (LHS) from Equation 1.8.2.1, we can find that ∂LHS∂k2 ≥ 0 if and only if
3δ2τ4uk
8
2+6
(
δ2τθ +
7
6
δ2τˆθ +
1
6
τθ
)
τ3uk
6
2+3k
4
2τ
2
u
(
(δ2 +
2
3
)τ2θ +
τˆθ
3
(7δ2 + 2)τθ + 5δ
2τˆ2θ
)
+ τuk
2
2
(
τ3θ + 2τ
2
θ τˆθ(δ
2 + 1) + τθ τˆ
2
θ + δ
2τˆ3θ
) ≥ δ2τθ τˆ2θ (τθ + τˆθ) (1.8.2.2)
which implies that there exists k∗2 such that
∂LHS
∂k2
≥ 0 if k2 ≥ k∗2 and ∂LHS∂k2 ≤ 0 if k2 ≤ k∗2 as
plotted in Figure 1.11. This implies that k2 exists if and only if the right term (RHS) in Equation
1.8.2.1 is sufficiently high to have an intersection. That is, when ρ is sufficiently low. This
proves the first result in the remark. Note that we choose the most informative equilibrium, the
equilibrium with the higher k2 which is on the right side as marked in the figure.
Figure 1.11: A diagram illustrating how k2 of the most informative equilibrium is determined from an
intersection of LHS and RHS.
To perform comparative statics on price informativeness, recall that price informativeness
depends on var(θt|pt) = (τθ + k22τu)−1. Therefore, unless we analyze the effect of a change in
τθ, we can just analyze the effect on k2 using the equation 1.8.2.1. A higher k2 would imply
that price informativeness is higher.
First, an increase in ρ decreases k2 since RHS shifts downward. To see how an increase in
τˆθ affects k2, we first obtain that ∂LHS∂τˆθ ≤ 0 iff
δ2τ4uk
8
2 + 2
(
δ2(τθ + τˆθ) +
τθ
2
)
τ3uk
6
2 + k
4
2(τθ + τˆθ)(δ
2(τθ + τˆθ) + 2τθ)τ
2
u
+ k22τuτθ(τθ + τˆθ)
2 ≥ δ2τθ τˆ2θ (1.8.2.3)
This finding implies that there exists kˆ2 such that the LHS curve will shift down for all values
of k2 ≥ kˆ2 and shift up for k2 ≤ kˆ2 when τˆθ increases. Given k∗2 in equation 1.8.2.2 and kˆ2 in
equation 1.8.2.3, we know that a sufficient condition for the most informative equilibrium to
exhibit ∂k2∂τˆθ ≥ 0 is when the equilibrium k2 ≥ max{k∗2, kˆ2}. This condition guarantees that the
most informative equilibrium (k2 ≥ k∗2) is increasing in τˆθ. Therefore, a sufficient condition
for the most informative k2 to be increasing in τˆθ is that RHS is sufficiently high (such that
k2 ≥ max{k∗2, kˆ2}). This can be achieved when ρ is sufficiently low.
Lastly, to prove that the market price is never fully revealing, it is sufficient to prove that
limτˆθ→∞ k4 is finite. Recall that
k2
k4
=
(
τˆθ + k
2
2τu
τθ + τˆθ + k
2
2τu
)(
1
1− αδ
)
and k4 =
(
τˆθ
τˆθ + k
2
2τu
)
1
K
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where K = ρ
[
1
(1− δα)2(k22τu + τˆθ + τθ)
+ δ2
((
k2
k4
)2 1
τθ
+
(
1
k4
)2 1
τu
)]
.
Taking the limit, we obtain
lim
τˆθ→∞
k2
k4
=
1
1− αδ
lim
τˆθ→∞
k4 =
1
limτˆθ→∞K
lim
τˆθ→∞
K = ρ
[
δ2
((
1
1− αδ
)2 1
τθ
+
(
1
limτˆθ→∞ k4
)2 1
τu
)]
.
Substitute limτˆθ→∞K into limτˆθ→∞ k4 and solve for limτˆθ→∞ k4 in the most informative
equilibrium yields
lim
τˆθ→∞
k4 =
1 +
√
1− 4ρ2δ4σ2θσ2u
(1−αδ)2
2ρδ2σ2θ
(1−αδ)2
which is finite. This proves the third result in the remark.
Proof of Remark 1.2: Let signal profile be sit = {θk}t+nk=t . Suppose that equilibrium price
function is
pt = k1dt−1 + k2,1θt + k2,2θt+1 + · · ·+ k2,n+1θt+n + k4ut (1.8.2.4)
Recall that the trading strategy of each investor i is
xit − uit = E(δpt+1 + dt|Iit)− pt
V ar(δpt+1 + dt|Iit)
which, once combining with market-clearing condition, implies that
pt =
∫
i
E(δpt+1 + dt|Iit)di+ ρV ar(δpt+1 + dt|Iit)ut. (1.8.2.5)
We know that
E(δpt+1 + dt|Iit) = (δk1 + 1)dt + δ(k2,1θt+1 + k2,2θt+2 + · · ·+ k2,nθt+n)
var(δpt+1 + dt|Iit) = δ2var(k2,n+1θt+n+1 + k4ut+1|Iit) = δ2(k22,n+1σ2θ + k24σ2u).
Substituting into Equation 1.8.2.5 yields
pt = (δk1 + 1)dt + δ(k2,1θt+1 + k2,2θt+2 + · · ·+ k2,nθt+n) + ρδ2(k22,n+1σ2θ + k24σ2u)ut
Comparing the coefficients with Equation 1.8.2.4 proves the following lemma
Lemma 1.4 Given signal profile of sit = {θk}t+nk=t , the equilibrium price is
pt =
α
1− αδdt−1 +
θt
1− αδ + δ
θt+1
1− αδ + δ
2 θt+2
1− αδ + · · ·+ δ
n θt+n
1− αδ + k4ut
where k4 = ρδ2
[
δ2n
(1−αδ)2σ
2
θ + k
2
4σ
2
u
]
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Figure 1.12: A diagram illustrating how an increase in n reduces k4 in the equilibrium.
It is immediate to see that the price is not fully revealing as k4 cannot be zero for any finite
value of n. This proves the first result in the remark.
Next, we will analyze the effect of an increase in n on k4. From k4 = ρδ2
[
δ2n
(1− αδ)2σ
2
θ + k
2
4σ
2
u
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
,
one can plot a diagram as shown in Figure 1.12.
As shown in Figure 1.12, an increase in n causes RHS to shift down, resulting in lower
equilibrium k4. Also, when discount factor is one, we obtain k4 = ρ
[
1
(1−α)2σ
2
θ + k
2
4σ
2
u
]
which
is no longer depending on n. This proves the second and third finding in the remark.
Proof of Remark 1.3: First, we characterize the equilibrium in the static setting when
τˆθ →∞. Suppose that equilibrium price in period 1 is
p1 = k1θ + k2u2 + k3u1.
Combine the standard trading strategy in period 1
xi − ui = E(θ + u2|Ii)− p1
var(θ + u2|Ii) ,
with the market-clearing condition yields
p1 = E(θ + u2|Ii) + ρvar(θ + u2|Ii)u1.
Define pˆ ≡ p1−k1θk2 = u2 + k3k2u1 and τp =
(
k2
k3
)2
τu. We obtain that
u2|p1, sit ∼ N
(
τˆusu,i + τppˆ
τˆu + τp + τu
, (τˆu + τp + τu)
−1
)
.
Substituting into the market-clearing price condition gives
p1 = θ +
τˆusu,i + τppˆ
τˆu + τp + τu
+ ρ(τˆu + τp + τu)
−1u1.
Comparing the coefficients, we obtain
k1 = 1, k2 =
τˆu + τp
τˆu + τp + τu
, k3 =
τp
k3
k2
+ ρ
τˆu + τp + τu
.
which we can solve to get k2k3 =
τˆu
ρ and that
k2 =
τˆu +
(
τˆu
ρ
)2
τu
τˆu +
(
τˆu
ρ
)2
τu + τu
, k3 =
ρ+
(
τˆu
ρ
)
τu
τˆu +
(
τˆu
ρ
)2
τu + τu
.
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From the formula, we obtain limτˆu→∞ k2 = 1 and limτˆu→∞ k3 = 0 which implies that
limτˆu→∞ var(θ + u2 − p1) = 0. Also, it is immediate to see that ∂k2∂τˆu > 0 For k3, first-order
derivative implies that ∂k3∂τˆu > 0 if and only if τˆ
2
uτ
2
u + 2τuρ
2τˆu + ρ
4 − τ2uρ2 > 0. Solving this
quadratic equation for positive value of τˆu, we obtain that τˆu >
ρ(τu−ρ)
τu
. Therefore, ∂k3∂τˆu > 0
iff τˆu >
ρ(τu−ρ)
τu
. This also immediately proves that ∂ var(θ+u2−p1)∂τˆu < 0 if τˆu >
ρ(τu−ρ)
τu
as k2
increases while k3 decreases. From perceived asset risk varθ + u2|p1, Ii = (τu + τp + τˆu)−1,
it must decrease when τˆu increases as
∂τp
∂τˆu
> 0.
For the price informativeness, we know that var(θ|p1) = (τθ + (k22 + k23)−1τu)−1. Since
var(θ|p1, τˆu = 0) = (τθ + ( τuρ )2τu)−1 and limτˆu→∞ var(θ|p1) = (τθ + τu)−1, this implies
that price informativeness must increase for some τˆu if ρ > τu, because var(θ|p1, τˆu = 0) >
limτˆu→∞ var(θ|p1) if ρ > τu. Moreover, considering the first-order derivative ∂k
2
2+k
2
3
∂τˆu
, we
obtain
sgn(
∂(k22 + k
2
3)
∂τˆu
) = sgn
((
τˆu
ρ
)3
τu +
τu
ρ
(τu − τˆu)− ρ
)
which will always be positive if τu > ρ and |τu − ρ| is sufficiently high, and will be negative if
τu < ρ and τˆu is sufficiently small. This proves the remark.
Proof of Proposition 1.1: First we substitute τˆuc = 0 and τˆθ → ∞ into equilibrium
characterization in Proposition 1.9 which gives the following lemma.
Lemma 1.5 Provided that τˆuc = 0 and 1τˆθ = 0, the equilibrium price is such that
k3 = δ
τˆu + k
2
3τu
τˆu + k23τu + τu
k2
k4
=
1
1− αδ
k4 =
1− δk3
(
k23τu
τˆu+k23τu+τu
)
ρδ2
((
k2
k4
)2
σ2θ +
(
k3
k4
)2
σ2u +
1
k24
(τˆu + k23τu + τu)
−1
)
From this characterization, we know that when τˆu = 0, then
k3 = 0 and k4 =
1
ρδ2
((
1
1−αδ
)2
σ2θ +
1
k24
σ2u
)
Let kˆ4 = 1k4 be the price sensitivity to noise factor ut. Rewriting the condition of k4 gives
kˆ4 = ρδ
2
((
1
1− αδ
)2
σ2θ + kˆ
2
4σ
2
u
)
→ kˆ4 =
1−
√
1− 4ρ2δ4kˆ22σ2θσ2u
2ρδ2σ2u
.
To prove the first result in the remark, taking first-order derivative with respect to τˆu around
τˆu = 0 on k3 and kˆ4 gives
∂k3
∂τˆu
∣∣∣∣
τˆu=0
=
1
τu
and
∂kˆ4
∂τˆu
∣∣∣∣∣
τˆu=0
=
δ2kˆ4(τu − ρkˆ4)
τu(τu − 2ρkˆ4δ2)
.
For the sign of ∂kˆ4∂τˆu
∣∣∣
τˆu=0
, it is positive if
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1. τu − ρkˆ4 ≥ 0 and τu − 2ρkˆ4δ2 ≥ 0, or
2. τu − ρkˆ4 ≤ 0 or τu − 2ρkˆ4δ2 ≤ 0.
This implies that if δ is sufficiently high, ∂kˆ4∂τˆu
∣∣∣
τˆu=0
≥ 0 if τu ≥ 2ρkˆ4δ2 or τu ≤ ρkˆ4. Checking
the condition τu ≥ 2ρkˆ4δ2 by substituting kˆ4 yields
1 ≥ 1−
√
1− 4ρ
2δ4( 11−αδ )
2σ2θ
τu
which is always true. This proves that, if δ is sufficiently high, then
∂kˆ4
∂τˆu
∣∣∣∣∣
τˆu=0
=
δ2kˆ4(τu − ρkˆ4)
τu(τu − 2ρkˆ4δ2)
≥ 0.
Also, since price sensitivity to next-period noise factor ut+1 is ∂pt∂ut+1 =
k3
k4
= k3kˆ4, we
immediately obtain that ∂pt∂ut+1 is increasing in τˆu when τˆu = 0. This proves the first result in
the proposition.
Next, we check the sign of ∂var(δpt+1+dt−pt)∂τˆu . Taking first-order derivative with respect to
τˆu and simplifying the condition gives
∂var(δpt+1 + dt − pt)
∂τˆu
∣∣∣∣
τˆu=0
= 2kˆ4
(
(δ2 + 1)
∂kˆ4
∂τˆu
− δk4
τu
)
which, once substituting ∂kˆ4∂τˆu , will be positive if
τu(δ(δ
2 + 1)− 1) > ρk4(1− δ)2
which is true if δ is sufficiently high. This proves the second result in the proposition.
It is immediate to see that price informativeness is decreasing when τˆu = 0 since the k2k4
remains unchanged, and k3k4 and
1
k4
are both increasing. This proves the third result in the
proposition.
Lastly, we check the sign of ∂var(δpt+1+dt|Iit)∂τˆu . First, note that var(δpt+1 + dt|Iit) =
δ2
((
k2
k4
)2
σ2θ +
(
k3
k4
)2
σ2u + kˆ
2
4(τˆu + k
2
3τu + τu)
−1
)
. The first-order derivative with respect
to τˆu implies that
∂var(δpt+1 + dt|Iit)
∂τˆu
∣∣∣∣
τˆu=0
≥ 0 iff ∂kˆ4
∂τˆu
∣∣∣∣∣
τˆu=0
≥ kˆ4
2τu
.
Substituting ∂kˆ4∂τˆu
∣∣∣
τˆu=0
into the condition ∂kˆ4∂τˆu
∣∣∣
τˆu=0
≥ kˆ42τu and simplifying the inequality condi-
tion gives the condition δ2 ≥ 12 which is true if δ is sufficiently high. This proves the last result
in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 1.2: Recall from Lemma 1.5 that, provided that τˆuc = 0 and τˆθ →∞,
the equilibrium price is such that
k3 = δ
τˆu + k
2
3τu
τˆu + k23τu + τu
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k2
k4
=
1
1− αδ = kˆ2
k4 =
1− δk3
(
k23τu
τˆu+k23τu+τu
)
ρδ2
((
k2
k4
)2
σ2θ +
(
k3
k4
)2
σ2u +
1
k24
(τˆu + k23τu + τu)
−1
)
Denote limτˆu→∞ k3 = k3∞,
1
k4
= kˆ4, and limτˆu→∞ kˆ4 = kˆ4∞. When τˆu → ∞, we obtain
that k3∞ = δ and kˆ4∞ = ρδ2(kˆ22σ2θ + δ
2σ2ukˆ
2
4∞) which can be solved to get kˆ4∞ =
1−
√
1−4ρ2δ6kˆ22σ2θσ2u
2ρδ4σ2u
. Now, to find kˆ4 for arbitrary τˆu, consider the equation of kˆ4.
kˆ4 =
ρδ2
(
kˆ22σ
2
θ + k
2
3σ
2
ukˆ
2
4 + kˆ
2
4(τˆu + k
2
3τu + τu)
−1
)
1− δk3
(
k23τu
τˆu+k23τu+τu
)
which is equivalent to
kˆ4 = δkˆ4
(
k3τu
τˆu + k23τu + τu
)
+ ρδ2
(
kˆ22σ
2
θ + k
2
3σ
2
ukˆ
2
4 + kˆ
2
4(τˆu + k
2
3τu + τu)
−1
)
Comparing with the equation of kˆ4∞, we obtain that kˆ4 > kˆ4∞ if and only if at kˆ4 = kˆ4∞,
δkˆ4
(
k3τu
τˆu + k23τu + τu
)
+ρδ2
(
kˆ22σ
2
θ + k
2
3σ
2
ukˆ
2
4 + kˆ
2
4(τˆu + k
2
3τu + τu)
−1
)
> ρδ2(kˆ22σ
2
θ+δ
2σ2ukˆ
2
4).
(1.8.2.6)
This is directly proved from the left panel in Figure 1.13 which shows that the RHS term
which determines kˆ4∞ must be lower than the RHS term which determines kˆ4 evaluated at kˆ4∞
to achieve kˆ4 ≥ kˆ4∞. Also, since a) RHS is continuous in τˆu, b) kˆ4 when τˆu = 0 is weakly
higher than kˆ4,∞ which can be proved easily by substituting τˆu = 0 into Lemma 1.5, and c)
∂kˆ4
∂τˆu
> 0 from Proposition 1.1, the condition 1.8.2.6 is sufficient to rule out the other case when
all the intersections of kˆ4 are on the left side of kˆ4∞. This case is shown in the right panel in
Figure 1.13.
Figure 1.13: The diagram (left) illustrating that RHS which determines kˆ4∞ must be below RHS which
determines kˆ4 to achieve kˆ4 ≥ kˆ4∞. The right panel illustrates another possible case which yields
kˆ4 ≤ kˆ4∞.
Simplifying Equation 1.8.2.6 yields
ρδ4σ2ukˆ
2
4 < δkˆ4
(
k3τu
τˆu + k23τu + τu
)
+ ρδ2
(
k23σ
2
ukˆ
2
4 + kˆ
2
4(τˆu + k
2
3τu + τu)
−1
)
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which is always true if
ρδ2σ2ukˆ
2
4 < δkˆ4
(
k3τu
τˆu + k23τu + τu
)
+ ρδ2
(
k23σ
2
ukˆ
2
4 + kˆ
2
4(τˆu + k
2
3τu + τu)
−1
)
.
because δ ≤ 1. Rearranging and simplifying the condition, given that τˆu 6= 0 yields
ρkˆ4
τu
(
(1− δ2)(τˆu + κ23τu) + τu
)
< τu.
This proves the following lemma.
Lemma 1.6 For any τˆu ∈ R+, kˆ4∞ < kˆ4 if and only if ρkˆ4∞τu
(
(1− δ2)(τˆu + κ23τu) + τu
)
<
τu.
Indeed, kˆ4∞ < kˆ4 is always true for any positive kˆ4 if δ is sufficiently high. To see this,
substituting kˆ4∞ into ρkˆ4∞τu
(
(1− δ2)(τˆu + κ23τu) + τu
)
< τu gives1−
√
1− 4ρ2δ6kˆ22σ2θσ2u
2ρδ4σ2u
( ρ
τu
)(
(1− δ2)(τˆu + κ23τu) + τu
)
< τu.
which is equivalent to
1−
√
1− 4ρ2δ6kˆ22σ2θσ2u <
2τuδ
4
(1− δ2)(τˆu + κ23τu) + τu
which is true if δ is sufficiently high. This proves the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 1.3 and 1.4: Recall from Lemma 1.5 that if τˆuc = 0 and τˆθ → ∞,
the equilibrium price is such that
k3 = δ
τˆu + k
2
3τu
τˆu + k23τu + τu
k2
k4
=
1
1− αδ
k4 =
1− δk3
(
k23τu
τˆu+k23τu+τu
)
ρδ2
((
k2
k4
)2
σ2θ +
(
k3
k4
)2
σ2u +
1
k24
(τˆu + k23τu + τu)
−1
)
which, given that kˆ4 = 1k4 , is equivalent to
kˆ4 = δkˆ4
(
k3τu
τˆu + k23τu + τu
)
+ ρδ2
(
kˆ22σ
2
θ + k
2
3σ
2
ukˆ
2
4 + kˆ
2
4(τˆu + k
2
3τu + τu)
−1
)
.
From the previous equilibrium conditions, when τˆu = 0, we obtain
k3 = 0, kˆ2 =
1
1− αδ , kˆ4 = ρδ
2
(
kˆ22σ
2
θ + kˆ
2
4σ
2
u
)
(∗)
Also, when τˆu →∞, we obtain
k3 = δ, kˆ2 =
1
1− αδ , kˆ4 = ρδ
2
(
kˆ22σ
2
θ + δ
2kˆ24σ
2
u
)
(∗∗).
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Denote kˆ4,0 = kˆ4 at τˆu = 0 and kˆ4,∞ = limτˆu→∞ kˆ4. From Equation (∗) and (∗∗), solving
for the most informative equilibrium kˆ4,0 and kˆ4,∞ yields
kˆ4,0 =
1−
√
1− 4ρ2δ4kˆ22σ2θσ2u
2ρδ2σ2u
, and kˆ4,∞ =
1−
√
1− 4ρ2δ6kˆ22σ2θσ2u
2ρδ4σ2u
which implies that
kˆ4,0 > kˆ4,∞.
Furthermore, one can prove that
var(δpt+1 + dt − pt|τˆu = 0) = δ2kˆ22σ2θ + δ2kˆ24,0σ2u + kˆ24,0σ2u
> δ2kˆ22σ
2
θ + δ
4kˆ24,∞σ
2
u + kˆ
2
4,∞σ
2
u
= lim
τˆu→∞
var(δpt+1 + dt − pt)
var(δpt+1 + dt|Iit, pt, τˆu = 0) = δ2kˆ22σ2θ + δ2kˆ24,0σ2u
> δ2kˆ22σ
2
θ + δ
4kˆ24,∞σ
2
u
= lim
τˆu→∞
var(δpt+1 + dt|Iit, pt).
Also, when δ = 1 which implies that kˆ4,0 = kˆ4,∞, it is immediate to see that
var(δpt+1 + dt − pt|τˆu = 0) = kˆ22σ2θ + kˆ24,0σ2u + kˆ24,0σ2u
= kˆ22σ
2
θ + kˆ
2
4,∞σ
2
u + kˆ
2
4,∞σ
2
u
= lim
τˆu→∞
var(δpt+1 + dt − pt)
var(δpt+1 + dt|Iit, pt, τˆu = 0) = kˆ22σ2θ + kˆ24,0σ2u
= kˆ22σ
2
θ + kˆ
2
4,∞σ
2
u
= lim
τˆu→∞
var(δpt+1 + dt|Iit, pt)
For the price informativeness, recall that kˆ4,0 = kˆ4,∞ ≤ kˆ4 when δ = 1 by Proposition 1.2
and kˆ3 > 0. Therefore, if δ is sufficiently high, then
var(θt|pt, τˆu = 0) =
(
τθ +
(
kˆ22
kˆ24,0
)
τu
)−1
<
(
τθ +
(
kˆ22
kˆ23 + kˆ
2
4
)
τu
)−1
= var(θt|pt)
This proves Proposition 1.3 and 1.4.
Proof of Remark 1.4: This is directly proved from Proposition 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4.
Proof of Proposition 1.5: Let signal profile be sit = {uk}t+nk=t+1. Suppose that equilibrium
price function is
pt = k1dt−1 + k2θt + k3,1ut+1 + k3,2ut+2 + · · ·+ k3,nut+n + k4ut (1.8.2.7)
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Recall that the trading strategy of each investor i is
xit − uit = E(δpt+1 + dt|Iit)− pt
V ar(δpt+1 + dt|Iit)
which, by market-clearing condition, implies that
pt =
∫
i
E(δpt+1 + dt|Iit)di+ ρV ar(δpt+1 + dt|Iit)ut. (1.8.2.8)
We know that
E(δpt+1 + dt|Iit) = (δk1 + 1)dt + δ(k3,1ut+2 + k3,2ut+3 + · · ·+ k3,n−1ut+n + k4ut+1)
var(δpt+1 + dt|Iit) = δ2var(k2θt+1 + k3,nut+n+1|Iit) = δ2(k22σ2θ + k23,nσ2u).
Substituting into Equation 1.8.2.8 yields
pt = (δk1+1)dt+δ(k3,1ut+2+k3,2ut+3+· · ·+k3,n−1ut+n+k4ut+1)+ρδ2(k22σ2θ+k23,nσ2u)ut.
Comparing the coefficients with Equation 1.8.2.7 yields the following lemma
Lemma 1.7 Given signal profile of sit = {uk}t+nk=t+1, the equilibrium price is
pt =
α
1− αδdt−1 +
θt
1− αδ + δk4ut+1 + δ
2k4ut+2 + · · ·+ δnk4ut+n + k4ut
where k4 = ρδ2
[(
1
1−αδ
)2
σ2θ + δ
2nk24σ
2
u
]
.
From the lemma, it is immediate to see that the price is not fully revealing as k4 cannot be
zero for any finite value of n. Next, we will analyze the effect of an increase in n on k4. From
k4 = ρδ
2
[(
1
1− αδ
)2
σ2θ + δ
2nk24σ
2
u
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
, one can plot a diagram as shown in Figure 1.14
Figure 1.14: A diagram illustrating how an increase in n causes RHS to tilt downward which causes the
equilibrium k4 to decrease.
From Figure 1.14, an increase in n cause RHS to tilt downward, resulting in lower equilib-
rium k4. To conclude, k4 is decreasing in n when discount factor is less than one. From this
finding, we can further prove that
var(δpt+1 + dt − pt) = δ2σ2θ
(
1
1− αδ
)2
+ σ2uk
2
4
(
1 + δ2(n+1)
)
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var(δpt+1 + dt|Iit, pt) = δ2σ2θ
(
1
1− αδ
)2
+ σ2uk
2
4δ
2(n+1)
are both decreasing when n increases when δ < 1.
When δ = 1, we know that k4 is independent in n as k4 = ρ
[(
1
1−α
)2
σ2θ + k
2
4σ
2
u
]
. Also,
substituting δ = 1 into var(δpt+1 + dt − pt) and var(δpt+1 + dt|Iit, pt) gives
var(δpt+1 + dt − pt) = σ2θ
(
1
1− α
)2
+ 2σ2uk
2
4
var(δpt+1 + dt|Iit, pt) = σ2θ
(
1
1− α
)2
+ σ2uk
2
4
which does not depend on n as well. However, price informativeness must be decreasing when
n increases as
var(θt|pt) =
(
τθ +
(
1
1− α
)2( 1
k24(n+ 1)
)
τu
)−1
which is increasing in n. This proves the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 1.6: First, we will prove that limτˆθ→∞,τˆu→∞
∂pt
∂ut
≤ limτˆθ→∞ ∂pt∂ut .
Recall from Proposition 1.9 that any stationary equilibrium price with signal precision {τˆθ, τˆu, τˆuc}
is such that
pt =
1
k4
(k1dt−1 + k2θt + k3ut+1 + ut + k5θ¯)
in which
k1
k4
=
α
1− αδ
k2 =
a1
(
τˆθ
τˆθ+τθ
)
ρ ((τZ + τP )−1 + Vt) +
(
τP
τZ+τP
)(
τˆθ
τˆθ+τθ
− τˆucτˆuc+τu
)
1
β
k3 =
a2
(
τˆu
τˆu+τu
)
ρ ((τZ + τP )−1 + Vt) +
(
τP
τZ+τP
)(
τˆu
τˆu+τu
− τˆucτˆuc+τu
)
1
β
k4 =
1
ρ ((τZ + τP )−1 + Vt) +
(
τP
τZ+τP
)(
1− τˆucτˆuc+τu
)
1
β
k5
k4
=
1
(1− δ)(1− αδ)
where
a1 =
1
1− αδ , a2 =
δ
k4
, Vt = δ
2
((
k2
k4
)2
σ2θ +
(
k3
k4
)2
σ2u
)
β =
k2a1(τu + τˆu) + k3a2(τθ + τˆθ)
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
τZ = (a
2
1(τθ + τˆθ)
−1 + a22(τu + τˆu)
−1)−1
τP = β
2
(
(k2a2 − k3a1)2
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
+ (τu + τˆuc)
−1
)−1
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Let τˆuc = τˆup. Denote limτˆu→∞ k3 = k3∞, kˆ4 =
1
k4
, and limτˆu→∞ k4 = k4∞. Taking
limit τˆθ →∞ and simplifying the equilibrium characterization yield the following equilibrium
conditions:
k2
k4
=
1
1− αδ = kˆ2
k3 = δ
(
k23(τu + τˆup) + τˆu
τˆu + τu + k23(τu + τˆup)
)
kˆ4 = δkˆ4
(
k3τu
τˆu + k23(τu + τˆup) + τu
)
+ρδ2
(
kˆ22σ
2
θ + k
2
3σ
2
ukˆ
2
4 + kˆ
2
4(τˆu + k
2
3(τu + τˆup) + τu)
−1
)
Also, when considering τˆu → ∞, we obtain k3∞ = δ and kˆ4∞ = ρδ2(kˆ22σ2θ + δ2σ2ukˆ24∞).
Following the same argument in the proof of Proposition 1.2 (to obtain Lemma 1.6), we know
that kˆ4 > kˆ4∞ if and only if, at kˆ4 = kˆ4∞,
ρδ4σ2ukˆ
2
4 < δkˆ4
(
k3τu
τˆu + k23(τu + τˆup) + τu
)
+ρδ2
(
kˆ22σ
2
θ + k
2
3σ
2
ukˆ
2
4 + kˆ
2
4(τˆu + k
2
3(τu + τˆup) + τu)
−1
)
which is always true if
ρδ2σ2ukˆ
2
4 < δkˆ4
(
k3τu
τˆu + k23(τu + τˆup) + τu
)
+ρδ2
(
kˆ22σ
2
θ + k
2
3σ
2
ukˆ
2
4 + kˆ
2
4(τˆu + k
2
3(τu + τˆup) + τu)
−1
)
because δ ≤ 1. Rearranging and simplifying the condition, given that τˆu 6= 0 yields
ρkˆ4
τu
(
(1− δ2)(τˆu + k23(τu + τˆup)) + τu
)
< τu.
Indeed, kˆ4∞ < kˆ4 is always true if δ is sufficiently high and n is finite (to guarantee that τˆup
is finite). To see this, substituting kˆ4 = kˆ4∞ into ρkˆ4τu
(
(1− δ2)(τˆu + k23(τu + τˆup)) + τu
)
<
τu. gives1−
√
1− 4ρ2δ6kˆ22σ2θσ2u
2ρδ4σ2u
( ρ
τu
)(
(1− δ2)(τˆu + k23(τu + τˆup)) + τu
)
< τu.
which is equivalent to
1−
√
1− 4ρ2δ6kˆ22σ2θσ2u <
2τuδ
4
(1− δ2)(τˆu + κ23τu) + τu
which is always true if δ is sufficiently high and n is finite (to guarantee that τˆup is finite). Also,
substituting τˆu = 0 into the equilibrium condition, we obtain that kˆ4 ≥ kˆ4∞ at τˆu = 0. From
the proof, we obtain the following lemma
Lemma 1.8 Provided that Assumption 1.3 is true, then
1. limτˆθ→∞,τˆu→∞
∂pt
∂ut
< limτˆθ→∞
∂pt
∂ut
for any τˆu ∈ R+.
2. limτˆθ→∞,τˆu→∞
∂pt
∂ut
≤ limτˆθ→∞ ∂pt∂ut at τˆu = 0.
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Next, we will prove Proposition 1.6. First note that limτˆθ→∞,τˆu→0 kˆ4 = limτˆθ→∞,τˆu→∞ kˆ4
if δ = 1 from Proposition 1.4. Note that Proposition 1.4 remains valid even though τˆuc = τˆup >
0 since the signal about ut does not affect the limit values in which τˆθ →∞ and τˆu →∞ of all
coefficients in the equilibrium price function. Also, from the equilibrium condition, k3 = 0 if
τˆu = 0 and k3 > 0 if τˆu > 0. Therefore, by Lemma 1.8, we immediately obtain that
lim
τˆθ→∞
∂pt
∂ut
≥ lim
τˆθ→∞,τˆu→0
∂pt
∂ut
if δ = 1
lim
τˆθ→∞
∂pt
∂ut+1
> lim
τˆθ→∞,τˆu→0
∂pt
∂ut+1
.
Lastly, from limτˆθ→∞
∂pt
∂ut
≥ limτˆθ→∞,τˆu→0 ∂pt∂ut when δ = 1 and limτˆθ→∞
∂pt
∂ut+1
> 0.
Therefore, if δ is sufficiently high, then
lim
τˆθ→∞,τˆu→0
var(θt|pt) =
(
τθ +
(
kˆ22
limτˆθ→∞,τˆu→0 kˆ
2
4
)
τu
)−1
<
(
τθ +
(
kˆ22
limτˆθ→∞(kˆ
2
3 + kˆ
2
4)
)
τu
)−1
= lim
τˆθ→∞
var(θt|pt)
This proves the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 1.7: Recall from Proposition 1.9 that any stationary equilibrium price
with signal precision {τˆθ, τˆu, τˆuc} is such that
pt =
1
k4
(k1dt−1 + k2θt + k3ut+1 + ut + k5θ¯)
in which
k1
k4
=
α
1− αδ
k2 =
a1
(
τˆθ
τˆθ+τθ
)
ρ ((τZ + τP )−1 + Vt) +
(
τP
τZ+τP
)(
τˆθ
τˆθ+τθ
− τˆucτˆuc+τu
)
1
β
k3 =
a2
(
τˆu
τˆu+τu
)
ρ ((τZ + τP )−1 + Vt) +
(
τP
τZ+τP
)(
τˆu
τˆu+τu
− τˆucτˆuc+τu
)
1
β
k4 =
1
ρ ((τZ + τP )−1 + Vt) +
(
τP
τZ+τP
)(
1− τˆucτˆuc+τu
)
1
β
k5
k4
=
1
(1− δ)(1− αδ)
where
a1 =
1
1− αδ , a2 =
δ
k4
, Vt = δ
2
((
k2
k4
)2
σ2θ +
(
k3
k4
)2
σ2u
)
β =
k2a1(τu + τˆu) + k3a2(τθ + τˆθ)
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
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τZ = (a
2
1(τθ + τˆθ)
−1 + a22(τu + τˆu)
−1)−1
τP = β
2
(
(k2a2 − k3a1)2
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
+ (τu + τˆuc)
−1
)−1
Case I: when τˆθ →∞ and τˆu →∞
Taking limits of τˆθ → ∞ and τˆu → ∞ gives τZ → ∞. Also, one can easily simplify the
characterization into
k2 =
a1
ρVt
, k3 =
a2
ρVt
, k4 =
1
ρVt
which implies that
k2
k4
= a1 =
1
1− αδ ,
k3
k4
= a2 =
δ
k4
→ k3 = δ
Denote kˆ2 = k2k4 , kˆ3 =
k3
k4
, kˆ4 = 1k4 . From the equation k4 =
1
ρVt
, we can rewrite it after
substituting kˆ2 and kˆ3 as follows:
kˆ4 = ρδ
2
((
1
1− αδ
)2
σ2θ + δ
2σ2ukˆ
2
4
)
.
To conclude, if τˆθ →∞ and τˆu →∞, then
kˆ2 =
1
1− αδ , k3 = δ, kˆ4 = ρδ
2
((
1
1− αδ
)2
σ2θ + δ
2σ2ukˆ
2
4
)
.
which immediately proves that price efficiency of all measures does not depend on τˆuc.
Case II: when τˆθ →∞ and τˆuc →∞
Taking limit τˆθ →∞ and τˆuc →∞ yields τP →∞, τZ = τu+τˆua22 and β =
k3
a2
. Substituting
τˆθ → ∞, τˆuc → ∞, β = k3a2 , τZ = τu+τˆua22 , and τP → ∞ into the characterization and
simplifying the system of equations yield
k2 =
a1
ρVt
, k3 =
a2
ρVt
, k4 =
1
ρVt
which implies that
k2
k4
= a1 =
1
1− αδ ,
k3
k4
= a2 =
δ
k4
→ k3 = δ
Denote kˆ2 = k2k4 , kˆ3 =
k3
k4
, kˆ4 = 1k4 . From the equation k4 =
1
ρVt
, we can rewrite it after
substituting kˆ2 and kˆ3 as follows:
kˆ4 = ρδ
2
((
1
1− αδ
)2
σ2θ + δ
2σ2ukˆ
2
4
)
.
To conclude, if τˆθ →∞ and τˆuc →∞, then
kˆ2 =
1
1− αδ , k3 = δ, kˆ4 = ρδ
2
((
1
1− αδ
)2
σ2θ + δ
2σ2ukˆ
2
4
)
.
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Case III: when τˆu →∞ and τˆuc →∞
Taking limit τˆu → ∞ and τˆuc → ∞ in the equilibrium characterization yields τP → ∞,
τZ =
τθ+τˆθ
a21
and β = k2a1 . Substituting τˆu →∞, τˆuc →∞, β = k2a1 , τZ =
τθ+τˆθ
a21
, and τP →∞
into the characterization and simplifying the system of equations yield
k2 =
a1
ρVt
, k3 =
a2
ρVt
, k4 =
1
ρVt
which implies that
k2
k4
= a1 =
1
1− αδ ,
k3
k4
= a2 =
δ
k4
→ k3 = δ.
Denote kˆ2 = k2k4 , kˆ3 =
k3
k4
, kˆ4 = 1k4 . From the equation k4 =
1
ρVt
, we can rewrite it after
substituting kˆ2 and kˆ3 as follows:
kˆ4 = ρδ
2
((
1
1− αδ
)2
σ2θ + δ
2σ2ukˆ
2
4
)
.
To conclude, if τˆu →∞ and τˆuc →∞, then
kˆ2 =
1
1− αδ , k3 = δ, kˆ4 = ρδ
2
((
1
1− αδ
)2
σ2θ + δ
2σ2ukˆ
2
4
)
.
From the three cases above, we obtain that, given that X = {dt−1, θt, ut, ut+1},
lim
τˆθ→∞,τˆuc→∞
pt(X) = lim
τˆu→∞,τˆuc→∞
pt(X) = lim
τˆθ→∞,τˆu→∞
pt(X).
as all the coefficients in the equilibrium price equation are identical across three cases. This
proves the proposition.
Proof of Remark 1.5: Recall from Proposition 1.9 that any stationary equilibrium price
with signal precision {τˆθ, τˆu, τˆuc} is such that
pt =
1
k4
(k1dt−1 + k2θt + k3ut+1 + ut + k5θ¯)
in which
k1
k4
=
α
1− αδ
k2 =
a1
(
τˆθ
τˆθ+τθ
)
ρ ((τZ + τP )−1 + Vt) +
(
τP
τZ+τP
)(
τˆθ
τˆθ+τθ
− τˆucτˆuc+τu
)
1
β
k3 =
a2
(
τˆu
τˆu+τu
)
ρ ((τZ + τP )−1 + Vt) +
(
τP
τZ+τP
)(
τˆu
τˆu+τu
− τˆucτˆuc+τu
)
1
β
k4 =
1
ρ ((τZ + τP )−1 + Vt) +
(
τP
τZ+τP
)(
1− τˆucτˆuc+τu
)
1
β
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k5
k4
=
1
(1− δ)(1− αδ)
where
a1 =
1
1− αδ , a2 =
δ
k4
, Vt = δ
2
((
k2
k4
)2
σ2θ +
(
k3
k4
)2
σ2u
)
β =
k2a1(τu + τˆu) + k3a2(τθ + τˆθ)
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
τZ = (a
2
1(τθ + τˆθ)
−1 + a22(τu + τˆu)
−1)−1
τP = β
2
(
(k2a2 − k3a1)2
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
+ (τu + τˆuc)
−1
)−1
Case I: when τˆθ →∞, τˆu = 0, and τˆuc = 0.
Substituting τˆθ →∞, τˆu = 0, and τˆuc = 0 into the characterization gives
k2
k4
=
1
1− αδ , k3 = 0, k4 =
1
K
where K = ρδ2
((
k2
k4
)2
1
τθ
+
(
1
k4
)2
1
τu
)
. Denote kˆ4 = 1k4 . Then, we have
kˆ4 = ρδ
2
((
1
1− αδ
)2
σ2θ + σ
2
ukˆ
2
4
)
.
Case II: when τˆθ →∞, τˆu = 0, and τˆuc →∞.
Substituting τˆθ →∞, τˆu = 0, and τˆuc →∞ into the characterization gives
k2
k4
=
1
1− αδ , k3 = δ, k4 =
1
K
where K = ρδ2
((
k2
k4
)2
1
τθ
+ δ2
(
1
k4
)2
1
τu
)
. Denote kˆ4 = 1k4 . Then, we have
kˆ4 = ρδ
2
((
1
1− αδ
)2
σ2θ + δ
2σ2ukˆ
2
4
)
.
Comparing two cases above, we see that when δ = 1, k2 and k4 are identical across two
cases. Consider var(θt|pt) =
(
τθ +
(
k22
k23+1
)
τu
)−1
. When τˆθ → ∞, τˆu = 0, and τˆuc = 0,
we have var(θt|pt) =
(
τθ + k
2
2τu
)−1. When τˆθ → ∞, τˆu = 0, and τˆuc → ∞, we have
var(θt|pt) =
(
τθ +
(
k22
δ2+1
)
τu
)−1
. Therefore, when discount factor is one, var(θt|pt) given
that τˆθ → ∞, τˆu = 0, and τˆuc = 0 must be lower than that of which τˆθ → ∞, τˆu = 0, and
τˆuc →∞. By continuity, this inequality is valid if δ is sufficiently high. This proves the remark.
Proof of Lemma 1.1: First, we find the ex-ante payoff of each investor i. Consider the
ex-ante utility function
E(Uit(piit|Iit)) = E(E(δpt+1+dt−pt|Iit)(xt−uit))−ρ
2
E (V ar((δpt+1 + dt − pt)(xt − uit)|Iit))
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Substituting xit − uit = E(δpt+1+dt|Iit)−ptV ar(δpt+1+dt|Iit) yields
E(Uit(piit|Iit)) = E
(
E(δpt+1 + dt − pt|Iit)2
ρV ar(δpt+1 + dt|Iit)
)
− 1
2ρ
E
(
E(δpt+1 + dt − pt|Iit)2
V ar(δpt+1 + dt|Iit)
)
= E
(
E(δpt+1 + dt − pt|Iit)2
2ρV ar(δpt+1 + dt|Iit)
)
=
V ar (E(δpt+1 + dt − pt|Iit)) + E(E(δpt+1 + dt − pt|Iit))
2ρV ar(δpt+1 + dt|Iit)
Since for any random variable X,
V ar(X) = V ar(E(X|I)) + E(V ar(X|I))
together with law of iterated expectation, we obtain
E(Uit(piit|Iit)) = V ar (δpt+1 + dt − pt)− V ar(δpt+1 + dt|Iit) + E(δpt+1 + dt − pt)
2ρV ar(δpt+1 + dt|Iit)
=
V ar (δpt+1 + dt − pt) + E(δpt+1 + dt − pt)
2ρV ar(δpt+1 + dt|Iit) −
1
2ρ
which proves the following lemma
Lemma 1.9 Ex-ante payoff of each investor is
E(Uit(piit|Iit)) = V ar (δpt+1 + dt − pt) + E(δpt+1 + dt − pt)
2ρV ar(δpt+1 + dt|Iit) −
1
2ρ
To find optimal information choice, it is easy to see that investors will choose optimal
information choice to minimize V ar(δpt+1 + dt|Iit) to maximize the ex-ante utility. This is
because (τˆu,it, τˆθ,it) does not enter into E(δpt+1 + dt − pt) and that investors do not take into
account their influence of unconditional variance V ar (δpt+1 + dt − pt) in the competitive
market setting. Since V ar(δpt+1 + dt|Iit) = Vt + (τZ + τP )−1, optimization problem of any
investor i amounts to
(τˆu,it, τˆθ,it) ∈ arg max
τˆuit,τˆθit
τZ + τP
subject to the technological constraint
τˆθ,it + γτˆu,it ≤ Γ
Since we characterize only symmetric and stationary equilibrium information choice (τˆθ, τˆu) ,
we drop subscript it and set Lagrangian function as follows.
L = τZ + τP + λ(Γ− τˆθ − γτˆu)
Recall that when τˆuc = 0
β =
k2a1(τu + τˆu) + k3a2(τθ + τˆθ)
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
τZ = (a
2
1(τθ + τˆθ)
−1 + a22(τu + τˆu)
−1)−1
τP = β
2
(
(k2a2 − k3a1)2
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
+ (τu)
−1
)−1
.
58
We obtain
∂τZ
∂τˆθ
=
a21(τu + τˆu)
2
(a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ))
2
∂τZ
∂τˆu
=
a22(τθ + τˆθ)
2
(a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ))
2
∂β
∂τˆθ
=
a1a2(k3a1 − k2a2)(τu + τˆu)
(a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ))
2
∂β
∂τˆu
=
a1a2(k2a2 − k3a1)(τθ + τˆθ)
(a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ))
2
∂(τP /β
2)
∂τˆθ
=
(
τP
β2
)2( k2a2 − k3a1
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
)2
a22
∂(τP /β
2)
∂τˆu
=
(
τP
β2
)2( k2a2 − k3a1
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
)2
a21
and the first-order condition for any interior solution of (τˆu, τˆθ) is
∂τZ + τP
∂τˆu
− 2λγ = 0
∂τZ + τP
∂τˆθ
− 2λ = 0
τˆθ + γτˆu = Γ
which can be simplified to the two following equations.
∂τZ+τP
∂τˆθ
∂τZ+τP
∂τˆu
=
∂τZ
∂τˆθ
+ 2β ∂β∂τˆθ (
τP
β2
) + β2 ∂(τP /β
2)
∂τˆθ
∂τZ
∂τˆu
+ 2β ∂β∂uˆθ (
τP
β2
) + β2 ∂(τP /β
2)
∂uˆθ
=
1
γ
and τˆθ + γτˆu = Γ.
Let
B =
τP
β2
=
(
(k2a2 − k3a1)2
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
+ (τu)
−1
)−1
.
Substituting all the expressions into the optimality condition gives
1
γ
=
(a1(τu + τˆu) + βB(k3a1 − k2a2)a2)2
(a2(τθ + τˆθ) + βB(k2a2 − k3a1)a1)2
which also shows that ∂τZ+τP∂τˆθ ≥ 0 and
∂τZ+τP
∂τˆu
≥ 0. Also,
βB =
k2a1(τu + τˆu) + k3a2(τθ + τˆθ)
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
(
(k2a2 − k3a1)2
a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ)
+ (τu)
−1
)−1
=
k2a1(τu + τˆu) + k3a2(τθ + τˆθ)
(k2a2 − k3a1)2 + (τu)−1X
where X = a21(τu + τˆu) + a
2
2(τθ + τˆθ). Note that
a1(τu+τˆu)+βB(k3a1−k2a2)a2 =
(
k3(k3a1 − k2a2) + a1(τu + τˆu)(τu)−1
)
X
(k2a2 − k3a1)2 + (τu)−1X
a2(τθ + τˆθ) + βB(k2a2 − k3a1)a1 =
(
k2(k2a2 − k3a1) + a2(τθ + τˆθ)(τu)−1
)
X
(k2a2 − k3a1)2 + (τu)−1X
and thus substituting βX into the optimality condition yields
1
γ
=
(
k3(k3a1 − k2a2) + a1(τu + τˆu)(τu)−1
k2(k2a2 − k3a1) + a2(τθ + τˆθ)(τu)−1
)2
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This simplified optimality condition is similar to equating slope of indifference curve of investors
with price ratio of the technological constraint. The right hand side term is absolute value of
MRS of choosing information bundle (τˆθ, τˆu) while the left hand side is the price ratio which is
somewhat depend on the signal precision itself due to the non-linear nature of technological
constraint.
Last step is to check second-order condition whether the function τP + τZ is quasi-concave.
A sufficient way to prove this is to show that (negative) slope of the indifference curve is
decreasing in τˆθ. To see this, let
MU = k3(k3a1 − k2a2) + a1(τu + τˆu)(τu + τui)−1
MD = k2(k2a2 − k3a1) + a2(τθ + τˆθ)(τu + τui)−1
and M =
MU
MD
.
Differentiate the slope of the indifference curve gives
∂M2
∂2τˆθ
= −2M
2
M2D
(τu)
−1 ((k3a1 − k2a2)2 + a21(τu + τˆu)(τu)−1 + a22(τθ + τˆθ)(τu)−1)
< 0
which is sufficient to prove that the second-order condition is satisfied. Thus, we obtain that, in
any symmetric equilibrium, optimal information choice (τˆu, τˆθ) for any interior solution must
satisfy
1
γ
=
(
τuk3(k3a1 − k2a2) + a1(τu + τˆu)
τuk2(k2a2 − k3a1) + a2(τθ + τˆθ)
)2
which proves the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1.8: Recall that any equilibrium information choice of an interior
solution must satisfy
1
γ
=
(
τuk3(k3a1 − k2a2) + a1(τu + τˆu)
τuk2(k2a2 − k3a1) + a2(τθ + τˆθ)
)2
.
However, if γ is sufficiently high such that
1
γ
<
(
a1τu
τuk22a2 + a2(τθ + Γ)
)2
,
Then, a corner solution of τˆu = 0 and τˆθ = Γ is possible.
Next, we will prove that τˆu > 0 if and only if Γ > Γ∗. Let Γ∗ satisfy
1
γ
=
(
a1τu
τuk¯22a2 + a2(τθ + Γ
∗)
)2
.
where k¯2 is evaluated at (τˆθ = Γ, τˆu = 0).
Now, consider Γ < Γ∗. Suppose that there is an interior solution (τˆθ, τˆu) such that τˆu > 0
in which
1
γ
=
(
τuk3(k3a1 − k2a2) + a1(τu + τˆu)
τuk2(k2a2 − k3a1) + a2(τθ + τˆθ)
)2
.
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Then, we can increase γ such that
1
γ
<
(
τuk3(k3a1 − k2a2) + a1(τu + τˆu)
τuk2(k2a2 − k3a1) + a2(τθ + τˆθ)
)2
.
for any (τˆθ, τˆu). That is, set γ to be sufficiently high to surpass the lowerbound of
(
τuk3(k3a1−k2a2)+a1(τu+τˆu)
τuk2(k2a2−k3a1)+a2(τθ+τˆθ)
)2
.
The lowerbound exists and must be positive because 1) k2, k3, and k4 are positive finite
value in the equilibrium which causes τuk2(k2a2 − k3a1) + a2(τθ + τˆθ) to be finite and 2)
τuk3(k3a1 − k2a2) + a1(τu + τˆu) > 0 when γ is sufficiently high. The latter condition is true
since τˆu ≤ Γ∗γ in any equilibrium and that Γ
∗
γ =
(
a1τu
√
Γ∗
τuk¯22a2+a2(τθ+Γ
∗)
)2
which implies that τˆu
(and k3) are approximately zero when γ is sufficiently high. Therefore, if γ is sufficiently high,
then only corner solution where τˆu = 0 exists.
When Γ > Γ∗, the corner solution is not possible since
1
γ
=
(
a1τu
τuk¯22a2 + a2(τθ + Γ
∗)
)2
>
(
a1τu
τu k22
∣∣
τˆu=0,τˆθ=Γ
a2 + a2(τθ + Γ)
)2
.
as k22
∣∣
τˆu=0,τˆθ=Γ
> k¯2 based on Remark 1.1 proved in the baseline equilibrium setting. This
proves the first result in the proposition
To prove the second statement in the proposition, consider
1
γ
=
(
a1τu
τuk¯22a2 + a2(τθ + Γ
∗)
)2
.
If γ is high, then Γ∗ must be high to achieve the break-even point. Recall from our previous
proof that if τˆθ →∞ and τˆu = 0, then
k2
k4
=
1
1− αδ , k3 = 0, k4 =
1
K
where K = ρδ2
((
k2
k4
)2
1
τθ
+
(
1
k4
)2
1
τu
)
. Denote kˆ4 = 1k4 . Then, we have
kˆ4 = ρδ
2
((
1
1− αδ
)2
σ2θ + σ
2
ukˆ
2
4
)
.
By continuity, we obtain that if Γ∗ is sufficiently large due to high γ, then the equilibrium price
at Γ∗ is such that
k2
k4
≈ 1
1− αδ , k3 = 0, kˆ4 ≈ ρδ
2
((
1
1− αδ
)2
σ2θ + σ
2
ukˆ
2
4
)
.
Now, consider Γ → ∞ which implies that τˆθ → ∞ and τˆu → ∞ in the interior solution.
Recall from the previous proof that if τˆθ →∞ and τˆu →∞, then
k2
k4
=
1
1− αδ , k3 = δ, kˆ4 = ρδ
2
((
1
1− αδ
)2
σ2θ + δ
2σ2ukˆ
2
4
)
.
This immediately proves that if discount factor is sufficiently high which causes kˆ4 (and k2) to
be approximately identical when Γ = Γ∗ and when Γ→∞, then
var(θt|pt,Γ = Γ∗) = (τθ + k22τu)−1 < (τθ +
k22
1 + δ2
τu)
−1 = lim
Γ→∞
var(θt|pt)
By continuity, there exists Γ¯ > Γ∗ such that for any Γ ≥ Γ¯, var(θt|pt) > limΓ→Γ∗ var(θt|pt).
This proves the second statement and the proposition.
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Chapter 2
Periphery Dealers in Over-the-counter
Markets
2.1 Introduction
Over-the-counter (OTC) markets are off-exchange decentralized markets where investors search
for trading counterparties and privately negotiate to settle trades. In the past years, OTC markets
have been important segments for trading wide-ranging financial products such as interbank
loans, derivatives, and fixed-income securities. Due to non-standardized nature of these financial
products, OTC markets are illiquid and highly dependent on dealers, the market makers who
quote prices and provide liquidity to investors using their inventories. To design appropriate
regulatory framework and ensure market efficiency within OTC markets, understanding trading
strategies of all market participants is thus crucial for policymakers.
The objective of this paper is to study trading behavior of buy-side investors, particularly on
their dealer choices, and discuss the implications on market efficiency and stability. Our research
question comes from recent empirical findings about business models of dealers locating at
different positions in OTC dealer network. Several empirical studies on OTC secondary markets
have documented persistent core-periphery dealer network – few highly interconnected dealers
constitute the core and several sparsely connected dealers constitute the periphery.1 Based on Li
and Schürhoff (2019), dealers at the core are the main suppliers of liquidity (i.e. immediacy
provision), executing incoming order flows using their own inventories to provide immediacy
and offloading their positions later with another end-user investor. In contrast, dealers at the
periphery are distributors of liquidity (immediacy) from core dealers to end-user investors.
Compared to core dealers, periphery dealers are more likely to pre-arrange trades between a
more central dealer and an end-user investor rather than matching trades between two end-user
1Examples of empirical literatures on OTC trading network include Li and Schürhoff (2019) for municipal
bonds market, Di Maggio et al (2017) for corporate bonds market, Bech and Atalay (2010) and Afonso and Lagos
(2014) on interbank market, and Hollifield et al (2017) for securitization market.
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investors or taking positions to provide liquidity.2 According to Li and Schürhoff (2019),
“...consistent with central dealers providing more immediate execution and getting compensated
for doing so, we find that central dealers match buyers with sellers more directly. After
purchasing a bond from an investor, a central dealer is more likely to sell it to the end-buyer
than to off-load it to another dealer...central dealers are more likely to offer immediacy by
trading on a principal basis, that is, by taking bonds into inventory, than to prearrange trades
between a buyer and a seller, which takes time to execute...we find that bonds flow from
periphery to center and partially back. Dealers in the middle of a chain are more central than
either the dealer purchasing the bond from the customer or the dealer ultimately selling the
bond to the customer. Central dealers thus act as hubs by redistributing the order flow.”
This finding raises a few interesting theoretical questions. Without a physical barrier that
prohibits investors to contact core dealers directly and shorten the intermediation chain,3 why
do some investors choose to trade with periphery dealers? To be specific, given superior
dealer network position and an ability to exercise price discrimination of core dealers, why can
periphery dealers compete and co-exist with core dealers? We aim to shed light on this issue
by providing a new theory on strategic dealer choice of buy-side investors which explains why
periphery dealers can compete for order flows with core dealers.
Our theory is based on a premise that buy-side investors form a non-binding long-term
trading relationship with sell-side dealers to obtain liquidity (immediacy). Relationship es-
tablishment among market participants is common in financial markets due to their repeated
interactions.4 Because OTC markets are search-based markets which involve investors searching
for a dealer (or vice versa) who is willing to trade at the best price, an ability to maintain
contact with customers is valuable for dealers.5 One competitive strategy of dealers is to form
a non-binding long-term relationship with investors by offering special benefits, such as price
discount or inside information, to the investors who frequently trade with them.6 This paper
considers a type of long-term relationship in which dealers offer liquidity insurance – a promise
to execute trade orders on the spot at an affordable price (i.e. immediacy provision) during
illiquid periods – to their loyal clients. We will show that investors might strategically choose
periphery dealers, because they expect to receive higher future benefits from trading with the
periphery dealers than trading with core dealers.
We develop a game-theoretic infinite-period model of a dealer market for liquidity service,
the service to execute trade order on the spot (i.e. immediacy). In short, the model consists of
a principal dealer who can produce indivisible units of costly liquidity service, a competitive
2Similar to Li and Schürhoff (2019), Hollifield et al (2017) documented that periphery dealers are more likely to
pre-arrange trades compared to core dealers who mostly execute principal trades in securitization market.
3Note that this situation is different from public exchanges, where only exchange members can participate in
trading, thus the investors must trade via brokerage firms which justify the existence of brokers.
4 A few examples include order preferencing agreement between brokers and specialists (Benveniste et al (1992),
Harris (2002)) or among dealers in NASDAQ (Dutta and Madhavan (1997)), information sharing between brokers
and investors (Di Maggio et al (forthcoming)), relationship lending in interbank markets (Afonso et al (2014)) and
repo markets (Han and Nikolaou (2016)).
5As mentioned in Li and Schürhoff (2019), “Locating bonds and potential buyers thus requires that financial
intermediaries have active relationships with various types of investors as well as with other dealers.”
6Hendershott et al (2017) also found evidence of client-dealer relationships in corporate bonds market and
confirmed the impact of long-term relationship on execution costs.
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principal dealer who always provides liquidity service at a competitive price, a group of
homogeneous investors who face i.i.d. random liquidity shocks and will demand one unit of
liquidity service from a principal dealer, and an agency dealer who cannot produce liquidity
service but can intermediate trades between principal dealers and investors.7 Indeed, the
principal dealer represents dealers at the core and the agency dealer represents dealers at the
periphery in the dealer network. There are two random states which determine the principal
dealers’ costs of providing liquidity service: good states in which the cost is low and bad states in
which the cost is high. All agents are long-lived and can form a non-binding relationship among
each other. We apply the Folk theorem to study incentive of all players to enter a non-binding
long-term relationship and characterize optimal dealer choice of the investors.
Our setup exhibits two main features which capture trade frictions in OTC markets. The
first one is cash constraint problem, in which the investors do not have enough cash to pay for
costly liquidity service in bad states. In reality, when providing immediacy, a principal dealer
may incur high inventory risk in some periods, particularly for trade orders of older, seasoned,
or illiquid security. Therefore, even though investors might value immediacy much higher than
liquidity cost of the principal dealer, the investors are unable to get immediacy if they do not
have enough cash to pay now. The second feature is imperfect information problem, in which
the investors do not have any information about trade or liquidity shocks of other investors,
capturing the current state of opacity within OTC markets.8
The model gives three main insights. First, the investors must have frequent liquidity shocks
to successfully form long-term relationship with the principal dealer directly. Specifically, due to
the cash constraint problem, the investor and the principal dealer make a non-binding agreement,
in which the dealer will provide liquidity service at an affordable price in bad states as long
as the investor continues trading with the dealer and pays a premium in good states. If the
relationship formation is successful, both parties will obtain higher surplus: the investor secures
liquidity in future bad states and the principal dealer earns higher profit from future order flows.
However, to form a relationship, the investor must bring sufficiently high future benefits (i.e.
high frequency of liquidity needs) to the principal dealer, so that the dealer would commit
to incur an upfront loss of liquidity provision in bad states. Similarly, the investor must also
face frequent liquidity shocks to willingly trade with the principal dealer in good states. If the
investor has infrequent liquidity shocks, either 1) the dealer will strategically refuse to provide
costly liquidity when a bad state comes or 2) the investor will not trade with the principal dealer
when a good states come. This two-sided commitment problem creates a non-physical barrier
against the investors to establish the relationship with the principal dealer and obtain liquidity in
bad states if they have infrequent liquidity shocks.
The second insight is that an agency dealer can attenuate the commitment problem and
sustain the relationship between the investors and the principal dealer. Intuitively, the agency
dealer can form non-binding relationships with several investors and aggregate frequency of
7This assumption on exogenous business model of dealers allows us to examine the dealer choice of the buy-side
investors in a tractable framework. There are several literatures that focus on the sell-side behavior and try to explain
who will emerge as core or periphery dealers. See literature review for more details.
8Currently, several OTC markets require only dissemination of post-trade information without trader identity to
the public. Thus, the investors are unable to identify trading patterns of other investors. Note that this informational
friction prevents the investors from forming relationships among each other.
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liquidity needs to be sufficiently high. Then, the agency dealer forms another non-binding
relationship with the principal dealer on behalf of all the investors and agrees on liquidity quota,
the minimum per-period amount of liquidity service that the principal dealer must provide in
bad states. Setting low liquidity quota will increase the principal dealer’s incentive to commit
to costly liquidity provision in bad states. This is because, to continue receiving future order
flows of all the investors who connect with the agency dealer, the principal dealer only needs to
incur relatively low upfront cost of costly liquidity provision in bad states when the quota is
low. Therefore, if the investors have infrequent trading needs, they will trade with the agency
dealer to obtain the benefit of liquidity insurance rather than trading with the principal dealer for
a one-period benefit.
Our third insight is that, when connecting with agency dealer, investors can still face liquidity
shortage if too many investors simultaneously demand liquidity from the agency dealer in bad
states. This is because the agreed liquidity quota must be low enough for the principal dealer
to commit to the relationship. This finding sheds light on an empirical finding on a tradeoff
between execution cost and trading speed (Li and Schürhoff (2019)). From our model, there
is a tradeoff between execution cost and the degree of liquidity insurance coverage when an
investor selects a dealer: a relationship with principal dealer offers full liquidity insurance with
expensive premium while a relationship with agency dealer offers partial liquidity insurance with
cheaper premium. In appendix, we extend the model to include investors with heterogeneous
frequency of liquidity shocks and show that this tradeoff is applicable to only frequent-liquidity-
need investors who can form direct relationship with principal dealer. However, due to the
commitment problem, investors who have infrequent liquidity shocks can obtain only the latter
deal, granting market power to the agency dealer (at the periphery) to co-exist with principal
dealer (at the core).
Our finding has important implications on market efficiency and stability within OTC
secondary markets. Contradicting to traditional view on long intermediation chain as a source
of allocative inefficiency, our model suggests that an agency dealer who intermediates trade
between a main liquidity-providing principal dealer and a group of investors can improve
allocative efficiency and market liquidity. However, in terms of market stability as measured by
the likelihood of first-trigger event of systemic crisis, the impact of agency dealers is ambiguous.
On the one hand, they reduce liquidity risk of existing small investors who cannot obtain liquidity
in bad states without agency dealers. On the other hand, the presence of agency dealers can
attract more small investors to enter the market and start investing in the security. However,
these investors are highly subjected to liquidity shortage when several investors demand liquidity
simultaneously. Depending on further knock-on effects from the first-round liquidity dry-up
among the investors, emergence of agency dealers can cause an alarming concern to market
regulators.
Related literature
Our paper relates to the literature of endogenous intermediation in over-the-counter markets.
A group of literatures adopted search and bargaining model which involves atomistic players
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randomly matched among each other to trade assets.9 To illustrate, Hugonnier et al (2016)
considered a search model in which investors have heterogenous valuation and found that those
with moderate valuation will emerge as intermediaries. Üslü (2019) considered a case when
investors have heterogenous search intensity and established that those with high search intensity
will emerge as intermediaries. Farboodi et al (2017) relaxed the assumption of exogenous search
intensity. Afonso and Lagos (2015) developed a search model to study fed funds market and
show that the equilibrium exhibits endogenous intermediation even though all players are
identical. While these literatures can capture several important features of over-the-counter asset
markets, this random matching model might not be suitable for studying relationship-based
OTC markets in which market participants repeatedly interact with each other. This paper fills
in the gap by studying impact of long-term relationship between dealers and end-user clients on
OTC market structure.
Our paper also belongs to a growing literature of financial network formation. Farboodi
(2017) studied formation of credit lending network in which players form a link to manage
their counterpart risks. The mechanism is different from our paper which focuses on liquidity
management in secondary asset markets. Chang and Zhang (2019) developed a dynamic
matching model in which the matching process is endogenous and traders have heterogeneous
volatility of private asset valuation. They established that the equilibrium network exhibits a
multi-layered hierarchy core-periphery structure in which investors with relatively low volatility
emerge as intermediaries and investors with relatively high volatility act as end-user clients.
This is different from our paper which focuses on strategic dealer choice of end-user investors
through the lens of long-term relationships. Similar to ours, Hollifield et al (2017) developed
a theoretical model to study strategic dealer choice of buy-side investors. Different from our
findings, they established that some investors choose periphery dealers because the investors are
indifferent choosing between core and periphery dealers; the dealers have full bargaining power
and capture the whole trade surplus. Wang (2017) considered strategic long-term relationship
formation among dealers who have repeated interactions and explained how competition and
inventory management strategy among dealers can endogenously create core-periphery dealer
network. In Wang (2017), all dealers have exogenous customer bases. While this assumption
can represent some wholesale markets such as interbank markets well, the effect of dealer choice
of end-user investors on market structure in some secondary asset markets, such as fixed-income
security markets, is unclear. We contribute to this literature by studying strategic dealer choice
of end-user investors.
The closest literature to our paper is Neklyudov and Sambalaibat (2017), which developed a
matching model consisting of dealers and end-user clients. Similar to this paper, Neklyudov
and Sambalaibat (2017) found that traders with frequent liquidity needs choose core dealers
to obtain immediacy in the future. Traders with infrequent liquidity needs choose periphery
dealers since they can obtain better price. However, the underlying theory in Neklyudov and
Sambalaibat (2017) is different from ours. The main assumptions in Neklyudov and Sambalaibat
(2017) are 1) that end-user clients must always trade with the dealer whom they choose at the
beginning, 2) that pricing is non-strategic (Nash bargaining) and 3) that either a) order matching
9A few literatures on over-the-counter asset markets with random matching model include Duffie et al
(2005,2007), Lagos et al (2011), Vayanos and Weill (2008), Lagos and Rocheteau (2009).
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capability of dealers when the match involves two dealers is sufficiently more efficient than
that with one dealer or(and) b) bargaining power of the clients when trading via longer dealer
chain is sufficiently larger than that when trading via one dealer. Under these assumptions,
the periphery dealers can survive because surplus that the clients receive from the periphery
dealer can be higher than trading with core dealers. This is different from our paper mainly
in two ways. First, we apply the Folk theorem which allows the cost of forming client-dealer
relationships to be endogenous and explain why the investors must trade with specific dealers
repeatedly. Second, our result suggests that investors with infrequent liquidity needs choose
periphery dealers because they cannot form relationships with core dealers due to commitment
problem.
In finance literature, the theory of financial intermediary and social pressure in repeated
game setting with commitment limitation has been applied to credit payment enforcement.10
Babus and Hu (2017) and Fainmesser (2019) discussed the role of financial intermediaries on
solving commitment problem of unsecured debt contract, in which borrowers may strategically
default or not pay the debt. In their models, the financial intermediary can solve the commitment
issue by threatening to exclude bad borrowers from future interactions, prohibiting them to
meet several lenders who are clients of the intermediary in the future. Our paper contributes to
this literature by studying the role of intermediary who solves commitment problem of costly
liquidity provision in secondary asset markets.
Structure of the paper
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic model. Section
3 discusses the equilibrium without long-term relationship. Section 4 introduces a notion of
liquidity insurance relationship and characterizes existence condition. Section 5 introduces an
agency dealer to the basic model. Section 6 discusses the role of agency dealer in the equilibrium.
Section 7 provides additional discussion of the results. Section 8 concludes. An analysis of the
model with heterogeneous investors and omitted proofs are in appendix.
2.2 Basic model
Consider an infinite-period game consisting of a principal dealer P who can provide indivisible
units of liquidity service, a competitive principal dealer P ′ who non-strategically provides
liquidity service at a competitive price, and a set of homogeneous investors I = {1, 2, . . . , N}
with |I| = n who face random liquidity demands.11 The liquidity service refers to dealer service
to execute a trade order on the spot by taking positions (i.e. immediacy). Assume that n is
common knowledge. Time is discrete and all players have discount factor δ.
There are binary observable market states θt ∈ {G,B} with Pr(θt = G) = p which
determine the cost of liquidity provision of both principal dealers {P, P ′}. Specifically, the
10See Greif et al (1994) and Fainmesser (2019) for more references.
11An implicit assumption in the model is that there is no asymmetric information about the asset fundamentals
across all players.
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per-unit cost of liquidity provision of all principal dealers at time t is
Ct =
0 if θt = GC otherwise.
This assumption on the cost structure reflects liquidity condition in the dealer market in each
period. When θt = G (i.e. good state), principal dealers expect to find another counterparty to
offload their positions without much effort, and thus the cost of providing liquidity is null. The
opposite case is when θt = B (i.e. bad state) in which the dealers expect to incur high inventory
cost or high effort cost when offloading their positions.
In each period, investors face i.i.d. stochastic demand of liquidity service lit ∈ {0, 1} with
Pr(lit = 1) = q. Denote Q = qδ1−δ . Private valuation of liquidity service of investor i is
Vit =
0 if lit = 0V otherwise.
Note that this valuation does not reflect the asset fundamental value per-se. Instead, it indicates
investors’ private benefit of obtaining liquidity service (i.e. the benefit of fast trade execution).
In each period, all investors have cash endowment of VL which is not transferable across periods.
We make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1 (Trade friction) V > C > VL
This assumption specifies that trade should always take place as the investors’ valuation of
liquidity service is always higher than liquidity-providing cost of dealers. However, the investors
do not have enough cash to cover high cost of liquidity provision of dealers in bad states.
Timeline
For every period t ≥ 1, the game runs as follows. At the beginning of period t, all players
observe market state θt and investors observe their own liquidity shocks lit. Then, the investors
contact principal dealer P who will quote βit ∈ R+ to all investors i ∈ I . After observing their
own quotes, all investors decide whether to accept or reject the quote, denoted by γit ∈ {0, 1}.
If investor i accepts the quote (γit = 1), dealer P will provide liquidity service to investor i
and receive cash βit. If rejecting the quote, investor i will obtain competitive price from dealer
P ′ which will give investor i an outside option of max{0, Vit − Ct}.12 After trade settlement,
dealer P observes liquidity shock of all investors lt = {lit}Ni=1, and the game moves to the next
period. Assume that the investors cannot observe neither actions, principal dealer’s quotes, nor
liquidity shocks of other investors throughout the game, reflecting the current limited market
transparency situation of several OTC markets.13 Formally, per-period payoff of investor i (uit)
and principal dealer P (pit) for any period t ≥ 1 satisfy
uit = γit(Vit − βit) + (1− γit)max{0, Vit − Ct}, pit =
∑
i∈I
γit(βit − Ct).
12This assumption implies that 1) market condition θt is homogeneous across dealers which represents frictionless
inter-dealer market where principal dealers can easily search and obtain liquidity among each other to realize full
trade surplus and 2) investors have perfect information about which principal dealers have liquidity in each period.
13This is equivalent to the standard assumption of private monitoring in the repeated game literature.
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Histories, information sets, and strategies
Let βt = {βit}Ni=1 and γt = {γit}Ni=1 be the sequence of actions of principal dealer P and all
investors, respectively. Let the set of histories at the beginning of period t be
Ht =
t−1⋃
j=1
[lj × θj × βj × γj ]
which consists of market states, liquidity shock realization of all investors, price quotes of the
dealer to all investors, and the decision of investors up to period t− 1. The information set of
principal dealer P (hPt) and investor i ∈ I (hit) at the beginning of period t are
hPt = Ht and hit =
t−1⋃
j=1
[lij × θj × βij × γij ] .
The strategy of principal dealer P and all investors i ∈ I are the functions which map the
information set at the beginning of period t and additional information observed in period t to
an action set such that
βt(θt, hPt) ∈ Rn+ and γit(θt, lit, βit, hit) ∈ {0, 1}.
The solution concept in this paper is the standard perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
2.3 Static equilibrium
To understand the role of long-term relationship, I will first characterize an equilibrium in a
static setting. It is trivial to see that there exists an equilibrium in which trade occurs only in
good states as established in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 (Static equilibrium) There exists an equilibrium in which for any investor
i ∈ I ,
β∗it =
0 if θt = GC otherwise , γ∗it(βit) =
1 if βit < Ct < Vit0 otherwise
This result highlights a cash constraint problem in bad states. As shown in Figure 2.1,
the investors cannot buy liquidity service in bad states due to limited cash. In reality, there
are two possible scenarios, depending on whether the investors would like to buy or sell an
asset. If investors would like to buy an asset, they will not be able to buy immediately, causing
allocative inefficiency. However, if investors would like to sell an asset, they are still able to
sell immediately but at a cheap price. To illustrate, if F is a fair price of the asset, then the
dealer would buy at the maximum of F − c to compensate for costly liquidity service. However,
the investor would like to sell at the minimum of F − VL to meet his urgent need of cash. In
this situation, the investor has two options: 1) do not sell the asset or 2) sell the asset at F − c
now. The former choice creates allocative inefficiency while the latter choice is known for
creating fire-sale phenomenon which is a threat to market stability. In any event, the possible
failure of obtaining liquidity service motivates investors to form a long-term relationship with
the principal dealer, inter-temporally hedging against their liquidity needs.
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iP ′P
i
P ′P
good state bad state
0
Figure 2.1: Static equilibrium with no trade during bad states.
2.4 Liquidity insurance relationship
This section will discuss what liquidity insurance relationship is, why it exists, and how it works.
The following definition formally describes the notion of liquidity insurance relationship.
Definition 2.1 (Liquidity insurance relationship) Provided that max{xG, xB} ≤ VL, an
equilibrium exhibits liquidity insurance relationship between investor i and principal dealer P ,
if the equilibrium outcome for every t is such that
β∗it =
xG if θt = GxB if θt = B , γ∗it(βit) =
1 if βit ≤ β∗it ≤ Vit0 otherwise.
By definition, liquidity insurance relationship requires the dealer to provide liquidity service
at price xB ≤ VL during bad states in exchange of all future trade orders of the investor, as
illustrated in Figure 2.2. To compensate for the dealer loss in bad periods, the investor pays a
premium xG to the dealer when the state is good. Indeed, this informal relationship allows the
investor to hedge his liquidity needs across periods. In this way, both parties can obtain higher
surplus; the dealer earns more profits in good states and the investor obtains liquidity service in
bad states. This relationship will continue as long as 1) the dealer continues providing liquidity
as agreed in every period and 2) the investor continues buying liquidity service from the dealer
as agreed in every period.14 Any deviation will result in reversion to a no-relationship outcome
in subsequent periods in which both players obtain their outside options.
i
PP ′
i
PP ′
good state bad state
xG xB
Figure 2.2: Liquidity provision of P under liquidity insurance relationship.
Under what conditions would the players successfully form the relationship then? The
answer lies upon whether they can reach an agreement on (xG, xB) which determines allocation
of the trade surplus. Because of no legal enforcement on the agreement, the relationship can
exist if both parties obtain sufficiently high surplus in the relationship that they are willing to
commit to the relationship. For the dealer, xG must be sufficiently high that he is willing to incur
upfront loss in bad states to continue reaping future benefits in good states of the relationship.
14Note that there are several possible punishment strategies to sustain the relationship. However, this trigger
strategy is the most severe one, which will give us the weakest condition for the relationship equilibrium to exist.
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On the other hand, xG must be sufficiently low that the investor is willing to pay the premium
during good states, instead of strategically opting out from the relationship and choose P ′, to
continue the relationship and obtain liquidity insurance during bad periods. This two-sided
commitment problem is shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 (Insurance premium) In any equilibrium,
1. principal dealer P will commit to the liquidity insurance relationship if and only if
xG ≥ 1 +Q(1− p)
Qp
(C − xB),
2. investor i will commit to the liquidity insurance relationship if and only if
xG ≤ max
{
Q(1− p)
1 +Qp
(V − xB), VL
}
.
The lemma highlights how feasible range of the premium depends on Q, the investor’s
trading frequency weighted by discount factor. On the one hand, when the investor has low
future trading needs, reflected by lowQ, he will request lower insurance premium since he would
not get much benefit from future liquidity coverage. Also, such premium must be feasible to pay
during good states (i.e. xG ≤ VL). On the other hand, the dealer will demand high premium
when the investor has low future trading needs, because the investor will rarely bring future order
flows during good states. Therefore, the investor must have sufficiently high liquidity needs to
successfully reach the agreement with the dealer, as confirmed in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2 (Equilibrium existence) A liquidity insurance equilibrium between investor i
and principal dealer P exists if and only if VL > (1− p)C and
Q ≥ max
{
1 +
√
1 + 4p(1− p)(V − C)
2p(1− p)(V − C) ,
C − VL
VL − (1− p)C
}
.
This proposition is intuitive. When the investors have low trading needs, they will obtain
low benefit from the relationship and will not commit to paying the premium to the dealer. For
the same reason, the dealer will not commit to providing costly liquidity during bad states as he
expects to reap low future benefit from the investor. This implies that the investors suffer from
the commitment problem and are excluded by the principal dealer, despite possibility of higher
payoffs for both parties under the agreement, when the investors have infrequent liquidity needs.
2.5 The model with an agency dealer
As discussed previously, lack of legal enforcement on the relationship contract and the commit-
ment problem cause relationship failure when the investors have infrequent liquidity needs. This
commitment problem exists because a threat by individual investors to terminate the relationship
is not significant enough to affect the principal dealer. However, what if the investors collec-
tively form the relationship with a principal dealer as a group? That is, if the dealer violates
the agreement with an investor in the coalition, all the investors would collectively terminate
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the relationship. As shown in panel (b) in Figure 2.3, when the investors form a coalition, they
can pool their liquidity needs, which will enlarge contract space that they can negotiate with
the principal dealer, and collectively punish the principal dealer when needed. With larger set
of contracting space and collective punishment, possibility of reaching a long-term agreement
increases.
Unfortunately, such coalition formation is not possible due to lack of necessary information
for collective punishment. To form a coalition, the investors must have information of other
investors’ trading activities to monitor and collectively punish the principal dealer. However, the
investors cannot observe neither actions, liquidity shocks, nor the principal dealer’s quotes of
other investors in the OTC markets.
P
ii i
(a) No relationship
when Q is low
P
ii i
(b) Collusion under
full information
P
A
ii i
(C) A as a facilitator under
imperfect information
Figure 2.3: Illustration of the role of an agency dealer
This gives rise to emergence of an agency dealer who can aggregate liquidity needs of the
investors, act on behalf of all the investors and the principal dealer, and punish the principal
dealer for all the investors when needed. This is shown in panel (c) in Figure 2.3. In this
case, the investors only need to monitor and maintain a long-term relationship with the agency
dealer which does not require the investors to have perfect information about trades of other
investors. Also, a threat imposed by the agency dealer towards the principal dealer to terminate
the relationship would represent a collective threat from all the investors. Therefore, if all
players can reach an agreement which provides correct incentives to the agency dealer, the
relationship formation can be successful.
In this paper, we will prove that agency dealer can indeed solve the commitment problem and
help investors obtain costly liquidity in bad states when the investors have infrequent liquidity
needs. We start with formal description of the model with agency dealer in this section. In
the next section, we introduce the notion of liquidity insurance relationship via agency dealer,
characterize existence condition and highlight important implications of market fragmentation
on market efficiency and stability.
Model setting
Consider an infinite-period baseline model which now consists of an agency dealer A who can
intermediate trades between a principal dealer and the investors. The agency dealer has no cost
of intermediation but will incur indefinite inventory cost if producing liquidity service. To solve
for the interesting case which the agency dealer solves the commitment problem and not the
problem of cash constraint in good states, we assume that VL > (1− p)C and Q ≥ C−VLVL−(1−p)C .
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Timeline
For every period t ≥ 1, the game runs as follows. At the beginning of period t, all players
observe market state θt and all investors observe their own liquidity shocks. All investors cannot
observe liquidity shocks of other investors. Let It = {i|lit=1} be the set of active investors with
|It| = nt. All active investors It contact agency dealer A who in turn contacts principal dealer
P to get a quote.15 Inactive investors i 6∈ It realize payoff 0.
First, principal dealer P quotes (βAt,mt) ∈ R+ × I+ to agency dealer A which specifies
per-unit upstream price of liquidity βAt and maximum quantity of liquidity mt that he is willing
to supply at price βAt. If mt < nt, principal dealer P will accommodate the residuals nt −mt
at competitive price Ct.
After obtaining the quote, agency dealer A chooses (dAt, βt) ∈ {0, 1}×Rnt+ which decides
whether to accept the quote (dAt = 1) from principal dealer P and what prices to quote to
all active investors denoted by βt = {βit|∀i ∈ It}. If rejecting the principal dealer’s offer
(dAt = 0), he will get a competitive upstream price quote Ct from principal dealer P ′ and obtain
an additional outside option WAt.16 Let βˆAt = dAtβAt + (1− dAt)Ct be the actual price that
agency dealer A pays to principal dealer P for trade orders covered within the supply quantity
mt.
After observing retail price quote βit, each investor i ∈ It chooses γit ∈ {0, 1} to in-
dicate whether to accept the offer. If rejecting the offer, the investors obtain outside option
of max{0, V − Ct}. Afterwards, agency dealer A reports final trade demands
∑
i∈It γit to
principal dealer P to settle all trades.17
At the end of period t, after trade settlement, principal dealer P observes liquidity shocks
and retail prices of all investors {lt, βt} and all active investors It observe the actual upstream
price βˆAt, and the game continues to the next period.18 Formally, the per-period payoff of active
investor i ∈ It (piit), of principal dealer P (piPt), and of agency dealer A (piAt) satisfy
piPt = dAt
(∑
i∈It
γit
)
(βAt − Ct)
piAt =
∑
i∈It
γitβit −min
{
mt,
∑
i∈It
γit
}
βˆAt −max
{
0,
∑
i∈It
γit −mt
}
Ct + (1− dAt)WAt
piit = γit(V − βit) + (1− γit)max{0, V − Ct}.
15This implies that agency dealer A knows the liquidity shock realization of all investors before contacting P .
16Note that this assumption is without loss of generality, as it is always optimal for agency dealer A to fully route
the order to either P or P ′. When routing some orders to P ′ and some to P , P can detect that deviation in the next
stage which will trigger punishment in subsequent periods. Thus, it is always optimal for A to fully route the orders
to P ′ if deciding to defect in the first place. Also, note that A has no incentive to renegotiate with P to get higher
payoff by lowering liquidity insurance, as the investor will also detect such renegotiation ex-post through a higher
markup.
17This simplifies the game as in reality A can strategically report the wrong number of liquidity demand during
good state. However, relaxing this assumption does not matter, as agency dealesr A has no incentive to direct partial
trade orders to P ′ anyway.
18The assumption on ex-post lt observability of principal dealer P simplifies our analysis to the case of perfect
monitoring on the behaviour of all investors.19 Also, this assumption of ex-post trading price observability reflects
the current state of limited post-trade transparency in OTC markets, which allows all players to observe additional
information after trade settlement. We will discuss in detail about this information structure in the next part.
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Histories, information sets, and strategies
Denote Akt the set of actions taken by player k ∈ {P,A} ∪ It in period t. Information set
of each player at the beginning of period t consists of a sequence of observable past actions
and state realization up until period t − 1. We assume that all players can observe only their
neighbours’ actions who have direct interaction with them at the time of trading, but they can
observe additional information ex-post.20 Specifically, let hkt ⊂ Ht be the information set of
player k at the beginning of period t such that
hkt =

⋃t−1
j=1
[
×k∈{P,A}Akj ×
{∑
i∈Ij γij
}
× [lj × θj ]
]
if k = P⋃t−1
j=1
[
×k∈{P,A}∪IjAjt × [lj × θj ]
]
if k = A⋃
j∈Tkt
[
Akj × βkj × βˆAj
]
×⋃t−1j=1 [lkj × θj ] if k ∈ I
where Tkt = {j|k ∈ Ij , ∀j ≤ t− 1} is the set of active periods of investor k up to period t− 1.
In simple words, everyone knows all past realizations of market state. Principal dealer
P knows 1) past actions of himself and of the agency dealer, 2) past liquidity shocks of all
investors, and 3) total number of executed trades (
∑
i∈Ij γij) in the past. The agency dealer has
perfect information about the game. The investor i knows 1) his own past liquidity shocks, 2)
his own past actions, 3) past quotes he obtained from agency dealer A when he is active, and 4)
past upstream prices of his own trades.
We consider only pure strategy equilibrium. Specifically, the strategy of principal dealer
P , agency dealer A, and investor i ∈ I for any period t maps the information that each player
knows at the time of trading to an action set such that
1. for principal dealer P who quotes upstream price and sets supply quantity:
(βAt,mt)(θt, hPt) ∈ R+ × I+
2. for agency dealer A who decides whether to accept P ’s offer and determines downstream
prices:
(dAt, βt)(θt, βAt,mt, hAt, lt) ∈ {0, 1} ×Rnt+
3. for investor i ∈ I who decides whether to accept A’s offer:
γit(βit, lit, θt, hit) ∈ {0, 1}.
The solution concept used in this paper is the standard perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Discussion on the model
Recall that the main cause, which prevents investors to pool their liquidity demands and negotiate
as a group with the principal dealer directly, is lack of information about other investors’ trade.
This is reflected in the assumption that the investors can only observe information of their own
20This is similar to the current state of OTC markets, as post-trade transparency regulation which requires
publication of past trading details (price and quantity) allows the market participants to obtain the additional
information ex-post.
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transactions but not others. For the collusion among investors to succeed, all the investors
must be able to simultaneously punish the principal dealer when appropriate. Without the
information to monitor the principal dealer properly, collective punishment is impossible.
From the model, there are two important features when trading via agency dealer. First, a
threat by the agency dealer toward the principal dealer represents a threat from all the investors.
Such threat can substitute the collective punishment of all the investors, provided that the agency
dealer has the incentive to punish the principal dealer. Second, even though investors do not
have information about other investors, they now have information about upstream prices of
their trades ex post. If the upstream price is contingent on whether the principal dealer and
the agency dealer are still in the agreement, then information about upstream price is sufficient
for the investors to monitor both dealers and assess whether the relationship is still ongoing.
These two features, as we will see in the next section, contribute to the success of relationship
formation.
2.6 Relationship via an agency dealer
We will begin our analysis by formally defining the notion of liquidity insurance relationship
via agency dealer. Different from our baseline case, it is a non-binding agreement between a
principal dealer and a group of investors with an intervention of agency dealer who can make
profits from his intermediation service, as described in the following definition.
Definition 2.2 (Liquidity insurance equilibrium via agency dealer) Provided thatmax{xG+
FiG, xB + FiB} ≤ VL for all i ∈ I and n∗ ≤ n, an equilibrium exhibits liquidity insurance
relationship among {P,A, I} if the equilibrium outcome in every period t ≥ 1 is such that
(β∗At,m
∗
t ) =
(xG, n) if θt = G(xB, n∗) otherwise
(d∗At, β
∗
t ) =

(1, {xG + FiG}nti=1) if θt = G
(1, {xB + FiB}nti=1) if θt = B and nt ≤ n∗
(1, {xB + FiB}n∗i=1 ∪ {C + Fi}nti=n∗+1) if θt = B and nt > n∗
γ∗it =
1 if βit ≤ β∗it ≤ VL0 otherwise
From the definition, investors form a relationship with agency dealer A, who will in turn
form liquidity insurance relationship on their behalf with principal dealer P . In the agreement,
principal dealer P trades with agency dealer A at per-unit price xG in good states for unlimited
quantity and at per-unit price xB for maximum quantity n∗ ≤ n in bad states. Thus, n∗
determines the extent of insurance coverage from principal dealer P . If n∗ = n, we say that
the insurance is unconstrained which guarantees full insurance to all investors. If n∗ < n, the
insurance is constrained in which the investors get partial insurance coverage and face liquidity
shortage in some bad periods.21 Agency dealer A accepts the offer and quotes the agreed retail
21Note that if one assumes arbitrary distribution of liquidity shock, n∗ < n can provide full insurance to all
investors if the probability that more than n∗ investors would demand liquidity at the same time is zero.
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price β∗it to investors with price markup (FiG, FiB). For the investors, they always accept offer
from agency dealer A, unless the price exceeds VL. This idea is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
P ′ P
A
I2I1
good state
xG
xG + FGxG + FG
P ′ P
A
I2I1
bad state
(xB, n
∗ = 1)
xB + FBC
Figure 2.4: Illustration of an equilibrium outcome under liquidity insurance relationship via agency
dealer when n∗ = 1.
It is worth noting that pooling liquidity needs of all the investors enlarges contract space of
choosing m∗t , the liquidity quota, against the number of investors. With bilateral relationship
between P and i, liquidity quota in both states is fixed (i.e. m∗t = n = 1). However, when
there are several investors, the choice of liquidity quota is richer (i.e. m∗t (θt = G) = n and
m∗t (θt = B) = n∗ ≤ n). The ability to adjust the liquidity quota n∗ (and n
∗
n ), which affects
incentives to form the relationship of both P and I , from liquidity pooling is the main key for
successful relationship formation.
Lastly, to reflect how principal dealers in relationship-based OTC markets compete for
relationships with agency dealers in practice, we make an additional assumption on outside
option of agency dealer A. Denote pi∗At = piAt(β
∗
At,m
∗
t , d
∗
At, β
∗
t , γ
∗
t ) the payoff of agency dealer
in period t under the liquidity insurance equilibrium outcome in Definition 2.2. Assume that
the outside option of agency dealer A in period t is WAt = pi∗At − piAt(dAt = 1) if there exists
k ≤ t− 2 such that
1. history of action sets of {P,A, I} of all periods up to period k coincides with the liquidity
insurance relationship equilibrium outcome,
(βAj ,mj , dAj , βj , γj) = (β
∗
Aj ,m
∗
j , d
∗
Aj , β
∗
j , γ
∗
j ), ∀j ≤ k
2. market state in period k + 1 is bad,
θk+1 = B
3. agency dealer A has been rejecting offers from principal dealer P since period k + 1,
dAj = 0, ∀j where k + 1 ≤ j ≤ t− 1.
Otherwise, the outside option WAt = 0.
In other words, if in the past
1. agency dealer A had successfully formed a long-term relationship with principal dealer P
and all investors I , and
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2. agency dealer A rejected an offer from principal dealer P in a bad state and has been
rejecting all offers since then,
then the agency dealer will obtain a payoff identical to the payoff under the relationship
equilibrium outcome if rejecting offer from principal dealer P in period t (i.e. piAt(dAt = 0) =
pi∗At). Intuitively, this assumption allows agency dealer to establish a new relationship with other
principal dealers in the market if the relationship with principal dealer P is broken. As we
will see later, the possibility to establish a new relationship will incentivise the agency dealer
to punish principal dealer P if principal dealer P deviates from the agreement in bad states.
Without this assumption, the agency dealer might have an incentive not to punish principal
dealer P in bad states, as the agency dealer will lose future intermediation profits. Note from
the assumption that agency dealer A must have had relationships with all the investors up until
period k to entitle for this outside-option relationship payoff. 22
2.6.1 Trigger strategy via an agency dealer
Next, we propose a strategy profile of all players that can support the relationship outcome
in the equilibrium. There are many possible strategy profiles that one can propose. However,
the strategy must ensure that every player will be monitored and punished by some players if
deviating. We propose the following strategy.
Definition 2.3 (Trigger strategy via an agency dealer) The modified trigger strategy consists
of
1. a strategy of principal dealer P in which
a) (βAt,mt) = (β∗At,m
∗
t ) if the history set hPt satisfies, for all j ≤ t− 1,
i. P never deviates in the past, (βAj ,mj) = (β∗Aj ,m
∗
j )
ii. A never deviates in the past, (dAj , βj) = (d∗Aj , β
∗
j )
iii. I never deviate in the past,
∑
i∈Ij γij ≥
∑
i∈Ij γ
∗
ij
b) (βAt,mt) = (Ct, n) if otherwise
2. a strategy of agency dealer A in which
a) (dAt, βt) = (d∗At, β
∗
t ) if the history set hAt satisfies, for all j ≤ t− 1,
i. P never deviates in the past, (βAj ,mj) = (β∗Aj ,m
∗
j )
ii. A never deviates in the past, (dAj , βj) = (d∗Aj , β
∗
j )
iii. and P does not deviate in period t, (βAt,mt) = (β∗At,m
∗
t )
b) (dAt, βt) = (0, β∗) if otherwise.
3. a strategy of every investor i ∈ I in which
22This gives an incentive for A to maintain the relationship with every I . Without this assumption, the agency
dealer might have incentive in some cases to terminate the agreement with a few investors. Relaxing this assumption
will introduce one more equilibrium condition which requires that the agency dealer cannot connect with too many
investors; that is, the size of agency dealer must be small enough.
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a) γit = γ∗it if the history set hit satisfies, for all j ∈ Tit,
i. P and A never deviate in good state in the past, βˆAj = β∗Aj
ii. A never unilateral deviate with i in the past, βij = β∗ij
iii. i never deviates in the past, γij = γ∗ij
iv. and A does not deviate in period t, βit = β∗it
b) γit = 0 if otherwise.
This strategy follows the rationale of standard trigger strategy. Every player will continue
choosing the agreed actions as long as they do not detect any deviation. If they detect a deviation,
they will terminate the relationship and revert to the no-relationship equilibrium strategy forever.
From the definition, every player reverts to the static Nash equilibrium outcome after detecting
deviation, except agency dealer A who will reject offer from principal dealer P but still quote
downstream price β∗t after the deviation, as it is weakly dominant to do so.23 Note that investors
can monitor agency dealer A and principal dealer P (imperfectly) but not other investors.
The punishment scheme in this proposed strategy is as follows. When P deviates in a bad
state by not providing costly liquidity, A will reject the offer and terminate the relationship
with P . This threat is credible, because A, if punishing, can obtain outside option equivalent
to the equilibrium relationship payoff in all subsequent periods.24 When P deviates in a good
state by quoting upstream price higher than the agreed level, active investors, who can observe
the change in upstream price in the subsequent period, and agency dealer A will terminate the
relationship. The threat by agency dealer A is also credible, because agency dealer A can obtain
(weakly) lower upstream price by choosing P ′ in the deviating period and in all subsequent
periods.
When any i ∈ I deviates in a good state by rejecting offer, P will terminate the relationship
with A.25 When A deviates in a good state, P will terminate the relationship, triggering active
investors who can observe the changing upstream price to terminate the relationship with A.
The resulting termination by the investors will threat A not to deviate, since A will no longer
obtain the equilibrium relationship payoff (i.e. WAt = 0 for all subsequent periods). Note that
A and I have no incentive to deviate during bad states.
2.6.2 Commitment problem and incentive constraints
Next, we will examine the commitment problem and construct incentive constraints of all
players. This is not as obvious as our baseline case, because it now involves an agency dealer
who has a private interest of maximizing his intermediation profit.
23This is because the agency dealer can still make positive profits even if WAt = 0. Thus, the agency dealer has
an incentive to quote the price at β∗ to deceive remaining investors that the relationship is still on.
24Note that the investors themselves cannot detect the deviation of the principal dealer in bad states when there is
partial insurance (n∗ < n), because the investors do not know whether the no-trade outcome is due to the principal
dealer’s deviation. Therefore, A must be the one who punishes P .
25This implies that deviation from one investor will break down the whole relationship. Note that, if investor i
deviates, A may have an incentive not to punish the investor. This is because A obtains more profits when there
are more trades to intermediate, thus he prefers more investors to contact him. Therefore, P must be the one who
punishes investor i by stopping providing liquidity to A. In practice, principal- and agency dealer might resolve this
problem through renegotiation. We assume that the renegotiation is not possible.
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I: Commitment problem of principal dealer P and investors I
Similar to baseline case, P must commit to providing liquidity in bad states and investors must
commit to trading with A instead of seeking cheaper prices from P ′ in good states.26 Therefore,
(xG, xB) must be sufficiently high to incentivize P , and xG + FiG must be sufficiently low to
incentivize every investor i ∈ I .
To see this formally, let αi(n∗, nt) : I+ × I+ → [0, 1] be a liquidity allocation function to
investor i which indicates the probability that investor i will obtain liquidity in period t, given
liquidity quota n∗ and aggregate liquidity demand nt. If αi = 1, investor i obtains liquidity
with probability one. Let f(k) = Pr(
∑
j∈I ljt = k) and f−i(k) = Pr(
∑
j∈I−i ljt = k)
be the probability distribution of aggregate liquidity shocks when including and excluding
investor i, respectively. Denote κ(n∗) =
∑
k≤n∗ f(k)(k) +
∑
n≥k>n∗ f(k)(n
∗) and yi(n∗) =∑
k≤n∗−1 f−i(k) +
∑
k>n∗−1 f−i(k)αi(n
∗, k). Intuitively, κ(n∗) is the expected amount of
liquidity that P must provide to A during bad states and yi(n∗) is the probability that investor i
obtains liquidity in bad states. Consider the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2 (Equilibrium price) In any equilibrium
1. principal dealer P will commit to liquidity insurance agreement if
xG ≥
n∗ + δ1−δ (1− p)κ(n∗)
nQp
(C − xB)
2. investor i ∈ I will commit to liquidity insurance agreement if
xG + FiG ≤ max
{
Q(1− p)yi(n∗)
1 +Qp
(V − (xB + FiB)), VL
}
This lemma highlights how changing liquidity quota n∗ affects incentive of principal dealer
P and investors. For the principal dealer, a decrease in liquidity quota n∗ increases his incentive
to commit to the relationship, as reflected in lower requirement on premium xG. Setting low
n∗ decreases the relationship-continuation cost of P , because P just needs to provide costly
liquidity (at most) n∗ units in bad states to continue the relationship and obtain future order
flows from agency dealer. On the other hand, a decrease in n∗ reduces incentive of the investors
to commit to the agreement. Intuitively, lower n∗ decreases the likelihood of obtaining liquidity
in bad states yi(n∗), resulting in lower willingness of the investors to trade with agency dealer
in good states.
II: Commitment problem of agency dealer A
Ideally, principal dealer P and investors would like to trade via an intermediating person who
has no interest misalignment. However, it is unrealistic as actions taken by agency dealer A is
strategic and can only be detected with delay. In the relationship, a good agency dealer A must
have incentive to 1) route trade orders of all investors in every period to principal dealer P and
26Note that principal dealer has no commitment problem in good states. If P deviates in good states, A will
reject the offer immediately.
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2) acquire liquidity from principal dealer P and pass it to demanding investors. The second
agency problem is not our concern, as the payoff structure of agency dealer A induces him
to intermediate as many transactions as possible. In fact, agency dealer A has no incentive to
withhold liquidity in any period. This is one of the main features of agency dealer A attributing
to successful relationship formation: by delegating the power to a third party who has no
misaligned interest, all the investors do not have to worry about collective punishment by all the
investors on agency dealer A.
P
A
i
P ′
ii i
0 xG
Figure 2.5: Illustration of strategic deviation of A when choosing whom to send trade orders to.
The first problem is of our interest. Recall that investors can monitor agency dealer A by
looking at upstream price after trade settlement, but this will cause delay in punishment if agency
dealer A deviates. As illustrated in Figure 2.5, delay in punishment creates an opportunity
for agency dealer A to strategically route orders to P ′, pay upstream price 0 (instead of xG),
and get upfront higher intermediation profits in the deviating period. Once agency dealer
A pulls the trigger, principal dealer P will terminate the relationship. Active investors who
observe abnormal upstream price will stop trading with agency dealer A in subsequent periods.
Therefore, principal dealer P and investors must leave agency dealer A a sufficiently large
trade surplus, in the form of intermediation fees (FiG, FiB), so that he will commit to sending
trade orders to P in good states and continue collecting future intermediation fees. Denote
σ(n∗) = κ(n
∗)
κ(n) which is the degree of liquidity insurance. Consider the following lemma which
is derived from incentive constraint of agency dealer A.
Lemma 2.3 (Intermediation fee) A pair of intermediation fee (FB, FG) in any symmetric
equilibrium satisfies
Q((1− p)σ(n∗)FB + pFG) ≥ xG.
From the lemma, the extent of agency cost depends on upstream price xG. This is intuitive,
as the upfront deviating benefit of agency dealer A depends on price gap between what P and
P ′ charge, and this gap is the premium xG. Also, the more frequently investors trade (higher
Q), the more frequently agency dealer A obtains intermediation fees, and thus lower fees per
transaction is required to incentivize agency dealer A.
2.6.3 Equilibrium analysis: effectiveness of agency dealer
Our last step is to find out when agency dealer A can successfully help the investors, who
otherwise would have been excluded from principal dealer P , eventually obtain costly liquidity
in bad states from principal dealer P . Let QP be the minimum Q for the liquidity insurance
equilibrium between principal dealer P and investor i to exist, and QA be the minimum Q for
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the liquidity insurance equilibrium between {P,A, I} to exist. Therefore, if QP > QA and if
Q ∈ [QA, QP ), then the investors who cannot form a relationship with P can now do so via
agency dealer A. The following proposition provides the condition which agency dealer A can
successfully help the investors get liquidity insurance from the principal dealer.
Proposition 2.3 (Effectiveness of agency dealer) QA < QP if, for any i ∈ I , there exists
n∗ ∈ I+ such that
1 +Q(1− p)
n∗
n +Q(1− p)σ(n∗)
>
(
1 +
1
Qp
)(
1
yi(n∗)
)
.
This condition compares the benefit of successful relationship formation by trading via A
with its cost. The benefit is the change in incentive of principal dealer P to enter the relationship
as reflected in the left term. The right term accounts for the cost of trading via A (i.e. the
intermediation fee) and any negative impact on the incentive of investors.27
1 +Q(1− p)
n∗
n +Q(1− p)σ(n∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
principal dealer
IC
>
(
1 +
1
Qp
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
intermediation
fee
(
1
yi(n∗)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
investor i
IC
When will this condition be satisfied? The answer relies on whether there exists a real-
valued liquidity quota n∗ that can satisfy this condition. Recall that liquidity quota n∗ is the
minimum per-period amount of liquidity that principal dealer P must provide in every bad
states. A reduction in n∗ will effectively reduce the upfront cost of sustaining the relationship
of the principal dealer relative to its benefit of relationship continuation of obtaining future
order flows from all investors. This is shown in the ratio nn∗ in the incentive constraint of the
principal dealer in the left side. When the relationship-continuation cost is lower (i.e. lower
n∗) or the relationship-continuation benefit is higher (i.e. higher n), the principal dealer would
be more willing to sustain the relationship. Also, a decrease in n∗ reduces the degree of
liquidity insurance (i.e. lower σ(n∗)). As a result, a decrease in n∗ results in higher likelihood
of successful relationship formation via agency dealer. Note that, from the proposition, the
liquidity quota must be less than the number of investors (i.e. n∗ < n) for the condition to be
satisfied. This implies that the investors will obtain partial insurance when trading with agency
dealer.
Remark 2.1 If QA < QP , n∗ < n must be true
Unfortunately, decreasing n∗ also has a negative effect on incentive of the investors, as it
reduces the extent of liquidity insurance. Specifically, a decline in n∗ reduces the probability that
investors will obtain liquidity yi(n∗), decreasing their willingness to commit to the relationship.
This idea is graphically illustrated in Figure 2.6. Overall, whether the relationship formation
will be successful depends on which effect dominates. This implies that relationship formation
via agency dealer A cannot always solve the commitment problems.
27Note that in the case of perfect monitoring (i.e when investors can perfectly observe other investor’s actions,
liquidity shocks, and the principal dealer’s response to every investors), then investors would no longer need A. This
implies that the intermediation fees will disappear from this condition. That is, 1+Q(1−p)n∗
n
+Q(1−p)σ(n∗) ≥
1
yi(n∗) .
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Figure 2.6: Graphical illustration of how high probability of simultaneous liquidity shocks by several
investors can cause relationship failure.
When would agency dealer A be most efficient at facilitating the relationship then? Ideally,
one should be able to reduce n∗ to minimize the relationship-continuation cost of principal dealer
P with minimal impact on liquidity insurance coverage of the investors. This is achievable only
when investors rarely acquire liquidity at the same time: the probability that several investors
face liquidity shocks in the same period is low. An extreme case is when the probability of
liquidity shock q is almost zero, implying that it is almost impossible that more than one investor
would demand liquidity at the same time. To clarify this point, consider the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1 If q ∈ N(0), then
1. yi(n∗) ≈ 1 and σ(n∗) ≈ 1 for any n∗ ∈ I+
2. QA < QP if p > 12 and
n
n∗
>
1 + pQ
Q(2p− 1)
The first condition states that even n∗ = 1 can guarantee almost full insurance to all investors
when the probability of liquidity shock q is almost zero. This is because it is very rare that
more than one investor would acquire liquidity at the same time. In this case, one can set the
quota n∗ = 1 to minimize the relationship-continuation cost with trivial effect on the degree
of liquidity insurance coverage, resulting in the highest likelihood of successful relationship
formation with (almost) full insurance coverage towards the investors. The second condition
states that, if the number of investors is sufficiently large, agency dealer A will have adequate
negotiation power to connect investors with the principal dealer. An implication from this finding
is that, in practice, an agency dealer will be ideal for investors who 1) rarely face liquidity
shocks (i.e. low q) but 2) are reasonably risk-averse about liquidity risk (i.e. moderate Q).
Result discussion
Our finding sheds light on the strategic dealer choice of investors in relationship-based OTC
markets. When the investors choose whom to trade with, they will take into account all possible
future benefits that they can obtain from the chosen dealer. In the relationship-based market,
when principal dealers attempt to compete with agency dealers and shorten the intermediation
chain, by quoting a one-period cheaper price to the low-trading-need investors, the investors
still prefer their agency dealers. This is because the investors know that maintaining informal
relationships with the agency dealer can bring higher benefits from future liquidity insurance,
the benefit that principal dealer cannot offer due to commitment problem. This can explain why
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the agency dealers, despite locating at inferior network positions, can still attract clients and
survive in the OTC markets.
Another interpretation of this finding relates to empirical findings on a tradeoff between
execution cost and trading speed when investors choose a dealer (Li and Schürhoff (2019)). In
relationship-based market, it might be more appropriate to state that there is a tradeoff between
execution cost (xG) and the degree of future liquidity insurance (yi(n∗)) when choosing a dealer.
That is, principal dealers will offer full liquidity insurance with expensive premium (i.e. high
xG and yi(n∗) = 1), while agency dealers will offer partial liquidity insurance with cheaper
premium (i.e. low xG and yi(n∗) < 1). When the investors have low trading needs, they cannot
choose the former agreement, granting market power to agency dealers to co-exist with the
principal dealers.
2.6.4 Implications on equilibrium prices
One interesting empirical prediction of our study is the relationship between equilibrium price
and length of intermediation chain in relationship-based markets. Our model suggests that retail
prices quoted by agency dealers can be cheaper than that quoted by principal dealers, because
the price accounts for future liquidity insurance benefits that their respective clients would
obtain. This contradicts to traditional belief that retail prices from longer intermediation chain is
higher due to higher markups. Consider the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4 (Price comparison) If QA ≤ Q < QP , a downstream price quoted by agency
dealer A in any liquidity insurance equilibrium among {P,A, I} must be lower than any price
that would have induced principal dealer P to form a direct relationship with an investor i ∈ I .
From Figure 2.7, without the intervention of agency dealer A, principal dealer P will charge
expensive price xG which is too high for investor i to commit to the relationship. However,
when trading via agency dealer, the investor can get cheaper prices due to lower degree of future
liquidity insurance. In the equilibrium, the size of coalition must be high enough for the agency
dealer to secure good price xG + FG from the principal dealer. As a result, the final price
xG + FG will be lower than the quote that the investors would have obtained directly from the
principal dealer, despite combining with the intermediation markup.
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Figure 2.7: Graphical illustration of price comparison in which xG > xG + FG if QA ≤ Q < QP .
2.6.5 Discussion on market efficiency and stability
In terms of market efficiency, our finding provides an important insight into conventional wisdom
about "long intermediation chain as a source of allocative inefficiency". In our model, agency
dealers who act as financial intermediaries between principal dealers and end-user investors
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improve allocative efficiency. With their presence in the market, low-trading-need investors,
such as retail investors, are more likely to obtain liquidity (i.e. immediacy) even though they
are not active players in secondary OTC markets. This results in improvement on allocative
efficiency and reduction in liquidity risk of OTC-based assets. Moreover, the presence of agency
dealers can enhance market participation of low-trading-need investors. Since the agency dealers
reduce liquidity risk and increase total surplus of the low-trading-need investors, presence of the
agency dealers can incentivize more low-trading-need investors, who might not invest in the
asset when there is no agency dealers, to enter the market.28 The resulting increase in market
participation can improve market efficiency and liquidity further.
However, in terms of financial stability as measured by the likelihood of first-trigger event
of systemic crisis, it is ambiguous to conclude whether agency dealers will be socially desirable.
Remember that trading with agency dealers solves the commitment problem because of lower
liquidity quota in bad states. Therefore, low-trading-need investors are still not fully insured
against extreme events when several investors demand liquidity simultaneously, as illustrated
in Figure 2.8. The liquidity shortage among several low-trading-need investors in extreme
events, despite highly unlikely, is still possible. Unfortunately, in some extreme events such
as when the investors would like to sell the asset simultaneously to meet their cash demands,
liquidity shortage can cause market disruption and trigger systemic crisis from asset fire-sale
phenomenon.
P
A
Figure 2.8: Graphical illustration of liquidity shortage in an extreme event when all the investors demand
liquidity simultaneously when n∗ = 2.
Consequently, presence of agency dealers has ambiguous effect on market stability. On
the one hand, they improve liquidity condition of existing investors with low trading needs
who would have invested in the asset, regardless of their presence. In this case, agency dealers
improve market stability. On the other hand, agency dealers can also deteriorate market stability
by attracting more low-trading-need investors to enter the market and start investing in the
security. However, the low-trading-need investors are highly subjected to liquidity shortage
during extreme events. Depending on further knock-on effects from the first-round liquidity dry-
up among the low-trading-need investors, emergence of agency dealers can cause an alarming
concern to the market regulators in terms of market stability.
2.7 Result discussion
2.7.1 Will investors with high trading needs choose agency dealers?
The assumption of homogeneous investors in the model so far allows us to understand the role
of agency dealers, but the equilibrium outcome when there are several types of investors in
28To see this, one can easily extend our model by allowing the investors to decide whether to enter the market in
period 0. If entering, they have to pay participation cost c.
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the market remains unclear. Given high bargaining power of obtaining good price of agency
dealers, would high-trading-need investors who can form direct relationship with principal
dealers choose agency dealers instead?
In appendix, we extend our model to include two types of investors: an investor with high
trading needs (i.e. the high type) and a group of investors with low trading needs (i.e. the low
type). We found that the high-type investor might indeed choose agency dealer, if the size of
agency dealer (i.e. the number of low-type investors connecting with the agency dealer) is
sufficiently large. This is because the high-type can obtain reasonably low price even if he
might be able to get only partial liquidity insurance from the agency dealer. However, if the
agency dealer does not have sufficiently large low-type clientèle, the high-type investor will
prefer direct relationship with the principal dealer to avoid intermediation fees and obtain full
liquidity insurance.
The implication on market efficiency when the high-type switches to agency dealer is
ambiguous. On the one hand, the low-type investors may benefit from the resulting higher
bargaining power of the agency dealer. On the other hand, when the high-type chooses the
agency dealer, either 1) the high-type will crowd out liquidity from the low-type in bad states if
liquidity quota does not increase in response to the joining of the high-type or 2) the low-type
might face higher price due to higher upstream price and agency cost if liquidity quota increases
in response to the joining of the high-type. Moreover, it is possible that some low-type investors
will no longer be able to form a relationship with the agency dealer upon the joining of the
high-type investor. In our model, we cannot examine this effect, since we assume that the
agency dealer can obtain outside option equivalent to the equilibrium relationship payoff only
if the agency dealer still connects with all the (low-type) investors in the game. Under this
assumption, every investor matters to the agency dealer, thus the agency dealer can commit to
every relationships with the investors. Relaxing this assumption might cause the agency dealer
to lose a few low-type investors upon the joining of the high-type investor, resulting in lower
allocative efficiency.
2.7.2 Possibility of a principal dealer executing agency trade.
In our model, we assume that only agency dealer can intermediate trades between a principal
dealer and investors. However, one can argue that in reality a principal dealer can take both
roles: providing liquidity by taking positions for their own clients and intermediating trans-
actions between low-trading-need investors and another principal dealer. Our conjecture is
that intermediation via an agency dealer who do not take positions and do not have their own
high-trading-need client base is preferable for both the investors and the upstream principal
dealer. This is because of higher agency cost when trading via the principal dealer. Unlike an
agency dealer, a principal dealer has an incentive to withhold trade orders from the investors
during good times. This agency problem supports the theory that vertical market fragmentation
(i.e existence of periphery layer) can still emerge despite the presence of multiple principal
dealers.
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2.7.3 Direct relationship with partial insurance coverage
In our model, an agency dealer can sustain relationship between a principal dealer and several
investors when the investors have infrequent liquidity shocks, by reducing liquidity quota
to induce the principal dealer to eventually commit to the relationship. In the equilibrium,
the investors will only obtain partial insurance coverage from the agency dealer. From this
finding, one can argue that the investors can just form partial insurance relationship directly
with a principal dealer, by requiring the principal dealer to provide liquidity with some positive
probability. This type of direct relationship will save the intermediation fees and improve the
surplus of both the investor and the principal dealer.
Unfortunately, this type of direct relationship with partial insurance between a principal
dealer and an investor involves a new imperfect monitoring problem: the investor cannot monitor
perfectly whether the principal dealer is still randomly providing liquidity or he strategically
reneges the agreement in bad states. From our model, trading via an agency dealer can eliminate
this imperfect monitoring problem, because investors do not have to monitor the agency dealer
who, unlike the principal dealer, has no incentive to withhold liquidity in bad states. Moreover,
trading via agency dealer allows investors to pool their liquidity shocks and enlarge contracting
space, increasing the likelihood of relationship formation. Therefore, intermediated relationship
can be preferable to direct relationship with partial insurance.
2.7.4 Multiple agency dealers and competition
Throughout the paper, we consider the model with one agency dealer. So far, our result suggests
that a market with only one agency dealer might be socially optimal (i.e. highest likelihood for
successful relationship), because contracting space is largest and a threat that the agency dealer
can impose on the principal dealer is maximized. Also, when we allow our model to contain
multiple agency dealers, equilibrium market structure is likely to be a market which only one
agency dealer forms the relationship with all the investors. However, the market structure with
one agency dealer might no longer be an equilibrium when we consider a more general setting.
Firstly, our model assumes that there is perfect competition among sell-side dealers. There-
fore, it is not surprising to get the equilibrium in which the market contains only one agency
dealer. However, if we consider competition structure and surplus allocation in a more realistic
setting, an equilibrium with several agency dealers can emerge endogenously. This is because the
investors need to establish relationships with several dealers to increase their outside options.29
Secondly, our model assumes that other principal dealers in the market will consider forming
relationship with the agency dealer only if 1) the agency dealer terminates the relationship with
previous principal dealer in a bad state and 2) all investors are still in the relationship with the
agency dealer. Under this assumption, the agency dealer can commit to relationships with all the
investors in the game. If relaxing this assumption, a commitment problem of agency dealer will
arise when agency dealer is too big, because punishment from each individual investor might
not be strong enough to threat the agency dealer to commit to the relationship in good states.
That is, in periods when the number of active investors is small and the market state is good,
29See Wang (2017) for more details on relationship formation and market competition
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the agency dealer will choose the other principal dealer P ′, get cheaper upstream price in the
deviating period, and establish relationship with a new principal dealer in subsequent periods. If
the size of agency dealer is large enough, relationship termination from a few active investors
in the deviating period will not be enough to prevent the agency dealer from forming a new
relationship later. Thus, in the relationship equilibrium, each individual investor must be able
to effectively punish the agency dealer. Indeed, relaxing this assumption will introduce one
more equilibrium condition on the size of agency dealer. Due to the size limit on agency dealer,
equilibrium with multiple agency dealers will naturally exist.
2.8 Concluding remark.
To summarize, this paper studies strategic dealer choice of buy-side investors in over-the-counter
(OTC) asset markets and provides a new insight into why periphery dealers, despite locating
at inferior positions in OTC dealer network, can survive and co-exist with core dealers. Our
main finding is that investors will trade with periphery dealers to obtain the benefit of long-term
relationship instead of trading with core dealers on a one-period basis when the investors have
infrequent liquidity needs, allowing periphery dealers to co-exist with core dealers.
Our finding on long-term relationships opens up a challenging question for policy makers
on designing appropriate marketplaces for OTC-traded products. Long-term relationships and
dealer network have been the bone of over-the-counter markets for several years due to the
feature of OTC-traded products which are non-standardized, traded in large lots, and highly
illiquid. However, recent financial crisis has put this traditional OTC market mechanism into
question. What should be a suitable policy direction for regulators or what regulatory framework
should be put in place are important questions we are yet to discover.
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2.9 Appendix
2.9.1 Additional material: the model with heterogeneous investors
In this section, we extend our model to have two types of investors: a high-trading-need investor
who can form direct relationship with principal dealers and a group of low-trading-need investors
who cannot do so, and characterize the conditions when the high-trading-need investor chooses
the agency dealer (pooling equilibrium) instead of the principal dealer (separating equilibrium).
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Figure 2.9: Pooling equilibrium (left) and separating equilibrium (right).
Model extension
Consider the model with an agency dealer and two types of investors: a high-type investor H
with probability of liquidity shock qH and a group of low-type investors IL = {1, 2, · · · , N}
with probability of liquidity shock qL and |IL| = n. Define Qi = qiδ1−δ . We limit our analysis to
a special case under the following assumptions.
Assumption 2.2
1. qL ∈ N(0)
2. QH ≥ QP ≥ QL
3. n ≥ 1QLmax
{
2Y −QH , 2p(1+QLp)
2(C−VL)
(1−p)((QLp)2(V−VL)−(1+QLp)2(C−VL)) −QH
}
4. {P,A} obtain their lowest possible payoffs.
The first assumption assumes that the low-type investors rarely face liquidity shocks, im-
plying that they can obtain almost full insurance in the equilibrium. This assumption allows us
to draw an insight about equilibrium market structure without technical complications about
a change in the low-type investors’ incentive from endogenous adjustment in the degree of
liquidity insurance coverage.
The second and third assumption specify characteristics of the low-type and the high-type.
The second assumption states that only the high-type investor can form the relationship directly
with the principal dealer. The third assumption states that the number of the low-type investors is
sufficiently large that they can form the relationship with the agency dealer without the inclusion
of the high-type investor; that is, a separating equilibrium can exist. The last assumption
specifies equilibrium surplus allocation of all players in a competitive dealer market, where the
sell-side dealers compete for relationship formation in a large decentralized market. This also
implies that we will consider only the most-likely-to-exist equilibrium, in which the low-type
investors obtain their highest possible payoffs.
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Timeline
The timeline of the game is identical to our main setting, except that the investors must choose
whom they want to form the relationship with in period t = 0. Specifically, all investors
i ∈ I decide whom they want to form the long-term relationship in period 0, denoted by
di0 = {A,P}. Assume that every player can observe all the investors’ dealer choice, implying
that the investors know the coalition size of the agency dealer. Denote N(A) = {i|di0 = A}
and N(P ) = {i|di0 = P} the set of investors who choose A and P in period 0, respectively.
The equilibrium
Before characterizing the equilibrium, we first formally define two types of the equilibrium.
Definition 2.4 (Equilibrium definition) A liquidity insurance equilibrium is
1. a pooling equilibrium if
a) di0 = A for all i ∈ I
b) FiG = xGpQi and FiB = 0
2. a separating equilibrium if
a) di0 = A for all i ∈ IL
b) dH0 = P
c) n∗ = 1
From the definition, we rule out the possibility of cross-subsidy across investors under
pooling equilibrium in condition (1.b). Specifically, the investors are responsible to pay for
only the agency cost incurred from their own transactions, and the agency dealer A cannot
strategically place higher fees to some investors to cover other investors’ agency costs. We also
consider only the separating equilibrium when liquidity quota n∗ is one. This is intuitive given
that the probability of liquidity shocks of the low-type investors is almost zero.
Our next step is to characterize existence condition of both the pooling and separating
equilibrium. The condition will depend on the decision of the high-type investor, because the
low-type investors have no other options but to form the relationship with the agency dealer.
Therefore, we only need to compare the expected payoff that the high-type would get under
separating equilibrium with his expected payoff under pooling equilibrium.
What is the key factor that determines the dealer choice of the high-type investor? Obviously,
one is the equilibrium price that he could obtain from both dealers. However, the high-type
investor must also consider his probability of obtaining liquidity in the future (i.e. his insurance
coverage yi(n∗)), if he chooses the agency dealer. To illustrate this point, we will consider
two cases of pooling equilibrium: the case of n∗ = 1 and the case of n∗ = 2. In the first
case, the agency dealer does not alter the liquidity quota to cover the inclusion of the high-type
investor; therefore, the high-type investor faces higher liquidity risk (i.e. lower yi(n∗)). The
second case is when the agency dealer adjusts the liquidity quota to n∗ = 2 to cover for the
high-type investor. In this case, the high type still obtains (almost) full insurance when choosing
the agency dealer.
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Case I: liquidity quota n∗ = 2 under pooling equilibrium.
The first case is when the liquidity quota rises by one unit to cover frequent liquidity needs
of the high-type investor. As shown in Figure 2.10, a unit increase in the quota will guarantee
the high-type investor almost full insurance coverage. Therefore, the decision of the high-type
investor will depend on the final price that he would be charged by the agency dealer. Consider
the following proposition.
P
A
L4
H
L3L2L1
separating equilibrium
1
P
A
L4 HL3L2L1
pooling equilibrium
2
Figure 2.10: Graphical illustration of a unit increase in liquidity quota when the high-type investor
chooses A.
Proposition 2.5 (Equilibrium characterization I) Provided that n∗ = 2 under pooling equi-
librium and that Assumption 2.2 is satisfied,
1. pooling equilibrium exists if p > 12 and
NQL ≥ 2 +QH
2p− 1
2. separating equilibrium exists if p ≤ 12 , or if p > 12 and
NQL ≤ 2 +QH
2p− 1 .
Interpretation of this proposition is straightforward. The high-type investor would prefer A
if the price quoted by A is cheaper than the price quoted by P . Therefore, when coalition size
of the low-type nQL is large enough relative to his own size QH , the high-type investor would
arbitrage by choosing the agency dealer.
Interestingly, the pooling equilibrium is more efficient than the separating equilibrium due
to positive externality from the high-type investor: the amount of liquidity provision in bad
states is slightly higher than the separating equilibrium. In the pooling, the low-type investors
have higher chance of obtaining liquidity in bad states, because they, as a group, can obtain
two units of liquidity instead of one unit when the high-type investor does not have liquidity
shock. However, will pooling equilibrium be preferable to all players? According to the next
proposition, the low-type investors in fact receive lower payoff if the high-type investor chooses
the agency dealer.
Proposition 2.6 (Surplus allocation) In the pooling equilibrium, the low-type investors obtain
lower payoff compared to the case which the high-type investor chooses the principal dealer.
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This finding is surprising, given that the inclusion of the high-type investor should help
the low-type investors get lower price due to larger group size. In addition, liquidity insurance
coverage of the low-type investors increases. The answer is because the upstream price depends
not only on the number of investors but also on the liquidity quota that the agency dealer requests
from the principal dealer. Upon the participation of the high-type investor, the upstream price
quoted to the agency dealer in fact increases which can hurt the low-type investors. Moreover,
the extra trade surplus goes to the agency dealer who also charges higher intermediation fees to
the low-type investors in response to higher upstream price.30 This finding implies that agency
dealer might improve market liquidity and efficiency, but he can have too much bargaining
power over low-type investors who have no other options but to trade with him.
Case II: liquidity quota n∗ = 1 under pooling equilibrium.
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Figure 2.11: Graphical illustration of no adjustment in liquidity quota when the high-type investor
chooses A.
The second type of pooling equilibrium is when the agency dealer does not request more
liquidity quota from the principal dealer to cover liquidity needs of the high-type investor in
the pooling equilibrium. Obviously, this is an inefficient pooling equilibrium, as the high-type
investor crowds out liquidity coverage from the low-type investors. In this situation, the dealer
choice of the high-type investor depends on both the price and the degree of his insurance
coverage he can obtain from A. Let xPA be the price that P offers to A when H chooses A and
and xPH be the price that P offers to H directly. The following lemma provides a sufficient
condition for the high-type investor to prefer A.31
Lemma 2.4 In period 0, dH0 = A if
xPH − xPA ≥ 1
QHp
xPA +
(
1− p
p
)
(nqL) (V − VL)
From the lemma, even though A can get lower price from P , choosing A is not always
an optimal decision for the high-type investor because of two reason because of two reasons:
positive intermediation fees (i.e. 1QHpxPA) and lower probability of obtaining liquidity in bad
states (i.e.
(
1−p
p
)
(nqL) (V − VL)). Indeed, the larger the number of low-type investors is, the
30Recall that the agency cost (i.e. minimum intermediation fees required by the agency dealer) depends directly
on the upstream price. When the upstream price increases, the agency dealer has more incentive to send trade orders
to the competitive principal dealer, resulting in higher agency cost.
31Note that this lemma considers a strategy profile with the lowest possible probability that the high-type investor
will get liquidity in bad states to obtain a sufficient condition.
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lower the chance that the high-type investor would get obtain liquidity in bad states is. Thus, the
price quoted by A must be sufficiently low to compensate for the lower insurance coverage.
Can a pooling equilibrium exist? From the lemma, the number of low-type investors must
be so high that A can get a very attractive upstream price for a pooling equilibrium to exist. The
following proposition provides a sufficient condition for existence of the pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 2.7 (Equilibrium characterization II) Provided that 1) n∗ = 1 under pooling
equilibrium, 2) p > 12 , and 3) qH is sufficiently low, there is a real interval [Q, Q¯] ∈ R+ in
which a pooling equilibrium exists if NQL ⊂ [Q, Q¯]
This proposition is straightforward. If 1) the frequency of liquidity needs of the high-type
is sufficiently low that his benefit of choosing A is relatively large and 2) the number of the
low-type investors is also large enough to bring the upstream price down significantly, then
the high-type investor will choose the agency dealer. However, the main difference from the
previous type of pooling equilibrium is the restriction on upperbound of frequency of aggregate
liquidity needs of all the low-type investors (nqL). This is because, unlike the previous type of
pooling equilibrium, the high-type investor faces higher likelihood of liquidity shortage when
the whole group of low-type investors demand liquidity more frequently.
Discussion
Overall, what do we learn from this section? For one thing, we know that agency dealers
and principal dealers are not direct competitors. From the model, an agency dealer attracts
trade orders from low-trading-need investors who are not the main target clients of principal
dealers. However, if agency dealers are bigger, they can start competing with principal dealers
by attracting the high-type investors. Such competition can be undesirable to both low-type
investors and principal dealers. From the model, under the case of efficient pooling equilibrium
(n∗ = 2) in which a high-type investor can bring more liquidity to low-type investors, the market
player who gains is the agency dealer at the expense of the low-type investors. In a nutshell,
agency dealers should be sufficiently big to effectively negotiate with principal dealers, but they
can become too big and harm the main market participants – main liquidity-providing supplier
(principal dealers) and end-user investors.
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2.9.2 Omitted proofs
First, the list of a few notations used in the following proofs are as follows.
• f(k) = Pr(∑j∈I ljt = k)
• f−i(k) = Pr(
∑
j∈I−i ljt = k)
• κ(n∗) = ∑k≤n∗ f(k)(k) +∑n≥k>n∗ f(k)(n∗)
• σ(n∗) = κ(n∗)κ(n)
• yi(n∗) =
∑
k≤n∗−1 f−i(k) +
∑
k>n∗−1 f−i(k)αi(n
∗, k)
Also, note that κ(n) =
∑
k≤n Pr
(∑
i∈I lit = k
)
k = nq since it is the mean of binomial
distribution.
Proof of Lemma 2.1: To prove the lemma, we have to consider both "if" and "only if"
condition. For the "if" condition, we follow the standard trigger strategy and use the static
equilibrium strategy as a threat on deviation of both players. That is, if someone deviates, both
of them will receive their respective outside options in all subsequent periods. For the "only
if" part, it is always true, because both players must obtain higher payoff under equilibrium
relationship outcome than their outside options when they choose to form the relationship. In an
equilibrium, the following incentive constraints must be true.
1. the investor is willing to pay insurance premium xG and continue the relationship instead
of contacting P ′ in good states
−xG +Q[p(V − xG) + (1− p)(V − xB)] ≥ QpV [E1.1]
2. the insurance premium xG is feasible to pay by the investor
xG ≤ VL [E1.2]
3. the principal dealer is willing to provide costly liquidity immediacy and continue the
relationship rather than withholding the liquidity in bad states
xB − C +Q(pxG + (1− p)(xB − C)) ≥ 0 [E2]
Rearranging [E1.1] and combining with [E1.2] yields
xG ≤ max
{
Q(1− p)
1 +Qp
(V − xB), VL
}
[E3]
Rearranging [E2] gives
xG ≥ 1 +Q(1− p)
Qp
(C − xB) [E4]
which proves the lemma.
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Proof of Proposition 2.2: To prove the existence condition, we find the condition in which
there exists (xG, xB) ∈ [0, VL] × [0, VL] such that [E3] and [E4] are satisfied. From Lemma
2.1, [E3] and [E4] are both satisfied when
1 +Q(1− p)
Qp
(C − xB) ≤ Q(1− p)
1 +Qp
(V − xB) [E5]
and
1 +Q(1− p)
Qp
(C − xB) ≤ VL [E6].
Rearranging [E5] gives
1 +Q(1− p)
Qp
C − Q(1− p)
1 +Qp
(V ) ≤ 1 +Q(1− p) +Qp
Qp(1 +Qp)
xB.
From this condition, it is obvious that xB = VL will maximize the chance of equilibrium
existence. This is also intuitive as it reduces the distortion in bad states. Substituting xB = VL
into [E5] and [E6] gives
1 +Q(1− p)
Qp
(C − VL) ≤ Q(1− p)
1 +Qp
(V − VL) [E5′]
1 +Q(1− p)
Qp
(C − VL) ≤ VL [E6′]
Solving [E5′] for Q ∈ R+ gives
Q ≥ 1 +
√
1 + 4p(1− p)(V − C)
2p(1− p)(V − C)
and rearranging [E6′] gives
Q ≥ C − VL
VL − (1− p)C provided that VL > (1− p)C
which proves the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 2.2: To prove this lemma, we consider the following incentive constraints
of the principal dealer and all investor i ∈ I:
1. principal dealer P must have incentive to provide liquidity in bad states and continue the
relationship
n∗(xB − C) + δ
1− δ (nqpxG − (1− p)(C − xB)κ(n
∗)) ≥ 0 [A1]
2. investor i has no incentive to choose P ′ during good state
−(xG +FG) +Q(p(V − (xG +FG)) + (1− p)yi(n∗)(V − (xB +FB)) ≥ QpV [A2]
3. investor i can afford to purchase liquidity service in all periods.
xG + FiG ≤ VL [A3]
xB + FiB ≤ VL [A4].
94
Rearranging [A1] yields
xG ≥
n∗ + δ1−δ (1− p)κ(n∗)
nQp
(C − xB) [E1].
Rearranging [A2] and combining with [A3] give
xG + FiG ≤ max
{
Q(1− p)yi(n∗)
1 +Qp
(V − (xB + FiB)), VL
}
[E2]
which proves the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2.3: To prove this lemma, we consider incentive constraint of the
agency dealer. The reason we restrict our attention to only symmetric equilibrium in which
all investors face same allocation rule αi(n∗, nt) = αj(n∗, nt) which implies that, for a
given n∗, yi(n∗) = yj(n∗) for all i, j ∈ I and face same intermediation fees in every state
(FiB, FiG) = (FjB, FjG) = (FB, FG), is that it maximizes the likelihood of an equilibrium to
exist. Since for an equilibrium to exist, all investors must agree to the relationship, including the
ones who face the most restrictive incentive constraint. Under symmetric equilibrium, incentive
constraint of the agency dealer is
(1− p)FB
∑
k≤n∗
[
Pr
(∑
i∈I
lit = k
)
k
]
+
∑
n≥k>n∗
[
Pr
(∑
i∈I
lit = k
)
n∗
]
+ pFG
∑
k≤n
[
Pr
(∑
i∈I
lit = k
)
k
]
≥ (1− δ)nxG
δ
This is in fact the most restrictive incentive constraint of the agency dealer, which is when he
chooses P ′ when all investors demand liquidity in good states and earns maximum deviating
payoff nxG.32 Substituting κ(n) = nq and rearranging the constraint give
Q((1− p)σ(n∗)FB + pFG) ≥ xG [I]
which proves the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 2.3: To prove the proposition, we find the existence condition of the
liquidity insurance equilibrium among {P,A, I} and compare it to the existence condition of the
direct relationship equilibrium between {P, i}. To characterize the existence condition, we find
the minimum value of Q in which there exists {xG, xB, FG, FB} such that incentive constraints
of all players ([E1], [E2], [I]) and feasibility conditions ([A3], [A4]) are satisfied.
First,
FB = VL − xB [C1]
32We confirmed this again in the proof of Proposition 2.3
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must be true or else we can increase xB or FB which will relax other constraints and get the
lower Q. Next, from [A3],
FB = max
{
xG
Q − pFG
(1− p)σ(n∗) , 0
}
[C2]
or else we can decrease FB and relax other constraints to get lower Q. Considering the interior
solution, we obtain from [C1] and [C2] that
xB = VL −
xG
Q − pFG
(1− p)σ(n∗) [C3].
Next, from [E1], we obtain
(1 +
n
n∗
QA)(C − xB) ≤ n
n∗
QpxG
where A = (1− p)σ(n∗) < 1. Next, substituting xB from [C3] into this condition gives
(1 +
n
n∗
QA)
(
C −
(
VL −
xG
Q − pFG
A
))
≤ n
n∗
QpxG [E1
′].
Rearranging [E1′] gives
(1 +
n
n∗
QA) (C − VL) ≤ n
n∗
Qp(xG + FG)−
(
n
n∗
+
1
QA
)
xG +
p
A
FG [E1
′′].
Consider [E2]. Substituting FB = VL − xB from [C1] and rearranging [E2] gives
xG + FG ≤ Q(1− p)yi(n
∗)
1 +Qp
(V − VL) [E2′].
From both [E1′′] and [E2′], to relax the constraint and minimize the value of Q, we must set xG
to its lowest possible value while setting FG to its highest possible value to relax the constraint
[E1′′] while unchanging the left term of [E2′]. Since FB cannot go below zero, we obtain the
following lemma.
Lemma 2.5 xG = pQFG and FB = 0
This lemma is intuitive. Because there is restriction during the bad state on the maximum price
that the principal dealer can charge, further distortion by setting FB higher will deteriorate profit
of P even more. Lastly, substituting xG = pQFG into [E1′′] yields
(1 +
n
n∗
QA) (C − VL) ≤ n
n∗
Q2p2FG
which can be simplified into
(1 + nn∗QA) (C − VL)
n
n∗Q
2p2
≤ FG [E1′′′].
Also, substituting xG = pQFG into [E2′] gives
FG ≤ (1− p)Qyi(n
∗)(V − VL)
(1 +Qp)2
[E2′′].
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Therefore, the equilibrium exist if
(1 + nn∗QA) (C − VL)
n
n∗Q
2p2
≤ (1− p)Qyi(n
∗)(V − VL)
(1 +Qp)2
which is equivalent to
(1 + nn∗QA) (C − VL) (1 +Qp)
n
n∗Q
2p2yi(n∗)
≤ Q(1− p)(V − VL)
1 +Qp
[E3.A]
Next, we compare the equilibrium existence condition [E3.A] with the existence condition
from Proposition 2.2. Recall the condition [E5′] from the proof in Proposition 2.2 that liquidity
insurance equilibrium between {i, P} for any i ∈ I exists if and only if
(1 +Q(1− p))(C − VL)
Qp
≤ Q(1− p)(V − VL)
1 +Qp
[E3.P ]
Let QP be the minimum Q that satisfies liquidity insurance existence condition between {P, i}
in the basic model and QA be the minimum Q that satisfies liquidity insurance existence
condition between {P,A, I}. From [E3.A] and [E3.P ], QA < QP if
(1 + nn∗QA) (C − VL) (1 +Qp)
n
n∗Q
2p2yi(n∗)
≤ (1 +Q(1− p))(C − VL)
Qp
.
Substituting A = (1− p)σ(n∗) into the condition and simplifying give(
1 +Q(1− p)
n∗
n +Q(1− p)σ(n∗)
)
≥
(
1 +
1
Qp
)(
1
yi(n∗)
)
.
Lastly, we need to verify that, given that QP > Q > QA,
1. the maximum agency cost of A is indeed nxG which will validate the incentive constraint
of A in Lemma 2.3.
2. xG + FG ≤ VL
To prove the first claim, we need to show that, when pQFG = xG,
nxG > zxG + (n− z) qpδ
1− (1− q)δ (xG + FG)
where the right term of the inequality is the expected payoff of the agency dealer when he decides
to choose P ′ when there are z liquidity orders in a good period. Substituting pQFG = xG into
the inequality condition yields
1 >
qpδ
1− (1− q)δ (1 +
1
pQ
)
which, once being simplified, becomes
1 > p
which is always true. This validates the incentive constraint of A in Lemma 2.3.
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To prove our second claim, it is sufficient to prove that xF + FG is lower than any price xG
offered by P to i under direct liquidity insurance relationship between {P, i}. First, the direct
liquidity insurance relationship equilibrium between {P, i} does not exist (i.e. Q < QP ) when
any xG which satisfies the following constraint
xG ≥ 1 +Q(1− p)
Qp
(C − xB)
violates the incentive constraint of investor i such that
xG >
Q(1− p)
1 +Qp
(V − xB) [Z1].
However, any equilibrium price xG + FG under liquidity insurance equilibrium between
{P,A, I} must satisfy the incentive constraint of investor i, which is
xG + FG ≤ Q(1− p)yi(n
∗)
1 +Qp
(V − (xB + FB)) [Z2].
Let xG =
Q(1−p)
1+Qp (V −xB) be the minimum price that the principal dealer quotes to investor
i in any direct relationship equilibrium. Since yi(n∗) ≤ 1, we obtain
xG + FG ≤ Q(1− p)yi(n
∗)
1 +Qp
(V − (xB + FB)) < xG.
Since xG ≤ VL at xB = VL by assumption, xG + FG ≤ VL must be true. This proves the
second claim and the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2.4: Recall from the proof of Proposition 2.3 that
xG + FG ≤ Q(1− p)yi(n
∗)
1 +Qp
(V − (xB + FB)) < xG.
This immediately proves the proposition.
Proof of Corollary 2.1: From the first-order Taylor approximation, limq→0κ(n∗) = nq(1−
q)n−1 = nq. Also, limq→0f−i(0) → 1. Therefore, limq→0yi(n∗) = 1, σ(n∗) = κ(n
∗)
κ(n) , and
limq→0 σ(n∗) = 1. This proves the first condition in the corollary.
Next, from Proposition 2.3, QA < QP if
1 +Q(1− p)
n∗
n +Q(1− p)σ(n∗)
≥
(
1 +
1
Qp
)(
1
yi(n∗)
)
.
Substituting yi(n∗) = 1 and σ(n∗) = 1 into the condition gives
1 +Q(1− p)
n∗
n +Q(1− p)
≥ 1 + 1
Qp
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which will be satisfied if p > 12 and
n
n∗
≥ 1 + pQ
Q(2p− 1) .
This proves the corollary.
Proof of Proposition 2.5: To prove this proposition, we 1) compare the expected payoff of
the high-type investor if he chooses A with his expected payoff if he chooses P and 2) check
that the low-type can form the relationship under both types of equilibrium. Let xP be the price
that the principal dealer would charge the high-type investor under separating equilibrium and
xA + FH be the equilibrium price that the agency dealer would charge the high-type investor
under pooling equilibrium. From Lemma 2.2, when n∗ = 2 under pooling equilibrium and
{P,A} obtains lowest possible payoff by Assumption 2.2, we obtain
xP =
(
1
QHp
+
1− p
p
)
(C − VL)
and
xA =
(
2
(QH + nQL)p
+
1− p
p
)
(C − VL) and FH = xA
pQH
.
Therefore, the high-type investor would choose A if(
2
(QH + nQL)p
+
1− p
p
)
(1 +
1
QHp
) ≤ 1
QHp
+
1− p
p
.
Simplifying the condition gives
nQL ≥ 2 +QH
2p− 1 provided that p >
1
2
[C1].
Next,we show that the low-type investors can form the relationship in both separating and
pooling equilibrium. From Lemma 2.2, the low-type investors would commit to the relationship
in the pooling equilibrium if(
2
nQL +QH
+
1− p
p
)(
QLp+ 1
QLp
)
≤ QL(1− p)(V − VL)
(1 +QLp)(C − VL) .
Rearranging the condition yields
n ≥ 1
QL
(
2p(1 +QLp)
2(C − VL)
(1− p)((QLp)2(V − VL)− (1 +QLp)2(C − VL)) −QH
)
which is always true by Assumption 2.2. Similarly, from Lemma 2.2, the low-type investors
would commit to the relationship in the separating equilibrium if(
1
nQL
+
1− p
p
)(
QLp+ 1
QLp
)
≤ QL(1− p)(V − VL)
(1 +QLp)(C − VL)
which is equivalent to
n ≥ 1
QL
(
p(1 +QLp)
2(C − VL)
(1− p)((QLp)2(V − VL)− (1 +QLp)2(C − VL))
)
.
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This is always satisfied by Assumption 2.2. This proves the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2.6: Let bs be the price that A charges to the low-type investors under
separating equilibrium and bp be the price that A charges to the low-type investors under pooling
equilibrium. Notice that bs < bp if [C1] is true. To see this, from Lemma 2.2, bs < bp if
1
nQLp
+
1− p
p
<
2
(QH + nQL)p
+
1− p
p
.
Rearranging the condition gives
nQL > QH .
which is always true when [C1] is true. This implies that the payoff of the low-type investors can
be lower in the pooling equilibrium compared to the case when the high-type investor chooses
P . Note that this is also true despite relaxing the restriction on no cross-subsidy across investors.
To see this, first note that the payoff of the principal dealer from the relationship does not change
(which is 2(C − VL)). Next, when the high-type investor chooses A, it will drive the upstream
price upward. Therefore, the amount of surplus that all players must leave to A must be strictly
higher by at least the new upstream price xG. However, upon choosing A, the high-type investor
increases total trade surplus by almost zero since qL → 0. This proves Proposition 2.6.
Proof of Lemma 2.4: To prove the lemma, we compare the payoff of the high-type investor
when he chooses A against his payoff when he chooses P . Let xPA be the price that P offers to
A when H chooses A. Let xPH be the price that P offers to H when H chooses P . Given that
FH =
1
QHp
, the payoff when H chooses A is higher than the payoff when he chooses P if
QH(p(V −XPA − FH) + (1− p)M(V − VL)) ≥ QH(p(V − xPH) + (1− p)(V − VL))
where M is the probability that the high-type investor will get liquidity in bad states if joining
A. This term will be at the lowest value when M = 1− nqL, which is when A gives priority to
the low-type investors. Substituting M = 1−nqL and FH = 1QHp into the condition, we obtain
xPH − xPA ≥ 1
QHp
xPA +
(
1− p
p
)
(nqL) (V − VL)
which proves the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 2.7: From Lemma 2.2, we obtain
xPH =
(
1
QHp
+
1− p
p
)
(C − VL)
and that
xPA =
(
1
(QLn+QH)p
+
(
1− p
p
)(
nQL +QH − nQLqH
nQL +QH
))
(C − VL).
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Let Qˆ = nQL and QN = QH + Qˆ. Plugging xPH and xPA into
xPH − xPA ≥ 1
QHp
xPA +
(
1− p
p
)
(nqL) (V − VL)
yields
1
QHp
+
1− p
p
−
(
1 +
1
QHp
)(
1
QNp
+
(
1− p
p
)(
1− nqLqH
qˆ
))
≥ qˆ
(
1− p
p
)(
V − VL
C − VL
)
which must be true if
1
QHp
+
1− p
p
−
(
1 +
1
QHp
)(
1
QNp
+
1− p
p
)
≥ qˆ
(
1− p
p
)(
V − VL
C − VL
)
.
Rearranging this condition gives
Qˆ− 1
p
− (1− p)QN ≥ QˆQNqH(1− p)
(
V − VL
C − VL
)
which is identical to
Qˆ2qH(1− p)
(
V − VL
C − VL
)
+ Qˆ
[
q2H(
δ
1− δ )(1− p)
(
V − VL
C − VL
)
− p
]
+
1
p
+ (1− p)QH ≤ 0.
The left side is the standard quadratic function of Qˆ. From the above inequality, a solution
for Qˆ exists if
q2H(
δ
1− δ )(1− p)
(
V − VL
C − VL
)
− p < 0
and(
p− q2H(
δ
1− δ )(1− p)
(
V − VL
C − VL
))2
− 4qH(1− p)
(
V − VL
C − VL
)(
1
p
+ (1− p)QH
)
≥ 0.
Both of them will be true if qH is sufficiently low. This proves Proposition 2.7.
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Chapter 3
Strategic Formation of Financial
Network
3.1 Introduction
In globalization era, financial interconnectedness becomes a prominent feature of global financial
landscape via all kinds of connection - equities, debts, derivatives, and other types of financial
obligations. While financial interlinkage brings a benefit of risk-sharing across financial entities,
it also generates financial fragility, or the so-called systemic risk, due to cascading failure from
interdependencies within the financial system. The materialization of systemic risk in the recent
financial crisis highlights a necessity to understand formation of financial network and possible
build-up of systemic risk.
While the literatures have unveiled systemic consequence of cascading failures of a fixed
financial network,1 the story of financial network formation which is critical for regulatory
design remains mystifying to regulators. In this spirit, this paper develops a game-theoretic
model to study strategic formation of financial network. The main objective is to identify
equilibrium pattern of financial network emerged from strategic decision of all self-interested
agents who can trade forward contracts (i.e. assets) to obtain fractions of investment return of
other players in a trading network. We contribute to the literature by shedding light on how the
equilibrium asset allocation depends on structural properties of trading network.
In the model, there is a finite number of risk-averse agents investing in a risky project and
holding unlimited amount of cash. To diversify the risk, agents can issue forward contracts (i.e.
asset) which guarantee a fraction of their project returns and sell to whom they have trading
connection with. All trades are bilateral, each involving two parties privately agreeing on asset
price and quantity. All trading relationships are represented by a directed network, in which
1A few examples include Allen and Gale (2000), Elliott et al (2014), Acemoglu et al (2015), Cabrales et al
(2014).
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vertices represent all agents in the economy and arcs indicate possibilities of bilateral trading
among agents.2
Asset prices are endogenously determined in two stages. In the first stage, agents simultane-
ously quote asset prices to all neighbouring buyers with a promise to sell unlimited amount of
assets at the quoted prices. In the second stage, after observing the quotes, all agents decide
quantities of asset demand. Asset resale is prohibited throughout the paper. We characterize the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium for an arbitrary trading network under standard assumptions
of CARA utility function and normal distribution of asset returns.
The main feature of the model is endogeneity of asset demand function, which depends on
topology of the trading network and asset return correlations. Intuitively, a quantity change in
asset demand of an agent from a price change causes his neighbour, his neighbour’s neighbours,
and so on to optimally adjust their portfolio compositions accordingly. This in turn can cause
non-trivial change in asset demand of all agents despite the agents being indirectly connected
through a sequence of counterparties. Such information is summarized in quantity impact
matrix, the coefficient matrix of asset demand functions determined in the second stage, which
indicates the sensitivity of demand quantity to a price change of all assets.
To examine how equilibrium asset allocation depends on structure of trading network, we
use the concept of line graph transformation to obtain a network of asset flows and identify
trading-link positions. Conceptually, the line graph transformation converts links of all agents
in the original network to become vertices in a new network, the network of asset flows, and
edges between each pair of new nodes represent the agents that tie the asset flows together.
Theoretically, the line graph is a network representation of local interactions of all players, so
its centrality plays a critical role in determining the equilibrium outcome.
There are three main insights from the model. First, the quantity impact matrix corresponds
to contribution matrix of a generalized Bonacich centrality measure of an asset-flow network, in
which the links between asset-flow nodes represent the buying parties of the asset flows. The
weight assigned to each link in the asset-flow network depends on opportunity of the buyer in
the flow to find substitutable assets and to sell his own asset. Intuitively, if a flow is central, a
price change in the flow will have significant impact on asset demand quantity of other asset
flows in the network.
The second insight is that the equilibrium asset allocation corresponds to a generalized
Bonacich centrality index of a network of asset flows, in which the links between asset-flow
nodes represent the buying and selling parties of the flows. Intuitively, demand quantity in a flow
is large (small) if the flow is adjacent to large-quantity flows with positive (negative) weight in
the asset flow network. We found that the weight assigned to each link in the asset flow network
relies on 1) the opportunity of the buying agent in the flow to buy other assets or to sell his asset,
2) the opportunity of the selling agent to sell the asset to other neighbours, and 3) the cost of
network externality from a price increase in a flow towards asset demand of other flows that
belong to the same seller. Intuitively, the selling agent will internalize the externality cost by
strategically increasing trading quantity (by reducing the price) in the asset flow that generates
positive externality toward his other asset outflows.
2Note that the assumption on directed network implies that some agents might be only the seller or the buyer in
the relationship.
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The third insight is that a constrained efficient allocation, the allocation which maximizes
the Utilitarian welfare subject to the trade friction of incomplete network, corresponds to a
generalized Bonacich centrality of an asset flow network, in which the links between asset-flow
nodes represent the agents whose utilities are affected by a quantity change in the corresponding
pair of asset-flow nodes. The main difference between the constrained efficient outcome and the
equilibrium outcome is the weight assigned to the links in the asset flow network. Specifically,
the weight for the constrained efficiency outcome depends on whether a quantity increase in
both connecting asset-flow nodes increases the utility of the agent corresponding to the link
between the two nodes.
We also found that the equilibrium asset allocation in a complete network is not efficient
in general due to monopolistic price-setting friction. An exception is when asset correlations
converge to one or become sufficiently negative. In both cases, the (inverse) asset demand
function becomes perfectly elastic; an increase in asset price can cause significant impact on the
demand quantity. Interestingly, when the correlation is sufficiently negative, market efficiency
can also be achieved even though the assets are not perfectly substitutable. The intuition is as
follows. With negative correlation, agents are willing to purchase high volume of assets despite
facing high asset price due to hedging benefits. When the correlation is highly negative, the
sellers can quote (almost) a zero-risk-premium asset price without losing the demand quantity.
However, a price increase above this level will significantly reduce demand quantity since it
exceeds the return mean. Since all agents cannot extract more rents by raising asset prices and
limiting demand quantities, the market inefficiency from the monopolistic friction disappears.
To obtain more insights, we further examine two specific cases: the case of no correlation
and the case of identical correlation in a star network and a core-periphery network. The no-
correlation assumption simplifies the model to a monopoly problem with differentiated goods,
as the quantity impact matrix becomes diagonal. We found that equilibrium asset allocation and
risk premium depend conversely on the degree centrality of selling parties, as predicted by the
standard monopoly problem.
The model provides a few interesting insights when examining the case of negative correla-
tions. Specifically, in the star network, central agent holds larger proportion of his own asset
than peripheral agents when the correlation is sufficiently negative. Moreover, when the number
of peripheral agents increases, the central agent sells less proportion of his own asset away
despite facing higher asset demands. The explanation is that, when the correlation is negative,
virtual value of assets to an agent depends on the variety of assets that the agent is holding due
to hedging benefits, resulting in larger amount of asset holdings of the hub in the equilibrium.
Considering equilibrium payoff, in the case of no asset correlation, trading with well-
connected neighbours is less beneficial than with stand-alone neighbours because of higher
competition. However, when the correlation is negative, connecting to well-connected agent
can be more beneficial. In the star network, if the asset correlation is negative, the utility of
the peripherals increases when the number of peripherals increases. This is because the benefit
from higher virtual asset valuation to the hub, of which the peripherals can take advantage by
charging higher prices, outweighs the loss from higher competition.
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Related literature.
This paper belongs to a vast growing literature in network theory in economics. Bramoullé
et al (2016) provided detailed discussion on the literature. Our paper is closely related to a
small literature of network games which map equilibrium outcome to Bonacich centrality in
a linear-quadratic framework. Ballester et la (2006) was the first to find the linkage between
Nash equilibrium and Bonacich centrality. Specifically, they found that Nash equilibrium
of noncooperative games with finite number of players, local complementarity, and linear-
quadratic interdependent utility is proportional to players’ Bonacich centrality in the network
when the direct effect is small; that is, when the equilibrium is interior and unique. Ballester
and Calvó-Armengol (2010) generalized the theory to cover broader class of games with local
substitutability in which local complementarity can be induced by a specific transformation.
Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) considered a game of public goods provision which has large
direct effects. Bramoullé et al (2014) generalized the findings in Ballester et al (2006) and
Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) by considering arbitrary level of direct effects and concluded
that equilibrium outcome depends on the lowest eigenvalue.
A few papers have developed network models with linear-quadratic framework and small
direct effects to study specific settings. For example, Calvó-Armengol et al (2009) developed a
network model to study peer effects in education. Denbee et al (2018) developed a model of
interbank network to study reserve holding decisions of banks. Candogan et al (2012) considered
a trading game in which a monopolist can sell a divisible good to consumers who face local peer
effects in social network from the goods consumption. They found that equilibrium prices of
the monopolist charged to each consumer correspond to Bonacich centrality of the consumer’s
position in the social network. The most closely related literature to this paper is Bimpikis et
al (forthcoming). Specifically, Bimpikis et al (forthcoming) considered a Cournot game with
homogenous goods in bipartite network and applied the concept of line graph to show that the
equilibrium production quantity corresponds to Bonacich centrality of the line graph. Our paper
contributes to this literature by considering an asset trading game and relating the equilibrium
asset allocation to the Bonacich centrality of the asset flow network.
There is a growing literature of trading in decentralized markets which can be divided mainly
into two groups based on assumptions of market environment. In the first group, studies of asset
trading were conducted in a search and bargaining model in which atomistic traders are matched
randomly in large markets (e.g. Duffie et al (2005,2007), Lagos et al (2011), Vayanos and Weill
(2008), Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), Afonso and Lagos (2015)). In the other group, trades
occur on a fixed network (e.g. Kranton and Minehart (2001), Gale and Kariv (2007), Blume et
al (2009), Manea (2011), Candogan et al (2012), Gofman (2014), Nava (2015), Condorelli et al
(2017), Choi et al (2017), Malamud and Rostek (2017), Kondor and Babus (2018), Bimpikis
et al (forthcoming)). Our paper belongs to the latter group. To the best of our knowledge, this
paper is the first to show the relationship between equilibrium asset allocation and centrality of
asset flows in decentralized asset markets.
Lastly, this paper also relates to a literature of financial network formation. While the theory
literature focused mainly on financial network formation from credit lending which can create
systemic crisis due to a sequence of counterparty risk exposure (e.g. Farboodi (2017), Babus
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(2016), Acemoglu et al (2015), Zawadowski (2013)), a small literature discussed systemic risk
from common asset holdings (e.g. Wagner (2008, 2010), Raffestin (2014)). Allen et al (2012)
developed a model with endogenous asset holding to analyze how an interplay between common
asset holding and short-term debt can generate systemic risk. We contribute to the literature by
characterizing strategic asset holdings of all agents in a general trading network which could be
further generalized to analyze the degree of systemic risk.
Structure of the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model setting. Section 3
discusses the notion of line graph transformation. Section 4 examines equilibrium outcome and
discusses how it relates to the network centrality. Section 5 considers a constrained efficient
outcome and implications on market efficiency. Section 6 considers a few special cases of
trading network. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in appendix.
3.2 The model
Consider a one-period economy with a finite number of risk-averse agents described by a set
of players N = {1, 2, ..., n}. Each agent invests in a risky project and holds unlimited amount
of cash. The project returns follow a joint normal distribution N(d,Σ) in which Σ is positive
definite with all diagonal elements of one (σ2i = 1;∀i ∈ N ).3 Denote off-diagonal element
σij = Σij . All agents have CARA utility function with identical degree of risk aversion α.
To diversify the risk, each agent can trade forward contract, a claim on the issuer’s project
return.4 Equivalently, all agents are endowed with one divisible unit of risky forward contract
(i.e. asset), which is a claim to their own project returns, and they can trade the assets among
each other. Denote forward contract of agent i as asset i. Assume that di ≥ ασ2i ,∀i ∈ N to
ensure that every agent prefers holding one unit of their own assets at the outset.5
To describe the trading environment, let a graph g represent bilateral trading relationships
among agents, in which ij ∈ g indicates the possibility of agent i selling asset i to agent j. The
trading network is directed (i.e. ij ∈ g 6→ ji ∈ g) and common knowledge. Throughout the
paper, flow ij ∈ g refers to trade link ij. LetB(i) = {j ∈ N, ij ∈ g} and S(i) = {k ∈ N, ki ∈
g} be the set of buyers and sellers of agent i, respectively. Denote S¯(i) = S(i) ∪ {i} and
B¯(i) = B(i)∪{i}. Let qij be asset quantity that agent i sells to agent j and qii = 1−
∑
j∈B(i)
qij
3 This implies that all the project returns have homogeneous volatility which is normalized to one, but the
pairwise correlation across agents can be different.
4 Note that out setting fits in two possible scenarios. The first is when the project ownership is transferred. This
is just a standard asset trading game. The other case is when the project ownership is not transferable. In this case,
the agents may refuse to pay the project return to the contract buyers when exposing to losses from other assets
in the portfolio. Consequently, while sharing the idiosyncratic risk amongst agents, trading forward contracts also
originates the network of risk exposure, thereby generating systemic risk. Our setting can explain this situation if the
agents do not realize the counterparty risk when trading assets.
5 The marginal benefit of holding more units of asset exceeds the marginal cost when the amount of asset holding
is less than di
ασ2i
. To see this, note that the first-order condition when the agent cannot trade is dui
dqii
= di−ασ2i qi = 0
which gives the optimal asset holding qi = diασ2i
. Therefore, if di
ασ2i
< 1, holding one unit of assets is be optimal.
This assumption is analogous to the classical non-satiation assumption within the set [0, 1]n. If this assumption is
violated, the agents would prefer discarding a part of initial asset holding, as holding one unit of asset is not optimal.
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is the net asset i holding of agent i after trading. The CARA utility function of agent i can be
simplified to the following mean-variance utility function:
Ui = di −
∑
j∈B(i)
qij(di − pij) +
∑
k∈S(i)
qki(dk − pki)− α
2
[
∑
k∈S¯(i)
∑
l∈S¯(i)
σklqkiqli].
The asset prices are endogenously determined in two stages. In the first stage, every agent
i ∈ N quotes (per unit) asset prices, denoted by pij , to all his potential buyers j ∈ B(i). The
price-quoting process for all transactions takes place simultaneously. In the second stage, upon
receiving the price offers, all agents j ∈ B(i) decide how much to buy from agent i, denoted
by qij . Afterwards, all trades are settled in which all agents j ∈ B(i) pay pijqij to agent i and
obtain asset i at the quantity qij . For simplicity, assume that agents cannot sell other agents’
assets. We follow the standard notion of subgame perfect equilibrium as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium) The equilibrium strategy profile con-
sists of a vector of asset prices P and a collection of demand function Q = {qj : P → R} such
that
qj = arg max
qj∈Qj
uj(Q,P );∀j ∈ N
pi = arg max
pi∈Rn(i)
ui(q(P ), P );∀i ∈ N
where Qj = {qj : PR
N(j)
+ → Rn(j)} ∀j ∈ N and q(P ) = {qj(P ), ∀j ∈ N}
This is the standard definition of the subgame perfect equilibrium which could be solved by
backward induction. First, we obtain asset demand functions of all players in the second stage
by solving the system of best-response functions given an arbitrary price vector P . Given the
asset demand functions, we then solve for equilibrium prices in the first stage.
3.3 Notion of line graph transformation
This section will discuss the concept of line graph transformation. Instead of considering the
position of decision-making agents, we will consider the position of asset flows using the notion
of line graph. Essentially, the line graph transformation is a means of constructing the network
of relationships, by converting all links of the original graph into vertices of the new graph and
assigning links to the new nodes accordingly. Consider the formal definition of the line graph in
Definition 3.2.
Definition 3.2 (Line graph) Consider a network G = (V,E). The line graph of G, L(G) =
(V ′, E′), is such that
1) each vertex of L(G) describes an edge of G.
2) a pair of vertices of L(G) are connected if and only if the corresponding edges in G are
incident.
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Figure 3.1: Graphical illustration of line graph transformation for undirected network (left) and directed
network (right)
Simply put, a line graph of G describes the relationships between edges of G. By transform-
ing every edge of G to be vertices of L(G), two nodes of L(G) are linked if the corresponding
edges in G are neighbouring by a node in G. The line graph transformation is straightforward
for the case of undirected network. The left panel in Figure 3.1 displays a line graph for an
undirected network in which all the links in the original network becomes the vertices in the
new network.
The definition can be applied to the case of directed network. However, a complication
arises when assigning links and link directions to the line graph. In the literature, a directed line
graph L(G) = (V ′, E′) is the transformation of the directed network G = (V,E) when 1) all
the arcs ij ∈ E are transformed to be nodes ij ∈ V ′ of the directed line graph L(G) and 2) two
vertices which represent directed edges from i1 to j1 and from i2 to j2 in G are connected in the
line graph if j1 = i2. This is shown in the right panel of Figure 3.1. From the figure, the new
nodes represent trading relationships between agents and the new edges represent the players
who knot the trading links together. The direction of the new edges indicates the direction of
asset flowing within the original trading network.
In our paper, the transformed line graph will consist of four types of linkages. Analogous to
traditional network theory, we define four types of link adjacency matrices which summarize
the information about different types of connection between two flows as follows.6
Definition 3.3 (Link adjacency matrix) In a line graph L(G), the entries of its corresponding
link adjacency matrices W outB , W
in
B , W
in
S , W
out
S are
W inS,(i1j1,i2j2) =
{
1 if i1 = j2
0 if otherwise
W outS,(i1j1,i2j2) =
{
1 if i1 = i2 and j1 6= j2
0 if otherwise
W outB,(i1j1,i2j2) =
{
1 if j1 = i2
0 if otherwise
W inB,(i1j1,i2j2) =
{
1 if j1 = j2 and i1 6= i2
0 if otherwise
From the definition, W outB and W
in
S are the standard out-degree and in-degree adjacency
matrices for a directed line graph in the literature. Intuitively, W outB identifies which flows depart
from the same buyer while W inS indicates which flows are pointing toward the same seller in the
original trading network. Consider the left panel in Figure 3.2. For the flow ij, the matrix W outB
will identify the asset outflows of buyer j while the matrix W inS will identify the asset inflows
6 In the literature, the adjacency matrix for a directed line graph is the outward adjacency matrix W outB . Note
that the link adjacency matrix is not necessary symmetric.
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of seller i. Similarly, the other two matrices W inB and W
out
S will indicate which flows have the
same buyer and the same seller, respectively. For flow ij in Figure 3.2, W inB will identify all the
other flows that agent j is the buyer, while W outS will identify all the other flows that agent i is
the seller.
i j
qijW inS W
out
B i j
qijW outS W
in
B
Figure 3.2: Graphical illustration of the matrix W inS and W
out
B (left) and the matrix W
out
S and W
in
B
(right).
The usage difference among these four adjacency matrices might not be evident at this
point, but all of them play important parts in determining centrality index of asset flows in later
sections. In short, W inB and W
out
B will matter for characterizing asset demand function in the
second stage, when the agents must decide how much to buy assets for a given price. Meanwhile,
W inS and W
out
S will matter when characterizing equilibrium price and asset allocation in the
first stage, when the agents must decide what prices to set.
3.4 Equilibrium outcome and network structure
This section will analyze how equilibrium outcome depends on structural properties of trading
network. We will proceed by considering the definition of generalized Bonacich centrality
measure and proving that quantity impact matrix, asset allocation, and risk premium in the
equilibrium are all closely related to the generalized Bonacich centrality of asset flow network.
To begin, we will list down all relevant notations in our analysis. Let the row (column) ik
of a matrix be the row (column) corresponding to the flow ik and n(g) = |g| be the number of
transactions. Define the following notations.
1. Qn(g)×1 is a quantity vector of all transactions ij ∈ g.
2. Pn(g)×1 is a price vector of all transaction ij ∈ g.
3. ΣL is a n(g)× n(g) correlation matrix in which ΣL,(i1k1,i2k2) = σi1i2 .
4. d is a n(g)× 1 vector of asset return mean where dik = di.
5. z is a n(g)× 1 vector of asset correlations where zik = σik.
Now, consider the following definition of generalized Bonacich centrality for a line graph.7
7See Jackson (2008) for more details on Bonacich centrality.
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Definition 3.4 (Generalized Bonacich Centrality) Let K be an n× 1 real-valued vector and
A be a weighted adjacency matrix of a line graph L(G). The vector of the generalized Bonacich
centrality C(A,K) of L(G) is such that
C(A,K) = (I −A)−1K
where (I −A)−1 is a contribution matrix and K is a vector of base values.
In the literature, the simplest centrality measure is the degree which counts the number of
ties. In contrast, the generalized Bonacich centrality quantifies a node importance that depends
not only on the number of its neighbours but also on the importance of its neighbours. A node
with less degree might be more (less) important as measured by the Bonacich centrality if it is
surrounded by important nodes when the weight is positive (negative).8
The information about asset flow centrality is contained in the contribution matrix (I−A)−1:
row i1j1 of (I − A)−1 represents the impact of flow i1j1 to the network and the column i2j2
represents the impact of other flows in the network toward flow i2j2. Vector K identifies a
base value of each node, capturing the extent to which the centrality of each node is affected
by some exogenous factors. Multiplying this contribution matrix with the vector K gives a
generalized Bonacich centrality measure; that is, centrality of flow i1j1 is the weighted sum of
the contributions of flow i1j1 toward the network.
In our trading game, the line graph is a network representation of local interactions of all
players, in which a node can represent trading decision in a transaction and a link between
two nodes represents the player who makes strategic trading decision of the corresponding
nodes. Hence, an equilibrium outcome emerged from strategic local interactions of the entire
trading network will somehow related to the generalized Bonacich centrality index, taking into
account both direct effects (toward adjacent asset-flow nodes) and indirect effects (toward other
non-adjacent asset-flow nodes). Also, the weight for adjusting adjacency matrix will indicate the
degree of strategic interdependence. That is, a positive (negative) weight indicates the degree of
strategic complementarity (substitution).
3.4.1 Asset demand function
We will start the equilibrium analysis by characterizing an equilibrium demand function. Let
◦ be the standard Hadamard product matrix operator. That is, for any m× n matrix A and B,
(A ◦B)ij = AijBij . Consider the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 (Equilibrium demand function) The equilibrium asset demand function is such
that
Q = Φ(d− αz)− ΦP
where Φ = 1α(I − (ΣL ◦W outB − ΣL ◦W inB ))−1 is a quantity impact matrix.
From the lemma, the magnitude of quantity impact of pij relates to Bonacich centrality of
flow ij in an asset flow network. When asset returns are correlated, marginal utility of buying
8See Bonacich (1987) and Bonacich and Lloyd (2004) for the interpretation of negative weights.
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assets of an investor depends on his portfolio composition. Therefore, if an agent decides to
buy less amount of his neighbour’s asset, it will affect his neighbour’s trading decision which
in turn affects his neighbours’ neighbour’s decision and so on, resulting in the asset demand
being dependent on asset prices of all transactions. Information about the global effect of a price
change throughout the network is summarized in the quantity impact matrix Φ.
Indeed, the quantity impact matrix is the contribution matrix of the asset flow network with
weighted adjacency matrix A = ΣL ◦W outB − ΣL ◦W inB . This implies that a sensitivity of
demand quantity to pi1j1 depends on the contribution value of flow i1j1 toward other flows
embedded in the asset flow network. If flow i1j1 is in a central position, in which a change in
the quantity of asset flow qi1j1 significantly interrupts other flows in the network, the impact of
change in pi1j1 will be influential. Figure 3.3 illustrates how a change in p31 can affect asset
demands of all agents. When asset demand q31 changes due to a change in price p31, this will
directly affect q13 which will further affect other flows. If flow 31 is central, the impact towards
other flows can be significant.
3 12
M p31 →M q31M q32
M q13M q23
Figure 3.3: Graphical illustration in the original trading network of how a change in p31 can affect asset
demands of all agents.
Note that we assign non-zero weights to the link adjacency matrices which identifies all
pairs of asset flows linked by the same buyers. This is intuitive, as asset demands depend on
strategic buying decision of agents. In particular, W outB and W
in
B capture how buying decision
of an agent will be affected by demand quantity of his asset outflows and his other asset inflows,
respectively. This is graphically illustrated in Figure 3.4. Also, the link adjacency matrix W outB
is positively weighted while W inB is negatively weighted by asset correlations to reflect the
asset substitutability degree. Intuitively, when the asset correlation is positive, the agent’s asset
demand in a flow will be positively (negatively) affected by a quantity increase in another asset
outflow (inflow).
j iqij
qj1
qj2
qj3
qj4 j iqij
q1j
q2j
q3j
q4j
Figure 3.4: Graphical illustration of how buying decision of agent j in flow ij is affected by demand
quantity in his other asset inflows (right) and asset outflows (left).
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3.4.2 Asset allocation and prices
This section will discuss how equilibrium asset allocation depends on structure of asset-flow
network. We will show that the equilibrium asset allocation corresponds to a generalized
Bonacich centrality of network of asset flows with appropriate weight assignment to each link.
First, we must ensure that our interior solution in the first stage game satisfies second-
order condition. Consider an arbitrary n × n matrix E. A submatrix of E, denoted by
E[i1, i2, · · · , in|j1, j2, · · · , jk], is the matrix consisting of intersection of rows {i1, i2, · · · , in}
and columns {j1, j2, · · · , jn}. Let Mouti = {ik;∀k ∈ B(i)} be the set of outflows of agent i
and M ini = {ki;∀k ∈ S(i)} be the set of inflows of agent i. Denote Ea,bi be the submatrix of
E[Mai ,M
b
i ] when a, b ∈ {in, out} which contains the intersection of rows Mai and columns
M bi . To illustrate, Φ
out,in
i is the submatrix of Φ in which all the rows correspond to all asset
outflows of agent i and all the columns correspond to all asset inflows of agent i. We make the
following assumption.
Assumption 3.1 (Second-order condition) For all i ∈ N ,
1. Φout,outi + Φ
out,out′
i is positive definite
2. Φin,out
′
i Σ
in,in
L,i Φ
in,out
i −[Φout,out
′
i Σ
out,in
L,i Φ
in,out
i +(Φ
out,out′
i Σ
out,in
L,i Φ
in,out
i )
′]+σ2i Φ
out,out′
i Φ
out,out
i
is positive definite
This assumption gives a sufficient condition to guarantee that an interior price solution
derived from first-order condition in the first stage is utility-maximizing.9 Intuitively, the
assumption puts a restriction on asset demand function to be well-behaved. The first restriction
is analogous to downward-sloping demand function in the standard profit maximization problem.
The second restriction takes into account a change in marginal utility from risk component of
risk-averse sellers. Consider the following proposition regarding the equilibrium asset allocation.
Proposition 3.1 (Equilibrium asset allocation) In a trading network G, provided that As-
sumption 3.1 is true, the equilibrium asset allocation corresponds to a generalized Bonacich
centrality index of a line graph of G. Specifically, there exists a real-valued diagonal matrix
V = V (Φ,W outS ) and a real-valued off-diagonal matrix F = F (Φ,W
out
S ) such that
Q = (I − V A¯)−1V (1ˆ− z)
where A¯ = ΣL ◦ (W outB +W inS −W inB −W outS ) + F ◦W outS .
Intuitively, the adjacency matrix A¯ summarizes local interactions of all selling parties, who
indirectly choose demand quantity of all his asset outflows by strategically setting prices in
the first stage. To interpret this proposition, I decompose the adjacency matrix A¯ into three
components as follows:
A¯ = ΣL ◦ (W outB −W inB )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
+ ΣL ◦ (W inS −W outS )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
+F ◦W outS︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
.
9Specifically, the assumption guarantees that ui(q(P ), P ), is concave in prices pi so that the first-order (linear)
condition is indeed the best response function for all sellers.
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The first component (1) identifies how every pair of asset flows in the asset-flow network is
connected by the buying parties in the flows. Specifically, the matrices capture the opportunity
of the buying party in each flow to sell their own assets to their neighbors (W outB ) and to buy
assets from other neighbors (W inB ). All links in the asset-flow network are weighted by asset
correlation to adjust for asset substitutability. Intuitively, this component identifies the asset
demand function. Notice that this matrix component is identical to the adjacency matrix that
determines the quantity impact matrix Φ, the coefficient matrix of asset demand function, as
established in Lemma 3.1.
The second and third components (2,3) identify how every pair of asset flows is connected by
the selling parties in the flows. Specifically, the second component (2) captures the opportunity
of the selling party in each flow to sell their assets to other neighbors (W outS ) and to buy
other assets from their neighbors (W inS ), weighted by correlation matrix to account for asset
substitutability.
Interestingly, the last component (3) identifies how every pair of asset flows can be affected
by a cost of network externality, an externality of a price change in a flow which can affect
demand quantity in other outflows of the same seller. Intuitively, a price change in flow ij will
not only affect demand quantity qij but also indirectly affect demand quantity in other outflows of
the same selling agent (qik; ∀k ∈ B(i)), even though prices in other outflows remain unchanged.
The extent of network externality is indicated in the off-diagonal matrix F (Φ,W outS ). When
flow ij has positive externality toward other outflows of agent i (i.e. a quantity increase in flow
ij increases demand quantity in other outflows), agent i will strategically increase qij , by setting
low price pij , to earn extra profits in other asset outflows from the externality.
Another weighting matrix that affects the centrality of asset flows is the diagonal real-valued
matrix V (Φ,W outS ). Intuitively, it identifies own-price network effect. To illustrate, when
agent i increases price pij , there is direct effect on quantity demand qij . However, there is also
indirect network effect on quantity demand qij . Because demand quantity in other flows will be
affected from the first-round change in qij , asset demand qij will in turn change in response to
endogenous change of portfolio composition of agent j.
Lastly, regarding equilibrium asset price, consider the asset demand function.
1
α
(I − (ΣL ◦W outB − ΣL ◦W inB ))−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quantity impact matrix Φ
(d− P − αr) = (I − V A¯)−1V (1ˆ− z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Equilibrium asset allocation Q
Recall that the quantity impact matrix Φ is the contribution matrix corresponding to a
generalized Bonacich centrality of the asset flow network with weighted adjacency matrix
ΣL ◦ W outB − ΣL ◦ W inB . As we have discussed, the equilibrium asset allocation Q is the
generalized Bonacich centrality index of asset flow network with weighted adjacency matrix
V A¯ and base vector V (1ˆ− z). Therefore, the implied risk premium adjusted for the degree of
risk aversion and asset correlation is the vector of base value that equates these two centrality
measures.
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3.5 Implications on market efficiency
There are two main frictions in this economy that cause market inefficiency. One is trade
friction from incomplete trading network, in which the agents are restricted to trade with only
the connecting agents. The other friction is trade friction from monopolistic price-setting
behavior. To shed light on market efficiency, this section will characterize the constrained
optimal allocation, which maximizes Utilitarian social welfare subject to the trade friction from
incomplete trading network, and discuss the conditions when the decentralized outcome is
constrained efficient.10 Let W (Q, g) =
∑
i∈N Ui be the Utilitarian welfare function of the
economy with network structure g. Consider the following definition.
Definition 3.5 (Constrained efficiency) A constrained efficient allocationQSB(g) is such that
QSB(g) = arg max
Q∈Rn(g)
W (Q, g)
From the definition, a constrained efficient allocation maximizes the sum of utilities of all
agents given that a social planner can only allocate the goods between agents who are connected
in the trading network. Note that the allocation is Pareto efficient when network g is complete.
Given the definition, we can characterize a constrained efficient allocation as follows.
Proposition 3.2 (Constrained efficient allocation) In a trading network g, the constrained
efficient allocation is
QSB =
1
2
(
I − 1
2
ASB
)−1
(1ˆ− z)
where ASB = ΣL ◦ (W inS +W outB −W outS −W inB ).
From the proposition, the constrained efficient allocation is also associated with a generalized
Bonacich centrality, in which the weight takes into account only the asset correlation of adjacent
asset flows. Intuitively, when a social planner chooses optimal asset allocation, he considers
how an asset quantity change in a flow affects portfolio risk of the agents involved. Unlike the
allocation from the decentralized system, there is no quantity impact matrix involved in the
weighting matrix or the base-value vector. This is because the social planner decides how to
allocate assets by internalizing how quantity change in one asset flow affects welfare, in contrast
to the decentralized outcome in which each agent will exercise his bargaining power by limiting
trading quantities and charging higher prices. For a decentralized economy to be constrained
efficient, consider the next proposition.
Proposition 3.3 (Constrained efficiency) The decentralized equilibrium allocation QE is con-
strained efficient if and only if (
Φ′ ◦ (W outS + I)
)−1
QE → 0ˆ.
10Note that the allocation which maximizes Utilitarian social welfare function is the set of Pareto efficient
allocations, as the utility function is quasi-linear without restrictions on monetary transfer across agents. Such
allocation is also minimizing the aggregate portfolio risk of the whole economy.
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This proposition implies that a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient when (inverse)
demand function of all sellers are almost perfectly elastic; that is, a slight change in a price
has significant impact on demand quantity in all asset outflows of the same seller. An obvious
example is when the asset is (almost) perfectly substitutable among all the agents such that
no seller could afford a significant loss in demand by increasing asset prices. In this case, the
economy is converging towards a price-taking economy, where the decision of all agents when
choosing demand quantity in the second stage has no effect on equilibrium prices, resulting in
no distortion in the decentralized outcome.
To see this clearly, consider an economy with identical asset correlation. Let r∗ ∈
{− 1|N |−1 , 1}. The following corollary provides an example when the decentralized outcome is
efficient.
Corollary 3.1 If asset returns are identically correlated and the trading network is complete,
then the asset allocation is efficient iff r → r∗.
This corollary shows that when there is no trade friction from incomplete trading network,
the monopolistic inefficiency does not dissipate away due to monopolistic behavior of agents.
When the correlation is positive, an increase in the number of agents does not eliminate the
market inefficiency as the assets are always heterogeneous. Figure 3.5 compares the equilibrium
allocation (left) with the efficient allocation (right) when there is no asset correlation.11 From
the figure, agents hold excessive amount of their assets and buy too few of other assets in the
decentralized outcome.
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium asset allocation (left) and efficient allocation(right) when there is no asset return
correlation
Interestingly, when the correlation is sufficiently negative, the decentralized outcome will
converge towards the efficient allocation. Specifically, the marginal utility of holding assets is
increasing in the quantity of all assets in the pool due to hedging benefit when the correlation
is negative. When the marginal benefit of hedging is relatively high, the buyers are willing to
purchase high volume of assets despite facing high asset prices, resulting in elastic (inverse)
demand function when the correlation is sufficiently negative or when the number of agents is
sufficiently high. Therefore, optimal pricing strategy of the seller is to quote the highest possible
level of prices such that the buyers are still willing to buy assets. This outcome is equivalent to
the price-taking economy, in which the asset prices are fixed at the zero-risk-premium prices.
11 Note that this allocation is also Pareto optimal for any correlation value regardless of the difference in the
mean of asset returns, as there is no restriction on monetary transfers
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At this price, all agents will choose to trade assets at the efficient level (full hedging) despite the
persistence of monopolistic friction, as illustrated in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Numerical result of asset allocation when r → − 1|N |−1
3.6 Special cases
To obtain more insights, this last section will analyse the equilibrium outcome of a few special
cases. Throughout this section, assume that trading network is undirected; that is, if ij ∈ g, then
ji ∈ g. Also, all numerical examples assume that α = 1 and di = 1 for all agents. We will first
consider a case of no asset correlation. Then we consider a case of identical asset correlations
with two structures of trading network: the star network and the core-periphery network.
3.6.1 No asset correlation
To begin, we make the following assumption to restate that there is no pairwise correlation
between assets; the asset returns are i.i.d. normally distributed.
Assumption 3.2 σij = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N and i 6= j
The following corollary describes the equilibrium.
Corollary 3.2 (Equilibrium outcome I) In an arbitrary network g, if Assumption 3.2 is satis-
fied, ∀ij ∈ g
1) qij = 12+n(i)
2) pij = di − α2+n(i)
3) ui = di − α2+n(i) + α2
∑
j∈N(i)
( 1
(2+n(j))2
)
4) qii = 22+n(i) .
Under the assumption of independent return distributions, the situation collapses to a
classical monopoly problem. In our context, each agent is both a monopolist of his own asset
and a buyer of his neighbours’ assets. From the corollary, an asset price depends on return mean
of the asset di adjusted for risk premium and price markup. When the agent is more risk-averse,
the buying agent will demand higher risk premium, pushing the price downward. Also, higher
number of buyers of agent i (i.e. higher n(i)) increases the equilibrium price since agent i
attains more monopoly power.
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Interestingly, asset prices depend only on the degree of the sellers and not of the buyers;
that is pij = pik,∀j, k ∈ N(i).12 This is because all agents could raise asset price without
affecting the buyers’ demand of other assets when the asset return is uncorrelated. As predicted
by standard monopoly problem, well-connected sellers can charge high prices and limit the
amount of assets sold to each neighbour to gain higher profits. Also, the well-connected agents
will trade away larger fraction of their own assets due to higher asset demands.
It is true that the utility from selling assets of agents depends on the number of neighbors
of the agents. However, the agent’s net utility also depends on his neighbours’ degree. This is
because the agents are also buying assets from the neighbors. Therefore, the marginal utility
of connecting to one more agent decreases if this agent is well-connected. Let n be the degree
centrality of agent i and n(j) be the degree centrality of agent j. The marginal utility of agent i
connecting to agent j is
ui(N(i) + j)− ui(N(i)) = α
(2 + n+ 1)(2 + n)
+
α
2(2 + n(j))
From the above equation, the marginal utility of connecting to j diminishes when the
degree of agent j increases. This finding implies that agents prefer forming a relationship with
low-degree agents to gain the highest bargaining power when considering endogenous trading
network formation.
3.6.2 Identical asset correlation
This subsection will analyse equilibrium outcome when asset return correlations are identical.
Consider the following assumption.
Assumption 3.3 σij = σkl = r ∈ (− 1|N |−1 , 1), ∀ij ∈ g and i 6= j.13
Star network
A star network is the network structure in which there is one node (hub) at the centre and a few
nodes (periphery) connecting to the hub. Therefore, the centre node has superior competitive
power over the peripheral nodes. Let i be the agent at the centre and j be an agent at the
periphery. Denote n = n(j). Consider the following remark.
Remark 3.1 If Assumption 3.3 is satisfied and trading network is a star network, then
1) qii ≥ qjj if and only if r ≤ −(4n−1)+
√
8n+9
2(2n2−2n−1) < 0
2) qij ≤ qji
3) limr→− 1
n
qij = 0, limr→− 1
n
qji = 1
In the star network, the hub is both the monopolist of his own asset and the monopsonist of
his neighbouring assets. When the correlation increases, the hub will buy less of his neighbouring
assets, as the marginal benefit drops significantly from holding large unit of all assets in the pool.
12 When there is no asset return correlation, the utility function is separable in the quantity of asset holdings by
assumption of CARA utility function. Note that the quantity impact matrix is diagonal.
13To guarantee the positive definiteness of the variance-covariance matrix, the correlation must be greater than
− 1|N|−1 .
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Meanwhile, as the marginal benefit of selling the asset increases when the correlation increases,
the hub will sell more units of asset to the peripherals by quoting lower prices, resulting in
qii ≤ qjj when the correlation is positive. Based on the remark, regardless of the correlation
value, quantity of asset outflow from the hub is always lower than quantity of asset inflow to the
hub (i.e. qij ≤ qji) due to monopolistic and monopsonistic power of the hub. This is illustrated
in the right panel of Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: Numerical result of asset allocation when qii > qjj (left) and qii < qjj (right)
However, the scenario can be different when the correlation is negative. In this case, the
opportunity to buy a variety of assets decreases the willingness to sell the asset of the hub due to
hedging motives. In fact, the hub is willing to buy more of neighboring assets at the higher price.
The peripherals, in spite of keening to buy more assets from the hub, cannot do so as the hub
also would like to hold his own asset and will request expensive prices from the peripherals who
would like to buy. As a result, the peripherals will demand less of the hub’s asset compared to
the case of no asset correlation. When the correlation is sufficiently negative, the asset outflow
quantity from the hub is so low that the proportion of the hub’s asset in his portfolio is greater
than the proportion of the peripherals’ own asset holding, qii ≥ qjj , as illustrated in the left
panel in Figure 3.7. An extreme case is when the correlation goes to − 1n , in which the hub fully
exploits the hedging opportunity by buying all assets from his neighbors and selling none to
them (full hedging).
The next question is how the equilibrium outcome would change when the number of
periphery agents increases. Consider the following remark.
Remark 3.2 Consider two star-network economies with the number of the periphery agents n
and n′ such that n′ > n. If Assumption 3.3 is satisfied, then
1) ∃r < 0 such that qjj(n′) < qjj(n)
2) ∃r < 0 such that qii(n′) > qii(n)
3) ∃r < 0 such that uj(n′) > uj(n)
This remark highlights the role of asset correlation toward the competition structure in the
network. Generally, when the correlation is positive, more number of the peripherals means that
there are more substitutable assets for the hub to buy. Therefore, the hub will demand less unit
of assets from each periphery agent, and the utility of the periphery will decrease due to more
aggressive competition.
Interestingly, when the asset correlation is negative, the outcome could be different. From
the remark, it is possible that the proportion of the peripherals’ own asset holding decreases and
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Figure 3.8: Numerical example of asset allocation when r = -0.3
that of the hub increases when the number of the periphery agents increases, as numerically
illustrated in Figure 3.8. Since the marginal utility of the hub to buy assets depends positively
on the variety of assets in possession when the correlation is negative, the hub will want to buy
larger amount of assets from each agent at the periphery when the number of periphery agents
increases. Meanwhile, the marginal benefit of holding own asset of the hub is so high that the
proportion of hub’s own asset in the portfolio also increases, despite higher demand from more
buyers.
The last point in the remark sounds counter-intuitive at first. It is natural to think that
payoffs of the periphery agents will decline when adding more periphery agents due to higher
competition. However, the virtual value of the peripherals’ assets toward the hub depends
crucially on the number of periphery agents. When the correlation is negative, the more variety
of assets the hub is holding, the more valuable the peripheral assets are to the hub due to hedging
benefits, and thus the higher prices the peripherals could charge to the hub. Therefore, if the
correlation is sufficiently negative, the benefit from higher virtual asset value outweighs the
costs from more competition, resulting in higher utility of all the peripherals, as numerically
illustrated in Figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.9: The utility of agents when r = -0.3
Core-periphery network
The core-periphery structure describes a topology in which the cores refer to the central and
densely connected set of nodes and the peripherals are the sparsely connected set of nodes who
connect to only the cores. This section examines the equilibrium outcome in a case of two core
agents, each connecting with two peripheral agents, as shown in Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10: An example of a core-periphery network
Let qcc, qcp, qpc (pcc, pcp, ppc) denote equilibrium quantities and prices of transactions be-
tween the cores, from the cores to the peripherals, and from the peripherals to the cores,
respectively. Consider the following proposition.
Remark 3.3 If Assumption 3.3 is satisfied and the economy is the core-periphery network with
n(core) = 2 and n(periphery) = 2, then
1) ∃k ∈ R+ such that ∂qcc∂r
∣∣∣
r=k
> 0.
2) qcp < qpc and pcp − dc > ppc − dp.
3) pcp < pcc and qcp < qcc when r < 0.
Intuitively, when the correlation is positive, an increase in correlation should reduce the
volume of asset trading between any pair of agents. However, this is not always the case for
the core-periphery network. The remark shows that the core agents may exchange more unit
of assets with the other core agent when the correlation increases. The main explanation relies
on the cores’ network position, where they can sell their assets relatively easy compared to the
peripherals. Therefore, the cores are more willing to buy additional assets from others compared
to the peripherals.
The second statement in the remark arises from the friction of imperfect competition between
the cores and the peripherals. Similar to the case of the star network, the cores are the sole
buyers and sellers of the peripheral assets in the core-periphery network. Therefore, the cores
will quote higher prices to the peripherals and limit the trading quantity in the equilibrium, as
illustrated in Figure 3.11.
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Figure 3.11: Asset flow and prices between the cores and the peripherals
Interestingly, based on the remark, the equilibrium price and trading quantity from the cores
to the peripherals are lower than the trading quantities among the cores when the correlation is
negative. When the asset is complementary, the richer variety of assets the cores are holding,
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the higher the marginal benefit of the cores to buy more assets. Thus, the cores could charge
higher prices to their core neighbour, who value the asset greatly, and still receive higher asset
demand in the equilibrium. This is numerically illustrated in Figure 3.12
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Figure 3.12: Trading quantities and prices between the cores and the peripherals
3.7 Concluding remark
To summarize, this paper develops a theoretical model to study the formation of financial
network driven by risk diversification motives. Using the concept of line graph transformation,
we found that equilibrium asset allocation corresponds to a generalized Bonacich centrality of
the network of asset flows.
It is worth pointing out that our main results are restrictive to linearity properties of best-
response functions based on the assumption of CARA utility function and joint normal distri-
bution of asset returns. With the linear best responses, unique equilibrium trading outcome
coincides with the Bonacich centrality of the line graph in the same manner with Ballester et
al (2006) and Bimpikis et al (forthcoming). Deviating from this assumption causes the best-
response function to contain high-order non-linear terms which can compromise our conclusion.
However, it seems intuitive to confirm that Bonacich centrality of the line graph is the right
solution for any decentralized trading game with linear trading strategies.
The natural step from here is to study the implications of systemic risk from trade friction.
One can use this model to explore how topology of trading network shapes the fragility of
financial network. This model can also serve as a tool for policymakers to study regulatory effect
of limiting market participation of financial institutions to limit financial interconnectedness.
Possible future extensions of the paper include:
1. Moral hazard. This paper abstracts from risk-taking behaviour of agents by the assumption
on exogeneity of project riskiness. Relaxing this assumption is also the next step to study
the risk-taking channel, in which the moral hazard is the key to propagate and amplify the
systemic risk in the financial network. Risk-sharing is the double-edge sword as it also
generates the excessive risk-taking behaviour when agents partially bear the risk from
their actions. The extension of this model by endogenizing the choice of investment in
the project is another challenge for future research.
121
2. Endogenous trading network. In this paper, one main assumption is the exogenous trading
network. Relaxing this assumption to incorporate endogenous trading network formation
can provide more interesting insights on the formation of financial network.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Summary of matrix notations
Let the row (column) ik of a matrix be the row (column) corresponding to the transaction ik.
Let n(i) = |N(i)| and n(g) = |g| Define the following notations
1. The link adjacency matrix
a) W inS,(i1k1,i2k2) =
{
1 if i1 = j2
0 if otherwise
b) W outB,(i1k1,i2k2) =
{
1 if j1 = i2
0 if otherwise
2. The adjustment matrix
a) W outS,(i1k1,i2k2) =
{
1 if i1 = i2 and j1 6= j2
0 if otherwise
b) W inB,(i1k1,i2k2) =
{
1 if j1 = j2 and i1 6= i2
0 if otherwise
3. Qn(g)×1 is the vector of quantity for all transaction ij ∈ g.
4. Pn(g)×1 is the vector of prices for all transaction ij ∈ g.
5. ΣL is the n(g)× n(g) matrix in which ΣL,(i1k1,i2k2) = σi1i2 .
6. Let F be the n(g)× n(g) matrix, then
a) Fˆ km = F ◦W km for k ∈ {in, out} and m ∈ {S,B} where W km is the link adjacency
matrix
b) FD = F ◦ I where I is the identity n(g)× n(g) matrix
c) F out,outi is the n(i)× n(i) submatrix of F [ik; ∀k ∈ N(i)|ij;∀j ∈ N(i)].
d) F in,outi is the n(i)× n(i) submatrix of F [ki;∀k ∈ N(i)|ij; ∀j ∈ N(i)].
e) F in,ini is the n(i)× n(i) submatrix of F [ki; ∀k ∈ N(i)|ji; ∀j ∈ N(i)].
f) F out,ini is the n(i)× n(i) submatrix of F [ik;∀k ∈ N(i)|ji; ∀j ∈ N(i)].
7. [k]−Dj×j , k ∈ R be the j × j matrix with all zeros at the diagonal and all k off the diagonals.
8. d is the n(g)× 1 vector of asset return where dik = di
9. z is the n(g)× 1 vector of asset correlation where zik = σik
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3.8.2 Equilibrium characterization
To characterize an equilibrium, I use the backward induction method. Consider buyer’s maxi-
mization problem in which agent j ∈ N will choose asset demand vector qj to maximize his
utility given any arbitrary price vector P as follows
qj = arg maxqj∈Qj uj(Q,P )
where Qj = {qj : PR
N(j)
+ → Rn(j)}.
Recall the mean-variance utility function ∀i ∈ N
Uj = dj−
∑
k∈N(j) qjk(dj−pjk)+
∑
k∈N(j) qkj(dk−pkj)−
α
2
[
∑
k∈N¯(j)
∑
l∈N¯(j) σklqkjqlj ].
We obtain the first-order condition for buyer j as follows.
duj
dqij
= di − pij − ασij(1−
∑
k∈N(j)
qjk)− α
∑
m∈N(j)
σmiqmj = 0; ∀i ∈ N(j).
Since the Hessian matrix, where jk ∈ N(j) for all k, is
H(uj)(qj) = −α

∂2uj
∂q2j1j
∂2uj
∂qj1jqj2j
· · · ∂2uj∂qj1jqjn(j)j
∂2uj
∂qj2jqj1j
∂2uj
∂q2j2j
· · · ∂2uj∂qj2jqjn(j)j
...
...
. . .
...
∂2uj
∂qjn(j)j qj1j
∂2uj
∂qjn(j)j qj2
· · · ∂2uj
∂2qjn(j)j

= −α

σj1j1 σj1j2 · · · σj1jn(j)
σj2j1 σj2j2 · · · σj2jn(j)
...
...
. . .
...
σjn(j)j1 σjn(j)j2 · · · σjn(j)jn(j)

which is negative definite as the correlation matrix is positive definite by assumption.
First-order condition gives the demand function for asset i as follows:
pij = di − ασij(1−
∑
k∈N(j)
qjk)− α
∑
m∈N(j)
σmiqmj
= di − ασij + α[σij
∑
k∈N(j)
qjk −
∑
m∈N(j)
σmiqmj ].
Using the matrix notations, the demand function can be written in matrix form as
P = d− αz + α[ΣL ◦ (W outB −W inB )− ΣD]Q.
Rearranging the terms gives
Q = (ΣL ◦ (W outb −W inb ))Q+
1
α
Σ−1D [d− P − αz].
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Define A¯ = ΣL ◦ (W outb −W inb ). We obtain that
Q =
1
α
(I − A¯)−1[d− P − αz].
Let Φ = 1α(I − A¯)−1 be the price impact matrix. Substituting into the asset demand function
gives
q(P ) = Φ[d− P − αz].
As a result, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2 The equilibrium asset demand function is such that
Q = Φ(d− αz)− ΦP
where Φ = 1α(I − (ΣL ◦W outB − ΣL ◦W inB ))−1.
Moving to the first stage, agent i chooses price vector pi such that
pi = arg max
pi∈R+n(i)
ui(q(P ), P )
subject to asset demand function q(P ) = Φ[d− P − αz].
The first-order condition of agent i for transaction ij is
∂ui
∂pij
= qij+
∑
m∈N(i)
(pim−di)∂qim
∂pij
−
∑
m∈N(i)
(pmi−dm)∂qmi
∂pij
−α
∑
k∈N¯(i)
∑
l∈N¯(i)
σklqki
∂qli
∂pij
= 0.
To verify that the first-order condition gives the maximum solution, it suffices to prove that
ui(q(P ), P ) is concave in pi. Since
∂2ui
∂p2ij
= 2
∂qij
∂pij
− α
∑
k∈N¯(i)
∑
l∈N¯(i)
σkl
∂qki
∂pij
∂qli
∂pij
= 2
∂qij
∂pij
− α[
∑
k∈N(i)
∑
l∈N(i)
σkl
∂qki
∂pij
∂qli
∂pij
− 2
∑
k∈N(i)
∂qik
∂pij
∑
l∈N(i)
σil
∂qli
∂pij
+ σ2i (
∑
k∈N(i)
∂qik
∂pij
)2]
∂2ui
∂pij∂pih
=
∂qij
∂pih
+
∂qih
∂pij
− α
∑
k∈N¯(i)
∑
l∈N¯(i)
σkl
∂qki
∂pih
∂qli
∂pij
=
∂qij
∂pih
+
∂qih
∂pij
− α[
∑
k∈N(i)
∑
l∈N(i)
σkl
∂qki
∂pih
∂qli
∂pij
− (
∑
k∈N(i)
∂qik
∂pij
∑
l∈N(i)
σil
∂qli
∂pih
+
∑
k∈N(i)
∂qik
∂pih
∑
l∈N(i)
σil
∂qli
∂pij
) + σ2i (
∑
k∈N(i)
∂qik
∂pij
)(
∑
k∈N(i)
∂qik
∂pih
)]
which can be written in terms of Hessian matrix as
H(ui)(pi) = −(Φout,outi + Φout,out
′
i )− α{(Φin,out
′
i Σ
in,in
L,i Φ
in,out
i
− [Φout,out′i Σout,inL,i Φin,outi + (Φout,out
′
i Σ
out,in
L,i Φ
in,out
i )
′] + σ2i Φ
out,out′
i Φ
out,out
i )}
where
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1. Φout,outi is the n(i)× n(i) submatrix Φ[ik;∀k ∈ B(i)|ij;∀j ∈ B(i)]
2. Φin,outi is the n(i)× n(i) submatrix Φ[ki; ∀k ∈ S(i)|ij; ∀j ∈ B(i)]
3. Σin,inL,i is the n(i)× n(i) submatrix ΣL[ki;∀k ∈ S(i)|ji;∀j ∈ S(i)]
4. Σout,inL,i is the n(i)× n(i) submatrix ΣL[ik;∀k ∈ B(i)|ji; ∀j ∈ S(i)].
Then I obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.3 u(q(P ), P ) is concave in pi if H(ui)(pi) is positive definite.
By Assumption 3.1, u(q(P ), P ) is concave. Thus, the first-order condition is utility maxi-
mizing. Recall that the first-order condition is
∂ui
∂pij
= qij+
∑
m∈N(i)
(pim−di)∂qim
∂pij
−
∑
m∈N(i)
(pmi−dm)∂qmi
∂pij
−α
∑
k∈N¯(i)
∑
l∈N¯(i)
σklqki
∂qli
∂pij
= 0.
Consider the last term
∑
k∈N¯(i)
∑
l∈N¯(i)
σklqki
∂qli
∂pij
, one can expand this term into
∑
k∈N¯(i)
∑
l∈N¯(i)
σklqki
∂qli
∂pij
=
∑
k∈N(i)
∑
l∈N(i)
σklqki
∂qli
∂pij
+
∑
l∈N(i)
σilqii
∂qli
∂pij
+
∑
k∈N(i)
σkiqki
∂qii
∂pij
+ σ2i qii
∂qii
∂pij
=
∑
k∈N(i)
∑
l∈N(i)
σklqki
∂qli
∂pij
+
∑
l∈N(i)
σil
∂qli
∂pij
−
∑
l∈N(i)
∑
k∈N(i)
σilqik
∂qli
∂pij
−
∑
k∈N(i)
σkiqki
∑
k∈N(i)
∂qik
∂pij
− σ2i
∑
k∈N(i)
∂qik
∂pij
+ σ2i
∑
k∈N(i)
qik
∑
k∈N(i)
∂qik
∂pij
.
Simplifying the terms gives
∑
k∈N¯(i)
∑
l∈N¯(i)
σklqki
∂qli
∂pij
=
∑
k∈N(i)
∑
l∈N(i)
∂qli
∂pij
(σklqki−σilqik)+
∑
k∈N(i)
∂qik
∂pij
∑
k∈N(i)
(σ2i qik−σkiqki)
− σ2i
∑
k∈N(i)
∂qik
∂pij
+
∑
l∈N(i)
σli
∂qli
∂pij
.
Substituting
∑
k∈N¯(i)
∑
l∈N¯(i)
σklqki
∂qli
∂pij
into the first-order condition gives
qij − α[
∑
k∈N(i)
∑
l∈N(i)
∂qli
∂pij
(σklqki − σilqik) +
∑
k∈N(i)
∂qik
∂pij
∑
k∈N(i)
(σ2i qik − σkiqki)]+
[
∑
m∈N(i)
∂qim
∂pij
(pim−di)−
∑
m∈N(i)
∂qmi
∂pij
(pmi−dm)]+α[σ2i
∑
k∈N(i)
∂qik
∂pij
−
∑
l∈N(i)
σli
∂qli
∂pij
] = 0
which can be written in matrix form as follows.
(I+α[Φˆout
′
B (Σˆ
in
LB+ΣD−ΣˆoutLB)+(Φˆout
′
S +Φ
′
D)(Σˆ
out
LS+ΣD−ΣˆinLS)])Q−(Φˆout
′
S −Φˆout
′
B +Φ
′
D)(P−d)
− α(ΣD(Φˆout′S + Φ′D)1ˆ− Φˆout
′
B z) = 0
where
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1. Φˆki = Φ ◦ W km for k ∈ {in, out} and m ∈ {S,B} where W km is the link adjacency
matrix.
2. ΣˆkLm = ΣL ◦W km for k ∈ {in, out} and m ∈ {S,B}
3. ΣD,(n×n) = ΣL,(n×n) ◦ I(n×n) ; n = n(g)
4. ΦD,(n×n) = Φ(n×n) ◦ I(n×n).
The last step is to use the demand function to solve for the equilibrium price. Define
Γ = I + α[Φˆout
′
B (Σˆ
in
LB + ΣD − ΣˆoutLB) + (Φˆout
′
S + Φ
′
D)(Σˆ
out
LS + ΣD − ΣˆinLS)]
Θ = −α(ΣD(Φˆout′S + Φ′D)1ˆ− Φˆout
′
B z)
Given Γ and Θ, the first-order condition in matrix form can be simplified into
ΓQ− (Φˆout′S − Φˆout
′
B + Φ
′
D)(P − d) + Θ = 0.
Substituting the demand function q(p) = Φ[d− p− αz] gives
ΓΦ[d− P − αz]− (Φˆout′S − Φˆout
′
B + Φ
′
D)(P − d) + Θ = 0
−(Φˆout′S − Φˆout
′
B + Φ
′
D + ΓΦ)(P − d) + (Θ− αΓΦz) = 0.
Therefore, the equilibrium price is
P = d+ (Φˆout
′
S − Φˆout
′
B + Φ
′
D + ΓΦ)
−1[Θ− αΓΦz]
with the equilibrium asset allocation
Q = Φ[(Φˆout
′
S − Φˆout
′
B + Φ
′
D + ΓΦ)
−1[αΓΦz −Θ]− αz].
Therefore, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4 (Equilibrium characterization) If Assumption 3.1 is satisfied, the equilib-
rium (P, q(P )) that solves the trading game is such that
P = d+ (Φˆout
′
S − Φˆout
′
B + ΦD + ΓΦ)
−1[Θ− αΓΦz]
q(P ) = Φ[d− P − αz]
Where Θ = α(Φˆout
′
B z − (Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)1ˆ)
Γ = I + α[Φˆout
′
B (Σˆ
in
LB + I − ΣˆoutLB) + (Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)(Σˆ
out
LS + I − ΣˆinLS)].
Next, we can further simplify the equilibrium asset allocation. From the demand function
Q = Φ(d − P − αz), I obtain d − P = Φ−1Q + αz. Substituting this into the equilibrium
condition in the proposition gives
(Γ + (Φˆout
′
S − Φˆout
′
B + ΦD)(Φ
−1))Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS
= −α(Φˆout′S − Φˆout
′
B + ΦD)z −Θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
(3.8.2.1)
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Substituting Θ and ΣD = I into the right hand side (RHS) gives
RHS = α(Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)(1ˆ− z).
For the left-hand side (LHS), substituting Γ and Φ gives
LHS = [I + α(Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)[(I + Σˆ
in
LB) + (I + Σˆ
out
LS )]]− α(Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)(Σˆ
out
LB + ΣˆLS)]Q.
Define A = ΣˆoutLB + ΣˆLS . Rewrite Equation 3.8.2.1 as
[I+α(Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)[(I+ Σˆ
in
LB) + (I+ Σˆ
out
LS )]]−α(Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)A]Q = α(Φˆ
out′
S + Φ
′
D)(1ˆ− z)
(3.8.2.2)
Define W = α[I + α(Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)[(I + Σˆ
in
LB) + (I + Σˆ
out
LS )]]
−1(Φˆout′S + ΦD). We can rewrite
Equation 3.8.2.2 as
(I −WA)Q = W (1ˆ− z) → Q = (I −WA)−1W (1ˆ− z)
which gives the next corollary.
Corollary 3.3 The equilibrium asset allocation is
Q = (I −WA)−1W (1ˆ− z)
where
1. W = α[I + α(Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)[(I + Σˆ
in
LB) + (I + Σˆ
out
LS )]]
−1(Φˆout′S + ΦD)
2. A = ΣˆoutLB + ΣˆLS .
3.8.3 Positive definiteness of correlation matrix
This section will find a condition to guarantee positive definiteness of asset correlation matrix
when the asset return correlations are identical. Mathematically, the correlation among random
variables are not pairwise independent. If R is a correlation matrix, then the correlations must at
least satisfy the condition det(R) > 0. This section will prove that the condition 1 > r > − 1n−1
when n is the number of assets is sufficient to guarantee positive definiteness of the correlation
matrix.
Given a correlation matrix
R =

1 r r
r
. . . r
r r 1

n×n
,
one can rewrite the matrix to be R = rA− (r − 1)I when A is the matrix with all entries of 1
and I is the diagonal matrix. Next, one can find that
det(R) = rndet(A− r − 1
r
I).
Let λ = r−1r . Substituting λ into the above equation gets
det(R) = rndet(A− λI) (3.8.3.1)
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where det(A− λI) is the characteristic polynomials of matrix A. From
det(A− λI) = f(λ) = (−1)n[λn − a1λ(n−1) + · · ·+ (−1)nan]
where a1 = tr(A), an = det(A), ai is the sum of the row-i diagonal minors of A, implying that
a1 = tr(A) = n
an = det(A) = 0
ai = 0,
substituting all the conditions into the characteristic polynomials gives
det(A− λI) = f(λ) = (−1)nλ(n−1)(λ− n).
Substituting λ = r−1r and det(A− λI) into Equation 3.8.3.1 gives
det(R) = (1− r)(n−1)(1 + r(n− 1)).
Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition for the correlation matrix R to be positive
definite is r > − 1n−1 .
3.8.4 Omitted proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1: See the proof of equilibrium characterization.
Proof of Proposition 3.1: From Corollary 3.3, we know that
(W−1 −A)Q = 1ˆ− z
where
W = α[I + α(Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)[(I + Σˆ
in
LB) + (I + Σˆ
out
LS )]]
−1(Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)
A = ΣˆoutLB + ΣˆLS .
Substituting W and A gives
(
1
α
(Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)
−1 + [2I + ΣˆinLB + Σˆ
out
LS ]− ΣˆoutLB − ΣˆinLS)Q = 1ˆ− z (∗).
Let V = [2I + 1α(Φˆ
out′
S + ΦD)
−1
D ]
−1 and A¯ = ΣˆoutLB + Σˆ
in
LS − 1α(Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)
−1
off −
ΣˆinLB − ΣˆoutLS where (Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)
−1
off is the matrix collecting only the off-diagonal terms (i.e.
(Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)
−1 ◦ ([1]n(g)×n(g) − I)) and (Φˆout′S + ΦD)−1D is the matrix collecting only the
diagonal terms (i.e (Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)
−1 ◦ I). Substituting K and A¯ into the equation gives
Q = (I − V A¯)−1V (1ˆ− z).
This proves the proposition.
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Proof of Proposition 3.2: To prove the proposition, we find first-order condition of ∂W∂qij =
∂Ui+Uj
∂qij
for all ij ∈ g. The first-order condition written in matrix form for all ij ∈ g is
2Q = ASBQ+ (1ˆ− z) where ASB = ΣinLS + ΣoutLB − ΣoutLS − ΣinLB. This implies that
Q =
1
2
(
I − 1
2
ASB
)−1
(1ˆ− z).
Note that the second-order condition is always satisfied as the correlation matrix is positive
definite. This proves the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: Recall Equation (∗) that the equilibrium asset allocation satisfies
(
1
α
(Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)
−1 + [2I + ΣˆinLB + Σˆ
out
LS ]− ΣˆoutLB − ΣˆinLS)QSB = 1ˆ− z.
From Proposition 3.2, the constrained efficient allocation is
QE =
1
2
(
I − 1
2
ASB
)−1
(1ˆ− z)
where ASB = ΣinLS + Σ
out
LB − ΣoutLS − ΣinLB. This implies that, when QE = QSB = Q,
(
1
α
(Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)
−1 + [2I + ΣˆinLB + Σˆ
out
LS ]− ΣˆoutLB − ΣˆinLS)Q = (2I −ASB)Q
must be true. Simplifying the terms give (Φˆout
′
S + ΦD)
−1Q = 0. This proves the proposition.
Proof of Corollary 3.1: To prove this proposition, we find the quantity impact matrix Φ of a
complete network. Let n be the number of agents in the economy. Let the ith n-1 rows/columns
associate with the transaction outflow from the ith agent as shown below
12 · · · 1n 21 · · · n(n− 1)
12
...
1n
21
...
n(n− 2)
n(n− 1)

aa aa aa aa aa aa
aa aa aa aa aa aa
aa aa aa aa aa aa
aa aa aa aa aa aa
aa aa aa aa aa aa
aa aa aa aa aa aa
aa aa aa aa aa aa

and the correlation of asset flow is
ΣL =

[1](n−1)×(n−1) [r](n−1)×(n−1) [r](n−1)×(n−1)
[r](n−1)×(n−1)
. . . [r](n−1)×(n−1)
[r](n−1)×(n−1) [r](n−1)×(n−1) [1](n−1)×(n−1)

n(n−1)×n(n−1)
From Proposition 3.4 that A¯ = ΣL ◦ (W outB −W inB ), the elements of matrix (I − A¯) is
(I − A¯)(i1k1,i2k2) =

1 if i1 = i2 and j1 = j2
−r if j1 = i2 and j1 6= j2
r if j1 = j2 and i1 6= i2
0 if otherwise.
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Now, consider the following matrix B defined as follows.
B(i1k1,i2k2) =

a = − (n−2)r+1K if i1 = i2 and j1 = j2
c = rK if i1 6= i2 and j1 = j2
b = − rK if j1 = i2 and j1 6= j2
0 if otherwise
where K = (n− 1)r2 − (n− 2)r − 1. In what follows, I argue that B is the inverse matrix of
(I − A¯) which can be easily verified by checking that (I − A¯)B = I . Thus, the quantity impact
matrix Φ = 1α(I − A¯)−1 is
Φ(i1j1,i2j2) =

− (n−2)r+1αK if i1 = i2 and j1 = j2
r
αK if i1 6= i2 and j1 = j2
− rαK if j1 = i2 (and j1 6= j2)
0 if otherwise
where K = (n− 1)r2 − (n− 2)r − 1. From Φ, we can obtain that
ΦˆoutS = 0 and ΦD = −
(
(n− 2)r + 1
αK
)
In(n−1)×n(n−1).
Therefore,
(ΦˆoutS + ΦD)
−1 = Φ−1D = −
(
αK
(n− 2)r + 1
)
In(n−1)×n(n−1)
which implies that all elements in (ΦˆoutS + ΦD)
−1 will be zero if K = 0. This is true when
r ∈ {− 1n−1 , 1}.14 This proves the proposition.
Proof of Corollary 3.2: First, reorder the rows/columns associate with the transaction
for all matrices as {12, 13, ..., 1n(1), 21, 23, ..., 2n(2), ...., nn(n)}, which can be illustrated as
below
12 · · · 1n(1) 21 · · · nnn
12
...
1n1
21
...
nnn−1
nnn

aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa
aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa
aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa
aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa
aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa
aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa
aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa aaa

Also, given σij = 0;∀i, j ∈ N , the correlation matrix of the asset flow or ΣL becomes
ΣL,(i1k1,i2k2) =
{
σ2i if i1 = i2
0 if otherwise
14Note that one can go further to obtain equilibrium characterization by substituting all matrices of the relevant
parameter value and verifying the second-order condition). One will obtain that qij = (n−2)r+1(n+1)((n−2)r+1)+r and
pij = dij − α ((n−1)r+1)
2
(n+1)((n−2)r+1)+r .
131
Also, by definition of W outb and W
in
b , all the elements where i1 = i2 are zero. Thus, the
quantity impact matrix Φ is simplified to
Φ =
1
α
(I − A¯)−1Σ−1D =
1
α
Σ−1D = ΦD
where the last equality is from ΦD = Φ ◦ I = Φ as the matrix Φ is a diagonal matrix.
To find the equilibrium price, recall from Proposition 3.4 that
Γ = I + α[Φˆout
′
B (Σˆ
in
LB + ΣDΣˆ
out
LB) + (Φˆ
out′
S + Φ
′
D)(Σˆ
out
LS + ΣD − ΣˆinLS)]
Θ = −α(ΣD(Φˆout′S + Φ′D)1ˆ− Φˆout
′
B z).
Since 1) Φ = ΦD and 2) the elements on the diagonal of W outB , W
in
S and W
out
S are zero, then
ΦˆoutB = Φ ◦W outB = 0
ΦˆoutS = Φ ◦W outS = 0
ΦˆinS = Φ ◦W inS = 0.
Therefore, we obtain that
Γ = I + αΦ′D(Σˆ
out
LS + ΣD − ΣˆinLS).
Since ΣˆinLS = ΣL ◦W inS = 0 and Φ′D = ΦD, substituting these two conditions gives
Γ = 2I + ΣoutLs and Θ = −1ˆ.
The last step is to plug in all the coefficient matrices into the equilibrium condition. From
Proposition 3.4, we obtain that
1
ασ2i
Ai(pi − di) = −1ˆ for i ∈ N
where
Ai =

3 1 · · ·
1
. . . 1
... 1 3

n(i)× n(i)
and pi − di =

...
pij − di
...

n(i)× 1
.
To solve for pi, by symmetry of pij = pik for j, k ∈ N(i), I obtain
pij = di − α σ
2
i
2 + n(i)
.
To find the equilibrium quantity, substituting p into the demand function q(P ) = Φ[d−P −αz]
gives
qij =
1
2 + n(i)
.
Also,
qii = 1−
∑
k∈N(i)
qik = 1− n(i)
2 + n(i)
=
2
2 + n(i)
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and
Ui = di −
∑
j∈N(i) qij(di − pij) +
∑
k∈N(i) qki(dk − pki)−
α
2
[
∑
k∈N¯(i)
∑
l∈N¯(i) σklqkiqli]
= di −
∑
j∈N(i) qij(di − pij) +
∑
k∈N(i) qki(dk − pki)−
α
2
[
∑
k∈N¯(i) σ
2
kq
2
ki]
= di − α σ
2
i
2 + n(i)
+
α
2
∑
j∈N(i)
(
σ2j
(2 + n(j))2
).
Note that the second-order condition is satisfied as all diagonal elements of Φ are positive. This
proves the corollary.
Proof of Remark 3.1: First, we find the equilibrium characterization of a star network
based on Proposition 3.4. Let n be the number of peripherals {1, 2, 3..., n} and denote the center
node (hub) h. Let the first n rows/columns associate with transaction outflows from the hub and
the last n rows/columns associate with transaction inflows to the hub. Then the link adjacency
matrices are as follows:
W outB =
[
[0]n×n In×n
[1]n×n [0]n×n
]
W inB =
[
[0]n×n [o]n×n
[0]n×n [1]−Dn×n
]
W outS =
[
[1]−Dn×n [0]n×n
[0]n×n [0]n×n
]
W inS =
[
[0]n×n [1]n×n
In×n [0]n×n
]
and the correlation of asset flow is
ΣL =
[
[1]n×n [r]n×n
[r]n×n I + [r]−Dn×n
]
and ΣD =
[
In×n [0]n×n
[0]n×n In×n
]
.
Therefore, we can obtain the quantity impact matrix Φ of a star network as follows.
Φ =
1
α

c d d re rf rf
d
. . . d rf
. . . rf
d d c rf rf re
g · · · g e f f
...
. . .
... f
. . . f
g · · · g f f e

where c = 1 − r2(nr+1)(r−1) , d = −r
2
(nr+1)(r−1) , e =
−(r(n−1)+1)
(nr+1)(r−1) , f =
r
(nr+1)(r−1) , g =
−r
(nr+1)(r−1) . Next step is to find all the expressions for the coefficients in the equilibrium
condition. Let [k]−D for k ∈ R be the matrix with all zeros at the diagonal and all k off the
133
diagonals. Given the quantity impact matrix Φ above, we can obtain
ΦˆoutB = Φ ◦W outB =
1
α
[
[0]n×n (re)In×n
[g]n×n [0]n×n
]
ΦˆoutS = Φ ◦W outB =
1
α
[
[d]−Dn×n [0]n×n
[0]n×n [0]n×n
]
ΣˆinLB = ΣL ◦W inB =
1
α
[
[0]n×n [0]n×n
[0]n×n [r]−Dn×n
]
ΣˆoutLB = ΣL ◦W outB =
1
α
[
[0]n×n rIn×n
[r]n×n [0]n×n
]
ΣˆinLS = ΣL ◦W inS =
1
α
[
[0]n×n [r]n×n
rIn×n [0]n×n
]
ΣˆoutLS = ΣL ◦W outS =
1
α
[
[1]−Dn×n [0]n×n
[0]n×n [0]n×n
]
ΣLD = ΣL ◦ I = 1
α
[
In×n [0]n×n
[0]n×n In×n
]
ΦD = Φ
′
D = Φ ◦ I =
1
α
[
cIn×n [0]n×n
[0]n×n eIn×n
]
where c = 1 − r2(nr+1)(r−1) , d = −r
2
(nr+1)(r−1) , e =
−(r(n−1)+1)
(nr+1)(r−1) , f =
r
(nr+1)(r−1) , g =
−r
(nr+1)(r−1) . Also, from Proposition 3.4, we can further obtain the expression for Γ and Θ as
follows. Let K = (nr + 1)(r − 1), To find Γ, substituting all relevant variables found above
gives
Γ =
[
In×n + [1]n×n [0]n×n
[0]n×n (1 +B)In×n
]
where B =
(r(n− 1) + 1)(r2 − 1)
K
Similarly, we can obtain
Θ = −
[
nr2−(n−1)r−1
K
(r(n−1)+1)(r2−1)
K
]
= −
[
[1]n×1
[B]n×1
]
.
The last step is to plug in all the expressions into the equilibrium condition in Proposition 3.4
and impose symmetric conditions. We can obtain the following expression for the equilibrium
asset price and allocation.
[
ph−d
α
pp−d
α
]
=
[
−r − (r−1)(nr−r+1)(−n2r2+nr2−4nr+r2+2r−3)X
−1− (r−1)(n3(3r3+2r2)−6n2r3+7n2r2+4n2r+2nr3−10nr2+8nr+2n+r2−5r+4)X
]
[
qh
qp
]
=
[
(nr+1)((n−1)r+1)((2n−3)r+3)
X
((n−1)r+1)(n2(r2+r)−n(r2−2r)+n−r2−r+2)
X
]
whereX = n3(r3+5r2)+n2(−5r3+5r2+7r)+n(r3−12r2+10r+3)+r2+r3+n4r3−8r+6.
Note that the second-order condition is also satisfied. To see this, first consider the second-order
condition for trading strategy of the peripherals.
∂2up
∂p2ph
= 2
∂qph
∂pph
− α[∂qph
∂pph
2
+
∂qhp
∂pph
2
− 2r ∂qph
∂pph
∂qhp
∂pph
] (3.8.4.1)
Also, recall that
Φ =
1
α

c d d re rf rf
d
. . . d rf
. . . rf
d d c rf rf re
g · · · g e f f
...
. . .
... f
. . . f
g · · · g f f e

134
where c = 1 − r2(nr+1)(r−1) , d = −r
2
(nr+1)(r−1) , e =
−(r(n−1)+1)
(nr+1)(r−1) , f =
r
(nr+1)(r−1) , g =
−r
(nr+1)(r−1) . Given the expression of Φ , we obtain
∂qph
∂pph
= − e
α
and
∂qhp
∂pph
= −re
α
.
Substituting into Equation 3.8.4.1 gives
∂2up
∂p2ph
= −2 e
α
− e
2
α
+
r2e2
α
=
−2e− (1− r2)e2
α
.
Since e = r(n−1)+1(nr+1)(1−r) > 0 as r ∈ (−1n , 1), then ∂
2up
∂p2ph
< 0 which satisfies the maximization
problem.
To check the second-order condition for the hub, recall that the second-order condition for
the first stage is satisfied if H(ui)(pi) is positive definite from Lemma 3.3.
For the first term Φout,outi + Φ
out,out′
i , recall that
Φout,outi =

c d d
d
. . . d
d d c

where c = 1 − r2(nr+1)(r−1) = 1 + d, d = −r
2
(nr+1)(r−1) . To check that Φ
out,out
i is positive
definite, first define
K =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 + d d d
d
. . . d
d d 1 + d
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
k×k
, ∀k ≤ n(g)
which implies that
K = (1 + d)k(1− d
1 + d
)(k−1)(1 +
d
1 + d
(k − 1)).
Since d = −r
2
(nr+1)(r−1) ≥ 0 as r ∈ (−1n , 1), then K > 0, ∀k ≤ n(g). Therefore, Φout,outi is
positive definite and thus Φout,outi + Φ
out,out′
i is positive definite.
Consider the leftover term in H(ui)(pi). Since Φ
out,out′
i Σ
out,in
L,i Φ
in,out
i is symmetric, it is
sufficient to prove that
Φin,out
′
i Σ
in,in
L,i Φ
in,out
i − 2Φout,out
′
i Σ
out,in
L,i Φ
in,out + +σ2i Φ
out,out′
i Φ
out,out
i
is positive definite. Given the expression of quantity impact matrix Φ we found earlier, one can
obtain
Φin,outi = [g]n×n, Φ
out,out
i = cIn×n + [d]
−D
n×n, Σ
in,in
L,i = In×n + [r]
−D
n×n, Σ
out,in
L,i = [r]n×n.
Therefore, we obtain that
Φin,out
′
i Σ
in,in
L,i Φ
in,out
i − 2Φout,out
′
i Σ
out,in
L,i Φ
in,out + σ2i Φ
out,out′
i Φ
out,out
i
= (1 + 2d+ nd2 +N)In×n + (2d+ nd2 +N)[1]−Dn×n
135
where N = n(g2(1 + (n− 1)r)− 2gr(c+ d(n− 1))). To see that this term is positive definite,
define
L =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 +A A A
A
. . . A
A A 1 +A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
l×l
where A = 2d+ nd2 + n(g2(1 + (n− 1)r)− 2gr(c+ d(n− 1))). Therefore, we just need to
prove that A is positive definite. Since we know that
L = (1 +A)l(1− A
1 +A
)(l−1)(1 +
A
1 +A
(l − 1))
Substituting all the relevant parameter values into A gives
A =
nr4
(nr + 1)2(r − 1)2 −
2r2
(nr + 1)(r − 1) −
nr2(r(n− 1) + 1)
3(nr + 1)(r − 1) ≥ 0.
The last inequality is from the assumption that r ∈ (−1n , 1). Therefore, the second-order
condition of the hub is satisfied. Up to this point, we can obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4 (Equilibrium characterization of star trading network) Let i be the agent at
the central (hub) and j be at the periphery. If Assumption 3.3 is satisfied and the network is the
star network, then [
qij
qji
]
=
[
(nr+1)((n−1)r+1)((2n−3)r+3)
X
((n−1)r+1)(n2(r2+r)−n(r2−2r−1)−r2−r+2)
X
]
whereX = n4r3+n3(r3+5r2)+n2(−5r3+5r2+7r)+n(r3−12r2+10r+3)+r2+r3−8r+6.
To prove the first statement in the remark, first note that X > 0. To see this, consider
∂X
∂r
= r2[3n4 + 3n3 − 15n2 + 3n+ 3] + r[10n3 + 10n2 − 24n+ 2] + 7n2 + 10n− 8.
Since [3n4 + 3n3 − 15n2 + 3n+ 3] > 0 and [10n3 + 10n2 − 24n+ 2] > 0 when n ≥ 2,
then infr∈(− 1
n
,1)[
∂X
∂r ] = 3n+ 1 +
1
n +
3
n2
> 0. Therefore, minrX = X(r = − 1n) which is
X(r = − 1
n
) = −n− 1 + 5n+ 5
n
+ 5− 7n+− 1
n2
− 12
n
− 10 + 3n+ ( 1
n
)2 − ( 1
n
)3 +
8
n
+ 6
=
1
n
− 1
n3
> 0.
Therefore, X > 0. Consider the condition qii ≥ qjj , this is true if and only if qji ≥ nqij .
Substituting qji and qij into the inequality condition and simplifying the terms give r2(2n2 −
2n− 1) + r(4n− 1) + 2 ≤ 0, which will be satisfied if
r ∈ (−(4n− 1)−
√
8n+ 9
2(2n2 − 2n− 1) ,
−(4n− 1) +√8n+ 9
2(2n2 − 2n− 1) ).
It is easy to check that −(4n−1)+
√
8n+9
2(2n2−2n−1) ≤ 0 as (4n−1)2 ≥ 8n+9 if and only if 2n2−2n−1 ≥ 0
By assumption that r ∈ (− 1n , 1), there exists the range of correlation such that qii ≤ qjj if
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− 1n ≤ −(4n−1)+
√
8n+9
2(2n2−2n−1) , which is always satisfied when n ≥ 2. Also, −(4n−1)−
√
8n+9
2(2n2−2n−1) < − 1n
is always satisfied, since rearranging the condition gives n ≥ − 1
3+
√
8n+9
which always holds.
Therefore, qii ≥ qjj iff
r ∈ (− 1
n
, 1) ∩ (−(4n− 1)−
√
8n+ 9
2(2n2 − 2n− 1) ,
−(4n− 1) +√8n+ 9
2(2n2 − 2n− 1) )
which is
r ∈ (− 1
n
,
−(4n− 1) +√8n+ 9
2(2n2 − 2n− 1) ).
This proves the first statement in the remark.
To prove the second statement in the remark, suppose that qji ≥ qij . Substituting qji and qij
and simplifying the terms gives
((n− 1)r + 1)(r − 1) ≤ 0
which is always true as r ∈ (− 1n , 1). This proves the statement.
To prove the last statement in the remark, substituting r ∈ {− 1n , 1} into the characterization
in Lemma 3.4 immediately proves the statement. This proves the statement and the remark.
Proof of Remark 3.2: Let n′ = n+ 1. To prove the first statement in the remark, consider
the equilibrium outcome when r → − 1n′ . By Corollary 3.4, one can obtain limr→− 1
n′
qji = 1.
Also, substituting r = − 1n′ into the analytical solution for qji(n) gives
qji(n, r = − 1
n′
) =
2
3
− 4n+
16
3
6n2 + 15n+ 14
< 1.
By continuity of qji in r, there exists r < 0 such that qji(n′) > qji(n). Since qjj(n′) < qjj(n)
if and only if qji(n′) > qji(n), this proves the statement.
To prove the second statement in the remark, consider the equilibrium outcome when
r → − 1n′ . By Corollary 3.4, one can obtain n′qij(n′, r → − 1n′ ) = 0. Substituting r = − 1n′
into the analytical solution for qij(n) gives
nqij(n, r = − 1
n′
) =
2n(n+ 6)
6n2 + 15n+ 14
> 0.
By continuity of qij in r, there exists r < 0 such that nqij(n) > n′qij(n′). Since qii(n′) > qii(n)
if and only if nqij(n) > n′qij(n′), this proves the second statement in the remark.
To prove condition 3, note that the utility of the periphery agent j is
uj = dj − (pij − di)qij + (pji − dj)qji − α
2
(q2ij + (1− qji)2 + 2rqij(1− qji)).
By Corollary 3.4, one can obtain
lim
r→− 1
n′
uj(n
′) = dj + α
[
11
5(n+ 1)
− 86
n
5 +
124
5
6n2 + 15n+ 14
]
.
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Also, we obtain
lim
r→− 1
n′
uj(n) = dj − α
[
24n4 + 314n
3
3 +
376n2
3 +
88n
9 − 5129
(n+ 1)(6n2 + 15n+ 14)2
+
1
18
]
.
Therefore, I obtain
lim
r→− 1
n′
(uj(n
′)− uj(n)) = 1
18
−
[
28n3
3 +
89n2
3 +
236n
9 − 2449
(n+ 1)(6n2 + 15n+ 14)2
]
which is always greater than 0. To see this, suppose that it is not, then
(n+ 1)(6n2 + 15n+ 14)2 ≤ 18
[
28n3
3
+
89n2
3
+
236n
9
− 244
9
]
which gives
36n5 + 216n4 + 405n3 + 279n2 + 144n+ 684 ≤ 0
which is impossible. By continuity of uj in r, there exists r < 0 such that uj(n′) > uj(n). This
proves the last statement in the remark.
Proof of Remark 3.4: First, we find the equilibrium outcome for the core-periphery
network when there are two agents at the core and two agents at the periphery. Let agent
1 and 2 be the cores, agent 3 and 4 be the peripherals connecting to 1, and agent 5 and 6
be the peripherals connecting to 2. Let the row and column of all matrices are ordered as
{12, 13, 14, 21, 25, 26, 31, 41, 52, 62}.
First, we find the expression for Φ. Since this is the symmetric network, I can only consider
the elements in column 12, 13, and 31, as the elements in other columns can be found by
symmetric properties. Let K1 = −2r2 + 3r + 1, K2 = −2r2 + 2r + 1, K3 = (r − 1)K1, and
M = (2r + 1)K3. From Proposition 3.4, one can obtain the elements of column 12,13,31 in Φ
as follows:
Φ(:, 12)′ =
1
α
[
( r+0.5K1 − 12(r−1)) −r
2
K3
−r2
K3
−r
K3
r2
K3
r2
K3
−r
K3
−r
K3
r
K3
r
K3
]
Φ(:, 13)′ =
1
α
[
− r2M −−(2r
4−6r3+4r+1)
M − r
2K2
M − rK2M − r
3
M − r
3
M − rK2M − rK2M − r
2
M − r
2
M
]
Φ(:, 31)′ =
1
α
[
r2
M −r (−2r
3+2r2+4r+1)
M
r2K2
M
rK2
M
r2
M
r2
M − (−2r
3+2r2+4r+1)
M
rK2
M
r2
M
r2
M
]
Using this matrix Φ, one can obtain other coefficient matrices in Proposition 3.4 as follows.
Γ =

A 0 0 0 0 0
0 A 0 0 0 0
0 0 a4 0 0 0
0 0 0 a4 0 0
0 0 0 0 a4 0
0 0 0 0 0 a4

where A =
a1 a1 a1a2 a3 a1
a2 a2 a3
 ,

a1 =
3r+1
K1
+ 1
a2 =
(3r+1)K2
(2r+1)K1
a3 = 2.5− (2r
2+2.5r+0.5)
(2r+1)K1
a4 =
2(−r4−2r3+5r2+5r+1)
(2r+1)K1
Θ =
[
−3r + 1
K1
− (3r + 1)K2
(2r + 1)K1
− (3r + 1)K2
(2r + 1)K1
− 3r + 1
K1
− (3r + 1)K2
(2r + 1)K1
− (3r + 1)K2
(2r + 1)K1
· · · − (r + 1)(−2r
3 + 2r2 + 4r + 1)
(2r + 1)K1
· · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
×4
]
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Let pcc, pcp, ppc(qcc, qcp, qpc) denote the price(quantity) of transaction between the cores,
that from the cores to the peripherals, and that from the peripherals to the cores, respectively.
Substituting all the relevant parameters into Proposition 3.4 and imposing symmetric condition,
one can obtain the equilibrium outcome as follows.pcc − dcpcp − dc
ppc − dp
 = −α

184r8+142r7−866r6−822r5+475r4+874r3+411r2+82r+6
216r7+78r6−1012r5−614r4+717r3+803r2+268r+30
168r8+98r7−768r6−656r5+441r4+758r3+363r2+76r+6
216r7+78r6−1012r5−614r4+717r3+803r2+268r+30
152r8+150r7−694r6−794r5+293r4+804r3+455r2+110r+10
216r7+78r6−1012r5−614r4+717r3+803r2+268r+30

and qccqcp
qpc
 =

− −400r8+52r7+1898r6+312r5−1700r4−871r3+85r2+120r+18
2(−216r8+138r7+1090r6−398r5−1331r4−86r3+535r2+238r+30)
− −320r8−40r7+1570r6+460r5−1428r4−879r3+25r2+108r+18
2(−216r8+138r7+1090r6−398r5−1331r4−86r3+535r2+238r+30)
−336r8+36r7+1554r6+256r5−1336r4−731r3−3r2+64r+10
2(r−1)(216r7+78r6−1012r5−614r4+717r3+803r2+268r+30)

The last step is to check whether the second-order condition in the first stage is satisfied.
Consider the second-order condition for the peripheral agent:
∂2up
∂p2pc
= 2
∂qpc
∂ppc
− α[∂qpc
∂ppc
2
+
∂qcp
∂ppc
2
− 2r ∂qpc
∂ppc
∂qcp
∂ppc
]
Substituting the first-order derivative value using the Φ matrix as previously found, I obtain the
following equation:
∂2up
∂p2pc
=
(−2r3 + 2r2 + 4r + 1)(2r4 − 8r3 + 2r2 + 5r + 1)
α(2r + 1)2(r − 1)(−2r2 + 3r + 1)2
which is always negative as −2r3 + 2r2 + 4r+ 1 > 0 and 2r4− 8r3 + 2r2 + 5r+ 1 > 0 when
r ∈ (−15 , 1). To check the second-order condition for the cores, we must prove that H(ui)(pi)
from Lemma 3.3 must be positive definite. Since
Φout,outi =

r+0.5
K1
− 12(r−1) − r
2
M − r
2
M
− r2K3 −2r
4−6r3+4r+1
M − r
2K2
M
− r2K3 − r
2
M −2r
4−6r3+4r+1
M
 Σin,inL,i =
1 r rr 1 r
r r 1

Φin,outi =
−
r
K3
− rK2M − rK2M
− rK3 − rK2M − rK2M
− rK3 − rK2M − rK2M
 Σout,inL,i =
r r rr r r
r r r
 .
Substituting into the Hessian matrix H and checking all the principal minors, one can find that
H is positive definite if r ∈ (−15 , 0.6813). Therefore, the equilibrium outcome ispcc − dcpcp − dc
ppc − dp
 = −α

184r8+142r7−866r6−822r5+475r4+874r3+411r2+82r+6
216r7+78r6−1012r5−614r4+717r3+803r2+268r+30
168r8+98r7−768r6−656r5+441r4+758r3+363r2+76r+6
216r7+78r6−1012r5−614r4+717r3+803r2+268r+30
152r8+150r7−694r6−794r5+293r4+804r3+455r2+110r+10
216r7+78r6−1012r5−614r4+717r3+803r2+268r+30

and qccqcp
qpc
 =

− −400r8+52r7+1898r6+312r5−1700r4−871r3+85r2+120r+18
2(−216r8+138r7+1090r6−398r5−1331r4−86r3+535r2+238r+30)
− −320r8−40r7+1570r6+460r5−1428r4−879r3+25r2+108r+18
2(−216r8+138r7+1090r6−398r5−1331r4−86r3+535r2+238r+30)
−336r8+36r7+1554r6+256r5−1336r4−731r3−3r2+64r+10
2(r−1)(216r7+78r6−1012r5−614r4+717r3+803r2+268r+30)

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if r ∈ (−15 , 0.6813).
To prove the first statement in the remark, using the equilibrium asset quantity above, one
can obtain ∂qcc∂r (r = 0.5) = 2.1025. By continuity, ∃k ∈ R+ such that ∂qcc∂r (r = k) > 0. This
proves the statement.
To prove the second statement in the remark, using the equilibrium condition above, I obtain
qcp − qpc = 2(r − 1)
A︷ ︸︸ ︷
(4r6 − 11r5 − 22r4 + 18r3 + 35r2 + 15r + 2)
216r7 + 78r6 − 1012r5 − 614r4 + 717r3 + 803r2 + 268r + 30︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(pcp−dc)−(ppc−dp) = −2α(2r + 1)(r − 1)
A︷ ︸︸ ︷
(4r6 − 11r5 − 22r4 + 18r3 + 35r2 + 15r + 2)
216r7 + 78r6 − 1012r5 − 614r4 + 717r3 + 803r2 + 268r + 30︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
To see that A > 0 and B > 0 when r ∈ (−15 , 1), set A = 0 and B = 0 and solve for r yields
1. if r ∈ {−1.3146,−0.5449, 1.5846, 3.7135, 0.0096i−0.3442,−0.0096i−0.3442}, then
A = 0.
2. if r ∈ {−1.8088,−0.5887,−0.4562,−0.3983,−0.3013, 1.1899, 2.0023}, then B = 0.
Since A > 0 and B > 0 when r = 0, then A > 0 and B > 0 when r ∈ (−15 , 1) by continuity.
Therefore, qcp < qpc and pcp − dc > ppc − dp. This proves the statement.
To prove the last statement, using the equilibrium condition previously found, I obtain
pcp − pcc = −2rα(2r + 1)(r
2 − 1)
C︷ ︸︸ ︷
(−4r4 − 9r3 + 25r2 + 18r + 3)
(216r7 + 78r6 − 1012r5 − 614r4 + 717r3 + 803r2 + 268r + 30)
qcp − qcc = 2r
D︷ ︸︸ ︷
(20r6 − 3r5 − 85r4 − 48r3 + 20r2 + 18r + 3)
(216r7 + 78r6 − 1012r5 − 614r4 + 717r3 + 803r2 + 268r + 30)
Note that C > 0 when −15 < r < 0 since −4r4 − 9r3 > 0 and 25r2 + 18r + 3 > 0. To
see that D > 0, setting D = 0 and solving for r give
r ∈ {−1.4831,−0.5776,−0.3896,−0.3211, 0.6041, 2.3172}
Since D > 0 when r = 0. By continuity, D > 0 if r ∈ (−15 , 0). Therefore, pcp < pcc and
qcp < qcc when r is negative. This proves the statement and the remark.
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